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Two Current Questions Concerning
Implied Private Rights of Action Under
the Exchange Act: Authority of the
Administrative Agency to Negate;
Existence for Violation of Self-
Regulatory Requirements
Morgan Shipman*
Because of recent court decisions and amendments to the Exchange
Act, the question of implied private rights of action has become increas-
ingly important. Professor Morgan Shipman presents an in depth dis-
cussion of two current implied rights problems. In part one, he addresses
himself to the power of administrative agencies to negate implied private
rights of actions by means of agency rules. Concerned over what such
a power could do, he states that there appears to be no good reason why
courts should manufacture for agencies a power to command the courts
to relinquish their traditional independent jurisdiction over implied
rights. In part two, the author discusses the implication by the courts of
private rights of action under the Exchange Act for injuries arising out of
violations of requirements of national securities exchanges and associa-
tions. He concludes that implication for violations of moderately specific
requirements that are direct substitutes for SEC regulation would be bene-
ficial in protecting the investor and in promoting reliance upon the self-
regulators.
'THIS ARTICLE discusses two current questions relating to a-
plied private rights of action under the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 (Exchange Act) 1 The first question concerns the
authority of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or Com-
mission), the Comptroller of
the Currency, and the otherTEAUTHOR (B.B.A., LL.B., Umver-
sity of Texas) is an Assistant Professor two agencies admimstering por-
of Law at Harvard Umversity and is a tions of the Exchange Act. Is
member of the Texas and District of an agency authorized to insert
Columbia Bars. in one of its own rules nple-
menting the act a provision
negating an implied private right of action for a violation of the
rule and the acte that would accrue but for the negation stipulation?
* The Author served as Special Counsel in the Office of Policy Research of the Se-
curites and Exchange Commission and at the present time has the status of a consultant
with the Commission. The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not
necessarily reflect the views of the Commission or its staff.
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This question can also arise in the administration of the other fed-
eral securities statutes under which private rights have been or may
be implied, and the discussion in this article, although limited to the
act, has some relevance concerning the negation authority under the
other statutes.'
The second question comes in two parts, the last part being
closely related to the first question: (a) Should the courts imply
a private right of action under the Exchange Act for injuries caused
by violations of the rules and requirements of registered national
securities exchanges, such as the New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE), and of the National Association of Securities Dealers,
Inc. (NASD), the self-regulatory organization for over-the-counter
broker-dealers in securities; and (b) Do the self-regulatory or-
ganizations, the Commission, or both have the rule-making auth-
ority to negate any such rights the courts might imply? This second
question is limited to the act because the other federal securities
statutes4 do not affect the self-regulatory organizations so directly.5
PART I
AUTHORITY OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE
AGENCY TO NEGATE
I. THE QUESTION AS POSED BY THREE RECENT
DEVELOPMENTS
The question is best posed by a summary of three events hap-
pening during the summer of 1964: the Supreme Court's decision
148 Star. 881 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. 5§ 78a to hh (1964) [hereinafter
cited as Exchange Act].
2 Concerning recent activity on the antitrust front, see e.g., Kaplan v. Lehman Bros.,
TRADE REG. REP. (1966 Trade Cas.) 5 71697 (N.D. IMI. Feb. 25, 1966) (complaint
alleged antitrust laws prevent exchanges from fixing minimum commission rates, making
the fixing illegal per se; court held Exchange Act obliquely gives exchanges power to
fix rates and establishes procedure for review by the SEC, obviating need for application
of antitrust laws); Jennings, The New York Stock Exchange and the Commission Rate
Struggle, 53 CALIF. L. REv. 1119 (Dec. 1965).
3See, e.g., Levitt v. Johnson, 334 F.2d 815 (1st Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S.
961 (1965); 3 Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1757-63, 1797-1805 (2d ed. 1961);
Eisenberg & Phillips, Mutual Fund Litigation - New Frontiers for the Investment
Company Act, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 73 (1962); Note, Mutual Funds and the Investment
Advisory Contract, 50 VA. L REv. 141 (1964).
4 The functions of the statutes are summarized in 1 Loss, op. cit. supra note 3, at
129-55. The 1964 amendment to the Securities Act of 1933 § 4, 48 Star. 77, as amended,
15 U.S.C. § 77d (1964) [hereinafter cited as Securities Act] is described in Phillips &
Shipman, An Analysis of the Securities Acts Amendments of 1964, 1964 DUKE L.J.
706, 795-97.
5 Under the Investment Company Act of 1940, the National Association of Securities
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in J. L Case Co. v. Borak;8 the 1964 amendments to the Exchange
Act;7 and the regulations issued on August 21, 1964, by the Comp-
troller of the Currency.8
A. J. I. Case Co. v. Borak
On June 8, 1964, the Supreme Court handed down its unani-
mous decision in the case of J. L Case Co. v. Borak.' Borak was the
first Supreme Court case considering implied private rights of action
for violations of any of the federal securities statutes; and until the
recent decision in Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp.," in which the
Court in dictum appeared to endorse implied rights under the Ex-
change Act and the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act), Borak
was the only such case passed upon by the Court. In Borak, the
Court held that the Exchange Act impliedly authorizes a federal
cause of action to be brought under section 27" for rescission or
damages by a stockholder of a corporation which has participated
in a consummated merger authorized pursuant to the use of a proxy
statement alleged to contain false and misleading statements viola-
tive of section 14 (a) of the Exchange Act' 2 and the proxy rules of
the SEC.
The Court in Borak decided that the action could be asserted
derivatively,'" that the federal court would have the power "to grant
all necessary remedial relief,""' and that the overriding federal law
rather than state law would, where the facts required, control the
Dealers, Inc. has extensive responsibilities with respect to the pricing of mutual fund
shares. Investment Company Act of 1940 § 22, 54 Star. 823 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-
22 (1964).
6377 U.S. 426 (1964).
778 Star. 565 (1964).
8 29 Fed. Reg. 12300-05 (1964). See also note 30 infra.
9377 U.S. 426 (1964).
10 383 U.S. 363 (1966).
"1Exchange Act 5 27, 48 Star. 902-03 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa
(1964).
12 Exchange Act 5 14(a), 48 Star. 895, as amended, 15 U.S.C.5 78n(a) (1964).
13j. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 430-31 (1964) overruling Howard v.
Furst, 328 F.2d 790 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 937 (1957), although the
Court's opinion in Borak did not mention Howard. See Posner, Developments in Fed-
eral Securities Regulation, 20 Bus. LAW. 595, 612-13 (1965). Questions of fairness
to innocent third parties remain pertinent.
14 J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, supra note 13, overruling Dann v. Studebaker-Packard
Corp., 288 F.2d 201 (6th Cir. 1961). Dant held that relief under federal law with
respect to a completed transaction would be limited to a declaration of invalidity of the
proxies and that any further relief would have to be granted under state law.
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appropriateness of the redress.15 The Court was careful to point
out that only allegations were before it and that questions of proof,
causation, and remedy must await trial. In dictum, the Court in-
dicated that state security-for-expenses statutes would not be ap-
plicable.1"
In reaching its conclusions, the Court said:
Private enforcement of the proxy rules provides a necessary
supplement to Commission action. As in antitrust treble damage
litigation, the possibility of civil damages or injunctive relief serves
as a most effective weapon in the enforcement of the proxy re-
quirements.17
B. 1964 Amendments
On August 20, 1964, President Johnson signed the Securities
Acts Amendments of 1964 (1964 amendments),"1 the most im-
portant advance in federal securities legislation since 1940, when
the Investment Company Act1 ' and the Investment Advisers Act 0
were passed. The two principal effects of the 1964 amendments
were to strengthen the regulation of securities broker-dealers and
to extend to the security holders of some 4,000 larger over-the-
counter companies the registration, periodic reporting, proxy solid-
tation, and insider trading protections of sections 12, 13, 14, and
16 of the Exchange Act.2 Generally speaking, these protections
had previously been available only in listed companies. The 1964
amendments vested the jurisdiction to "administer and enforce"
these provisions with respect to listed and over-the-counter banks
with deposits insured under the Federal Deposit Insurance Act 2
15 See note 14 suara.
16 The court below held, following other decisions under the Act and other federal
statutes, that such a state statute would not be applicable to implied private rights un-
der the Act. See Borak v. J. . Case Co., 317 F.2d 838, 849 (7th Cir. 1963), aff'd,
377 U.S. 426 (1964). That question was not raised in the petition for certiorari.
17 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964).
Is 78 Stat. 565 (1964). For a discussion, see Phillips & Shipman, supra note 4;
Comment, The Securities Acts Amendments of 1964: Selected Provisions and Legisla-
tive Deficiencies, 53 CALIF. L. REv. 1494 (1965).
1954 Stat. 789 (1940), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -52 (1964).
20 54 Stat. 847 (1940), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §5 80b-1 to -21 (1964).
21 Exchange Act § 12, 48 Stat. 892 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. S 781 (1964).
Exchange Act § 13, 48 Stat. 894 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78m (1964); Ex-
change Act § 14, 48 Stat. 895 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. S 78n (1964); Exchange
Act § 16, 48 Stat. 896 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78p (1964).
2248 Star. 168 (1933), as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 1811-31 (1964).
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in the three federal bank regulatory agencies: (1) national and
District of Columbia banks - the Comptroller of the Currency;
(2) other member banks of the Federal Reserve System - the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (FRB); and
(3) all other insured banks - the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC) *2
The vesting of jurisdiction in the bank regulatory agencies was
a compromise adopted, without Commission opposition, to resolve
the controversy concerning the coverage of banks in the biL2 The
banking agencies - with respect to the banks under their juris-
diction and the sections of the Exchange Act which they "administer
and enforce" - have all the administrative, rule-making, and en-
forcement powers contained in any section of the Exchange Act 5
The 1964 amendments specify that the rules, regulations, and
forms of the Commission are not binding upon the banking agencies
in the execution of their functions.26 The Comptroller opposed the
inclusion of banks, and especially banks under his jurisdiction, with-
in the 1964 amendments. He argued that the inherent powers of
his office and the FRB and the FDIC were sufficient and that any
explicit legislative authority considered necessary should be added
by amendments to the various banking acts.
C. Comptroller's Regulations
On August 21, 1964, the Comptroller of the Currency issued,
under the general authority of the National Bank Act28 and under
(and in implementation of) the portion of the Exchange Act ad-
ministered by him," regulations applicable to national banks gov-
erning registration, periodic reporting, proxy solicitation, and in-
sider trading - the four areas transferred to him by the 1964
amendments.3 The regulations were revisions of previous regula-
23 See Phillips & Shipman, supra note 4, at 735-43; Comment, supra note 18.
24 See Phillips & Shipman, supra note 4, at 736.
25 Id. at 736-41.
2 6 See § 12(i) of the Act, added by the 1964 amendments, 78 Stat. 569, 15 U.S.C.
§ 781(i) (1964); Phillips & Shipman, supra note 4, at 735-43.
27 See Phillips & Shipman, supra note 4, at 736 n.101.
2 8National Bank Act, 13 Star. 99 (1864) (codified in scattered sections of 12
U.S.C.).
29 See Phillips & Shipman, supra note 4, at 735-43; Comment, supra note 18.
8029 Fed. Reg. 7676-78, 12300-05 (1964); Phillips & Shipman, supra note 4, at
742-43; Comment, note 18 supra. Although the only source of authority formally cited
is the National Bank Act, the releases note that the revised rules also implement the
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tions3" adopted under the general authority of the National Bank
Act and carried forward sections stating that "enforcement... shall
be the function solely of the [Comptroller] . . ." and that "no
provision [of the implementing regulations] is intended to confer
any private right of action on any stockholder or other person
against a national bank." 2 No reason for the adoption of the nega-
tion provisions was announced at either date." The regulations of
the Commission, the FRB, and the FDIC do not contain similar
declarations, outside of limited provisions discussed below.
The negation regulations - which have no explicit statutory
authorization - purport, for example, to command a federal court,
in a private action involving a solicitation by a national bank al-
legedly violating section 14(a) of the Exchange Act as imple-
mented by the Comptroller's proxy rules, to disregard the Supreme
Court's decision in Borak and to pay no heed to the alleged viola-
tion. The regulations also attempt to negate implied rights under
the general National Bank Act 4 foundation for the various sub-
stantive requirements imposed by the Comptroller's rules.3 5
II. A BRIEF SUMMARY OF IMPLIED RIGHTS
The Comptroller has attempted to override the twenty-five years
of experience of the federal courts in dealing with, shaping, and
placing limits upon implied private rights, " which exist in addition
to the limited express private rights under sections 9(e), 16(b),
Act. See also 12 C.F.R. § 10.1 (Supp. 1965), concerning registration under § 12 of
the Act; 30 Fed. Reg. 6160 (1965); CCH FED. BANKING L. REP. 5 94362 (item 11).
Miscellaneous amendments were made in 31 Fed. Reg. 6949-57 (May 12, 1966).
The regulations, as revised, are stated to be under the authority of both the National
Bank Act and the Exchange Act.
81 See 27 Fed. Reg. 12811 (1962).
32 12 C.F.R. § 10.2, 16.11 (Supp. 1965), as amended, 31 Fed. Reg. 6949-57 (May
12, 1966).
33 See materials cited notes 30-32 supra.
34 National Bank Act, 13 Stat. 99 (1864) (codified in scattered sections of 12
U.S.C.).
36 This article will not discuss the attempted restriction. Neither will it discuss the
express or implied private rights for violations of requirements, similar to those under
5§ 12, 13, 14, and 16 of the Exchange Act, imposed by state legislatures and insurance
commissioners with respect to stock insurance companies, partially as a result of the
1964 amendments. See Phillips & Shipman, supra note 4, at 747-54; Comment supra
note 18, at 1499-1505.
Advice by the Comptroller concerning the r'ghts of a snarehc.lder to obtain a share-
holders list pursuant to the National Bank Act was disregarded in In Re Northeast
Bancshares, Inc., 34 U.S.L. WEEK 2538 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 23, 1966).
36 The first implied rights case apparently was Geismar v. Bond & Goodwin, Inc.,
40 F. Supp. 876 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
[Vol. 17: 925
IMPLIED PRIVATE RIGHTS
and 18 of the Exchange Act."7 Section 9 (e) authorizes the recov-
ery of damages by certain persons harmed by specified manipulative
activities in listed securities. Section 16(b) allows a suit by or on
behalf of listed companies and over-the-counter companies regis-
tered under section 12 (g) of the act, added by the 1964 amend-
ments, against an insider (officer, director, or ten per cent share-
holder) for recovery of certain types of short-swing profits in the
trading of the company's equity securities. Section 18 relates to
persons making false or misleading statements in applications, re-
ports, or documents filed pursuant to the act. The section creates
a right of action against those persons in favor of purchasers or
sellers who deal in a security at a price affected by the statement,
rely upon the statement, and thereby suffer damage. Section 18
excuses from liability a defendant showing that he acted in good
faith and without knowledge that the statement was false or mis-
leading.
The federal courts - rejecting expressio unius arguments based
on the presence of sections 9(e), 16(b), and 1838 - have also
implied private rights of action in favor of investors and other
parties injured by violations of several provisions of the Exchange
Act and agency rules thereunder. Private actions for violations of
3 7 Exchange Act § 9(e), 48 Stat. 890 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e) (1964) is dis-
cussed in 3 Loss, op. cit. supra note 3, at 1746-51.
For discussions of Exchange Act § 16(b), 48 Stat. 896 (1934), as amended, 15
U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1964), see, e.g., Painter, Section 16(d) of the Securities Exchange
Act: Legislative Compromise or Loophole?, 113 U. PA. L. Rnv. 358 (1965); materials
cited in Phillips & Shipman, supra note 4, at 721-23, 746-47, 769-75.
The most important recent cases under § 16(b) have been Heli-Coil Corp. v. Web-
ster, CCH .ED. SEC. L. REP. 5 91578 (3d Cir. 1965) (conversion); Booth v. Varian
Associates, 334 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 961 (1965) (determina-
tion of date of purchase); Petteys v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
5 91582 (D. Minn. 1965) (conversion); Max Factor & Co. v. Blau, CCH FED. SEC. L.
REP. 5 91359 (S.D. Cal. 1964), aff'd, 342 F.2d 304 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
892 (1965) (conversion); Kornfeld v. Eaton, 217 F. Supp. 671 (S.D.N.Y. 1963),
aff'd, 327 F.2d 263 (2d Cit. 1964) (upholding a Commission exemptive rule). A
significant trend has been a seemingly greater willingness to look to subjective factors
in borderline areas. See note 116 infra. For important recent exemptive rules, see SEC
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7826, Feb. 17, 1966, discussed infra note 111.
Exchange Act § 18, 48 Star. 897, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78r (1964), is discussed
in 3 LosS, op. cit. supra note 3, at 1751-54.
38 See, e.g., J. I. Case" Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964); Baird v. Franklin, 141
F.2d 238 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 737 (1944); Kardon v. National Gypsum
Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946) (motion to dismiss), 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa.,
(on the merits), modified, 83 F. Supp. 613 (E.D. Pa. 1947) (on request for additional
findings); see text accompanying note 73 infra.
The question whether a degree of scienter is required in private Rule 10b-5 actions
(see note 52 infra and accompanying text; 3 Loss, op. cit. supra note 3, at 1766-71)
to some extent grows out of the relationship of Rule 10b-5 actions by purchasers to ac-
tions under the Securities Act. SEC Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1964).
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section 14 (a) " and the proxy rules (where injunctive actions have
also been frequent)4" and section 10(b) 4 (still administered by
the Commission with respect to all bank and other securities)' and
Rule 10b-54' have been the most numerous. Rule 10b-5, of course,
prohibits - in connection with any purchase or sale of any security
by any person in which the mails or facilities of interstate commerce
are used - schemes to defraud, statements which are false or mis-
leading or half-truths, and acts, practices, and courses of business
which operate or would operate as a fraud.44 Several other sections
of the Exchange Act have also been involved.45
Implied rights have been furnished several protections and ad-
vantages because of the structure of the Exchange Act. Since im-
plied rights have been considered as arising under the act, private
plaintiffs have been allowed to use the liberal venue and service of
process provisions of section 27.4" In Borak, the Court based, in
part, the implication of the right upon the section, which gives the
federal courts exclusive jurisdiction of actions brought to enforce
any liability or duty created by the Exchange Act or agency rules
39 Exchange Act § 14(a), 48 Star. 895 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a)
(1964).
40 See 2 Loss, op. cit. supra note 3, at 932-1020. Cf. Ruckle v. Roto American
Corp., 339 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1964) (Rule 10b-5 action - temporary injunctive relief
granted and case remanded for trial on the merits concerning permanent injunctive re-
lief); 3 Loss, op. cit. supra note 3, at 1795-96. For important recent proxy cases and
materials, see J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964), discussed in Posner, note
13 supra, at 613; Eagle v. Horvath, 241 F. Supp. 341 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Barnett v.
Anaconda Co., 238 F. Supp. 766 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Union Pac. R.R. v. Chicago & N.W.
Ry., 226 F. Supp. 400 (N.D. Ill. 1964) (discussed in Posner, supra note 13, at 613);
SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7208, Jan. 7, 1964; SEC Securities Exchange
Act Release No. 7774, Dec. 30, 1965.
4 1 Exchange Act § 10(b), 48 Stat. 891 (1934), 15 U.S.C. 78j(b) (1964).
42 Phillips & Shipman, supra note 4, at 739-41.
43 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1964).
44 See 3 Loss, op. cit. supra note 3, at 1757-1861; Ruder, Civil Liability Under
Rule lob-5: Judicial Revision of Legislative Intent, 57 Nw. U.L. REv. 627 (1963);
Joseph, Civil Liability Under Rule lOb-5 - A Reply, 59 Nw. U.L. REv. 171 (1964);
Ruder, Pitfalls in the Development of a Federal Law of Corporations by Implication
Through Rule lOb-5, 59 Nw. U.L. REv. 185 (1964); materials cited in notes 50 and
52 infra.
45 See, e.g., Baird v. Franklin, 141 F.2d 238 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 737
(1944); Pettit v. American Stock Exchange, 217 F. Supp. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); Low-
enfels, Implied Liabilities Based Upon Stock Exchange Rules, 66 CoLUM. L. REv. 12,
16 (1966); Comment, Securities Exchange Act of 1934 - Civil Remedies Based
Upon Illegal Extensions of Credit in Violation of Regulation T, 61 MIcH. L. REv. 940
(1963). See also notes 55 and 65 infra.46 Exchange Act § 27, 48 Stat. 902 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1964).
See, e.g., J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964); Remar v. Clayton Sec. Corp.,
81 F. Supp. 1014 (D. Mass. 1949) (considered that action on implied rights theory
was one enforcing a liability created by the act).
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thereunder." Section 28(a)4" states that the rights and remedies
provided by the Exchange Act are in addition to all others that may
exist "at law or in equity" and that nothing in the act affects state
regulation insofar as it does not conflict with the act or rules there-
under. Section 29 (a) 49 voids any provision binding any person to
waive compliance with the Exchange Act or any rule.
On the other hand, implied rights under the Exchange Act are
subject to many of the usual defenses and limitations. The courts
have applied state statutes of limitations and traditional liability-
limiting requirements of causation have been imposed; other limi-
tations such as estoppel and laches may also sometimes be appli-
cable." The right of any person permitted under the Exchange
Act to sue for damages is limited by section 28 (a) to a total recov-
ery - whether in one or more actions - of his "actual damages on
account of the act complained of."'" Two of the most interesting
current issues center around whether a degree of scienter is re-
47 Section 27 may have been the subject of specific congressional focus, insofar as
private actions are concerned, only with respect to plaintiffs given express private rights
under §§ 9(e), 16(b) and 18. The language of §-27 is not, however, limited in that
manner.
4 8 Exchange Act § 28(a), 48 Stat. 903 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1964).
49 Section 29(a) has been considered applicable to implied rights under the act.
Exchange Act S 29(a), 48 Stat. 903 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(a) (1964).
Reader v. Hirsh & Co., 197 F. Supp. 111 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). So has the portion of §
28 (a) discussed in the text. See, e.g., Voege v. American Sumatra Tobacco Corp., 241
F. Supp. 369 (D. Del. 1965). But cf. Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., CCH FED. SEc. L
REP. 55 91634, 91663 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 23, 1966).
50 See Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781 (1st Cit.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879
(1965) (a federal rule applied concerning date statute of limitations commences to
run); 3 Loss, op. cit. supra note 3, at 1771-77 (statute of limitations); Royal Air Prop-
erties, Inc. v. Smith, 333 F.2d 568 (9th Cir. 1964) (handling of estoppel, waiver,
and laches); Note, 73 YALE L.J. 1477 (1964) (discussion of waiver, estoppel, and
laches); 3 Loss, op. cit. supra note 3, at 1797-1805 (enforceability of illegal con-
tracts; id. at 1811-17 (non-waiver provisions); Painter, Inside Information: Growing
Pains for the Development of Federal Corporation Law Under Rule 10b-5, 65 COLUM.
L. REV. 1361 (1965) (analysis of reliance and other causation considerations and of
privity); note 68 infra (privity).
The timeliness of a suit under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947
for damages caused by an alleged breach of an employer's obligation embodied in a col-
lective bargaining agreement is to be determined, as a matter of federal law, by reference
to the appropriate state statute of limitations. UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 34
U.S.L. WEEK 4300 (U.S. Mar. 24, 1966).
51 See Estate Counseling Service, Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
303 F.2d 527 (10th Cir. 1962); Meisel v. North Jersey Trust Co., 216 F. Supp. 469
(S.D.N.Y. 1963); Kohler v. Kohler Co., 208 F. Supp. 808 (E.D. Wis. 1962), a! 'd,
319 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963). Section 28(a) has not prevented courts from some-
times granting rescission and accounting in Rule lob-5 cases. See Janigan v. Taylor,
344 F.2d 781 (1st Cit.), cert. denied, 382-U.S. 879 (1965); 3 Loss, op. cit. supra note
3, at 1792-96.
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quired in Rule lOb-5. actions and the Commission's complaint in
the case of SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co."
The issue dramatically posed by the Comptroller's attempt to
erase implied rights for violations of his rules is fundamental and
important. It is fundamental as it involves the inherent power of
an agency to oust the courts from their traditional role in determin-
ing when and what types of private relief should be granted for vio-
lations of the Exchange Act. It is important because implied pri-
vate rights have become more important under the Exchange Act
than the express liabilities. Before turning to a discussion of the
power of an agency to negate, it may be helpful to note some pre-
liminary points and to discuss the two sources of implied private
rights: section 29 (b) 53 and the statutory tort doctrine.
III. SOURCES OF IMPLIED RIGHTS
A. Some Preliminary Points
Under the structure of the Exchange Act, a violation of an
agency rule is nearly always a direct violation of the statute, for
the substantive portions of the act either make unlawful the failure
52 Civil No. 1182/1965 S.D.N.Y., complaint filed April 19, 1965. Concerning
scienter, see, e.g., Stevens v. Vowell, 343 F.2d 374 (10th Cir. 1965); Ellis v. Carter,
291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961); Weber v. C.M.P. Corp., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 5 91539
(S.D.N.Y. June 2, 1965); Parker v. Baltimore Paint & Chem. Corp., 244 F. Supp. 267
(D. Colo. 1965); Voege v. American Sumatra Tobacco Corp., 241 F. Supp. 369 (D.
Del. 1965); Trussell v. United Underwriters, Ltd., 228 F. Supp. 757 (D. Colo. 1964),
discussed in Posner, supra note 13, at 604-05; Texas Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Bankers
Bond Co., 187 F. Supp. 14 (W.D. Ky. 1960), rev'd on other grounds, 307 F.2d 242
(6th Cir. 1962); 3 Loss, SEcuRTims REGULATiON 1766-71 (2d ed. 1961); Note, 63
Mic2. L. REv. 1070 (1965).
Contrary to the statement in Trussell v. United Underwriters, supra, a showing of
a criminal violation is not necessarily required in a Rule lob-5 action. Section 10(b)
itself makes unlawful the violation of Rule lOb-5, and the tort doctrine is not limited
to criminal violations. In J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964), for example,
the Court did not pin its result to a criminal violation, which under § 32 (a) would re-
quire a showing of willfulness. Section 29 (b) refers to violations, not willful violations.
Relationship of Rule 10b-5 actions by purchasers to actions under the Securities Act
also enters the picture, in which respect § 28 (a) is relevant. Also involved is the ques-
tion of the Commission's power under § 10 (b). See, e.g., Ellis v. Carter, supra. Liabil-
ity for negligent misstatements is analyzed in Comment, Negligent Misrepresentations
Under Rule lOb-5, 32 U. CHI. L. REV. 824 (1965).
On the Texas Gulf Sulphur case, see Fleischer, Securities Trading and Corporate
Information Practices: The Implications of the Texas Gulf Sulphur Proceeding, 51 VA.
L. REV. 1271 (1965); Kennedy & Wander, Texas Gulf Sulphur, A Most Unusual Case,
20 Bus. LAW. 1057 (1965); Painter, supra note 50; Whitney, Section lOb-5: From
Cady, Roberts to Texas Gulf: Matters of Disclosure, 21 Bus. LAW. 193 (1965); Note,
Ancillary Relief in SEC Injunction Suits for Violation of Rule lOb-5, 79 HARV. L. REV.
656 (1966).
53 Exchange Act § 29(b), 48 Stat. 903 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(b)
(1964).
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to comply with implementing rules or directly require observance
of the rules.' For example, conduct violating the Comptroller's
proxy rules also directly violates section 14(a) of the Exchange Act,
the source of his power in the act to issue proxy rules. However,
although the Comptroller's negation rules explicitly attempt only to
negate private rights for violations of the implementing rules, the
plain intent is also to erase implied private rights for the violations
of sections of the statute that become operative solely through an
implementing rule.55
The deviation from the rules of the Commission, the FRB, and
the FDIC in the negation rules of the Comptroller is probably not
itself fatal. The Comptroller's substantive rules differ in many ways
from the Commission's and those of the FRB and the FDIC, which
are similar to those of the SEC.56 For example, the Comptroller's
proxy rules do not expressly prohibit false and misleading state-
ments, an omission which may have also been designed to avoid
Borak, but which may have little effect because the prohibition is
easily implied." The legislative history of the 1964 amendments
quite directly states that a bank agency may adopt rules different
54See, e.g., Exchange Act 5 10(b), 48 Star. 891 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)
(1964); Exchange Act § 11, 48 Star. 891 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78k
(1964); Exchange Act § 12(b),48 Star. 892 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 781(b)
(1964); Exchange Act § 12 (g), 48 Star. 892 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 7-81(g)
(1964); Exchange Act § 13, 48 Star. 894 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78m
(1964); Exchange Act § 14, 48 Star. 895 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78n
(1964).
55 The negation rules do not purport to contract the statutorily created § 16(b)
liabilities, although some of the Comptroller's other rules do provide exemptions from
the section. See 12 C.F.R. § 12.5(b) (Supp. 1965). The negation rules also seem-
ingly do not attempt to limit implied private rights under § 16(a), which directly re-
quires insiders to report all transactions. On implied private rights under § 16(a),
see Chicago So. S. & So. B. R.R. v. Monon R.R., CCH FED. S c. L. REP. 5 91525 (N.D.
IIl. 1965) (suit by management to compel filing by outside purchaser); Kroese v.
Crawford, CCH FED. Sac. L. REP. 5 91262 (1961-1964 Transfer Binder) (S.D.N.Y.
1963) (shareholders action to compel filing).
12 C.F.R. § 10.2, as revised in 31 Fed. Reg. 6949-57 (May 12, 1966), dearly does
not attempt to affect implied rights under 5 16(a). At the present time, the Comp-
troler's rules, as revised, supra, contain a number of exemptions from § 16(b).
56 See Cooney, Banks and Insurance Companies, 20 Bus. LAW. 293 (1965); Phil-
lips & Shipman, supra note 4, at 741-43; Comment, The Securities Acts Amendments
of 1964: Selected Provisions and Legislative Deficiencies, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 1494,
1505-10.
57 See Exchange Act § 18, 48 Star. 897 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78r
(1964); Exchange Act § 32(a), 48 Star. 904 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. 78ff(a)
(1964); Cooney, supra note 56, at 298. The Commission has held that Exchange
Act § 13(a), 48 Stat. 894 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a) (1964) neces-
sarily requires, by implication, that reports filed thereunder be true and correct. See
2 Loss, op. cit. supra note 52, at 811. See also note 69 infra.
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from the Commission's when the agency deems it appropriate.58 Un-
der this permission, the omission of a prohibition against false and
misleading statements, whatever its effect, is not inconsistent with
the Exchange Act solely because the Commission's rules have an
explicit prohibition. The deviation in the negation rule seems to
stand on much the same footing. If negation rules are sanctioned,
the difference in opinion is seemingly not fatal, although the vast
divergence here involved may be given some weight.
The Comptroller, it should be noted, is not entirely a pioneer
in attempting to negate implied rights. At one time, the Commis-
sion's proxy rules declared that noncompliance with them would not
invalidate any proxy pursuant to which action had been taken. This
was deleted in 1940 on the ground that "the legal consequences of
noncompliance... are for determination by the courts."" At pres-
ent, Rule 17a-8,6" which requires the reporting by exchanges of pro-
posed changes in their rules three weeks before adoption, states that
a failure to file as required "shall not affect the validity, force or
effect of any rule of the exchange or of any exchange action or
omission to act thereunder."'" Furthermore, the Commission's pro-
posed reporting rules for foreign issuers attempt to remove from the
express private rights under section 1862 certain registration state-
ments and periodic reports to be required under sections 12(g) and
13." The Comptroller's negation rules also apparently attempt to
eliminate section 18 liability but not the express rights under section
16(b)64 or implied rights flowing from the language of section
5 8 See § 12(i); CCH FED. BANKING L. REP. 5 94362 (item 11); Phillips & Ship-
man, supra note 4, at 736 n.101, 741-43.
59 See discussion and materials cited in Phillips & Shipman, supra note 4, at 737-38
n.105.
60 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-8 (1964).
6 1 In the 1950's the Commission proposed to promulgate rules under section 14(b)
concerning the voting by broker-dealers of street name securities. The proposed rules
stated that once a proxy was executed, the broker-dealer's noncompliance would not in-
validate the proxy. See Lowenfels, Implied Liabilities Based Upon Stock Exchange
Rules, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 12, 26-27 (1966).
6 2 Exchange Act § 18, 48 Star. 897 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78r (1964).
63Exchange Act § 12(g), 48 Star. 892 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 781(g)
(1964). Exchange Act § 13, 48 Stat. 894 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78m
(1964). See SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7746, November 16, 1965. For
background, see Phillips & Shipman, supra note 4, at 754-62. See also Form 9-K.
The Commission has extended to Nov. 30, 1966 its earlier temporary exemption
from § 12 (g) for foreign issuers. The proposed implementing rules were not with-
drawn, however. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7867, April 21, 1966.
64 Exchange Act § 16(b), 48 Star. 896 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b)
(1964).
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16(a).65 Presumably, the Comptroller's negation rules would not
foreclose him from attempting to obtain recoveries - as the Com-
mission is attempting to do in the Texas Gulf Sulphur case66 - for
private parties in the form of relief ancillary to his court enforce-
ment actions.
The purported exemptions by the Commission and the Comp-
troller from section 18 dearly seem invalid. The agencies appear
to have an insurmountable task in manufacturing authority to negate
an express private right in respect of which the Exchange Act pro-
vides no explicit or easily implied exemptive authority.6" Ironically,
if the agencies successfully eliminate section 18 liability, the in-
tended beneficiaries may be subject to stricter liabilities under Rule
65 Exchange Act § 16(a), 48 Stat. 896 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b)
(1964). This is not altogether clear. Section 18 is a self-executing statutory civil lia-
bility, and the Comptroller's rules perhaps do not attempt to relieve persons of § 18
liability, even though it would arise out of a paper required by the implementing rules.
Exchange Act § 18, 48 Stat. 895 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78r (1964). See
also notes 55 supra and 69 infra. The 1964 amendments provide one limited exemp-
tion from S 18. Exchange Act § 12(g) (1), 78 Stat. 566-67, 15 U.S.C. § 781(g) (1)
(1964); Phillips & Shipman, An Analysis of the Securities Acts Amendment of 1964,
1964 DuxiE L.J. 706, 717-18.
The negation rules do attempt to void implied rights for violations bf § 13. Con-
cerning implied rights for such violations, see Kroese v. Crawford, CCH FED. SEC L.
REP. (Transfer Binder, 1961-64) 5 91262 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); Jaypen Holdings, Ltd. v.
Bellanca Corp., 27 F.R.D. 190 (D.NJ. 1958). If the alleged violation is a false or
misleading statement in a report or other paper (rather than a complete omission, a
failure to file, or a late filing), § 18 should seemingly control. Cf. materials cited note
68 inIra.
66 Civil No. 1182/1965 S.D.N.Y., complaint filed April 19, 1965. See also ma-
terials cited in note 52 ,upra.
67 The discussion of the authority to negate implied rights and the text accompany-
ing notes 123-25 infra are applicable here, and an agency attempt to exempt from 5 18
seems to rest on even weaker grounds than an attempt to override § 29(b). One ap-
proach used in the exemption in the Commission's proposed foreign securities rules
(see note 63 supra) is to declare that required documents will not be deemed "filed"
with the Commission. This approach appears futile on a literal basis, for §§ 12(g),
13, and 15 (d), under which the implementing rules will be issued, require "filing" of
- or state that the company "shall file" - registration statements, reports, and docu-
ments. The Commission's power to define technical, trade, and accounting terms (Ex-
change Act § 3(b), 48 Stat. 882 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. 5 78c(b) (1964),
does not seem nimble enough to allow it to define away its statutory base of power for
one purpose and retain the base for another. Would the result be different if a condi-
tional exemption from § 12(g) -were allowed? See text accompanying note 112 infra.
The exemption in Rule 14a-3, 17 C.F.R. § 24 0.14 a-3 (1964) stands on firmer foot-
ing, as § 14(a) is the source of authority. See, however, Phillips & Shipman, supra
note 65, at 790; note 68 infra.
In dealing with certain types of American Depositary Receipts registered under the
Securities Act, the Commission has attempted a similar limitation of liability. See 1
Loss, op. cit. supra note 52, at 465; Phillips & Shipman, supra note 65, at 759.
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10b-5,68 just as the Comptroller's attempt to overturn Borak in the
proxy area may, if successful, be an invitation to an extension of
Rule 1Ob-5 to many solicitations by national banks."9 Furthermore,
68 Section 18 requires that the plaintiff show reliance and a purchase of the security
at a price influenced by the false statement. The section provides the defendant a de-
fense if he shows action in good faith and without knowledge of the false statement.
Although Rule 10b-5 actions require reliance (see Painter, supra note 50), the other
obstacles to recovery contained in § 18 may not be present in Rule lOb-5 cases.
In two recent cases, courts have upheld, on motions to dismiss, Rule 10b-5 actions
by investors who made purchases in the open market and claimed reliance on allegedly
false and misleading information disseminated by defendant issuers. Freed v. Szabo
Food Service, CCH FED. SEC L. REP. (Transfer Binder, 1961-64) 5 91317 (N.D. Ill.
1964); Miller v. Bargain City, U.S.A., Inc., 229 F. Supp. 33 (E.D. Pa. 1964). See
also Cochran v. Channing Corp., 211 F. Supp. 239 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
May an action be brought under Rule 10b-5 when the paper containing the state-
ment complained of is subject to § 18? In Miller, judgment on this question of over-
lap was reserved.
The Comptroller's negation rules cannot contract Rule lob-5. See note 42 supra
and accompanying text; but cf. note 69 infra. The Commission's rules attempting to
excuse companies from § 18 liability do not, in terms, also purport to negate Rule lOb-5
liability, but they could be considered (despite the Commission's intimate acquaintance
with civil liabilities under Rule 10b-5) as necessarily attempting to include such an
exemption.
69 The Commission's view is that if there is overlap in the authority retained by it
over the trading of bank securities and the authority transferred to the bank agencies,
each agency has authority to act, and the rules of each are applicable. See Phillips &
Shipman, supra note 65, at 739-41. If so, Rule lob-5 would not be restricted because
one of the bank agencies also has proxy rules governing solicitations. Yet, the courts
might hold that where the bank agency has applicable proxy regulations under the Act,
Rule lOb-5 would not be applied to proxy solicitations subject to the bank agency's
rules. A court taking that attitude might, however, hold differently if the Comptroller's
negation rules were upheld or if it were held that the failure of the Comptroller's rules
explicitly to prohibit false and misleading statements has effect.
Rule 10b-5 would in any event be applicable to a proxy solicitation only if one of
the matters to be voted upon concerned the purchase or sale of a security - for example,
a merger or a stock option plan. Though there should be no question, it is not clear
whether Rule lob-5 can be applied to mergers. H. L. Green Co. v. Childree, 185 F.
Supp. 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) held that Rule lob-5 could be applied to certain types of
mergers. See also Voege v. American Sumatra Tobacco Corp., 241 F. Supp. 369 (D.
Del. 1965). In Borak v. J. I. Case Co., 317 F.2d 838, 846-47 (7th Cir. 1963), aff'd,
377 U.S. 426 (1964), both lower courts had taken a dim view of the possible applica-
tion of Rule lob-5 to the solicitation concerning the merger. For other cases casting
doubt on the application of Rule lob-5 to mergers, see Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., CCH
FED. SEC. L. REP. S 91634 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 23, 1966); SEC v. National Sec., Inc., CCH
FED. SEC. L. REP. 5 91646 (D. Ariz. Feb. 14, 1966); Elfenben v. Yaeger, CCH FED.
SEC. L. REP. (Transfer Binder, 1961-64) 5 91368 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Sawyer v. Pioneer
Mill Co., 190 F. Supp. 21 (D. Hawaii 1960), appeal dismissed as moot, 300 F.2d 200(9th Cit.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 814 (1962). This uncertainty is probably due to
the Commission's Rule 133 under the Securities Act, spelling out a no-sale exemption
from Securities Act 5. Rule 133 is discussed in 1 Loss, op. cit. supra note 52, at
518-42.
Rule lob-5 and 5 14(a) were relied upon by the plaintiff in Simon v. New Haven
Board & Carton Co., 250 F. Supp. 297 (D. Conn. 1966), a derivative action based on
allegations of damage through approval of a merger by shareholders relying on false
and misleading reports and proxy statements. The court, on a motion to dismiss, held
an action was stated under Rule lOb-5, finding it unnecessary to consider § 14 (a).
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the good-faith-reliance immunity of section 23 (a)"0 is probably in-
applicable.7
B. Section 29(b)
The attempted negation of implied rights - which have been
based upon section 29(b)7" and the statutory tort doctrine, bases
which often, but not always, overlap - raises more difficult issues.
In addition to the express private rights created by sections 9(e),
16 (b), and 18, the Exchange Act provides an almost-express private
cause of action in section 29(b), although rights under section
29(b) are most often discussed in the "implied" classification. Sec-
tion 29(b) states that every contract made in violation of the Ex-
change Act or any rule thereunder, or the performance of which in-
volves the violation of such act or any rule thereunder, is void. The
contract is void, however, only as it regards the rights of the viola-
tor or any successor to the contract taking with actual knowledge
of the facts constituting the violation. Section 29(b) is applicable
only if there is privity of contract 3 and thus complements sections
9(e), 16(b), and 18, which furnish private remedies in three situ-
ations where the plaintiff will seldom be in privity of contract with
the defendant.
Although section 29(b) was not extensively discussed during
the congressional hearings and debates on the Exchange Act, there
was some recognition of the effect of the section upon the rights and
liabilities of private parties." Furthermore, during the congression-
70Exchange Act § 23(a), 48 Stat. 901 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78w(a)
(1964).
71 See notes 174-79 infra and accompanying text.
72 Exchange Act § 29(b), 48 Stat. 903 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. 78cc(b)
(1964).
73 See 3 Loss, op. cit. supra note 52, at 1759.
74 In both original bills, the forerunner of § 29(b) would literally have voided the
contract rights of innocent as well as violating parties. See § 27(b) of the original
bills, reprinted in Hearings Before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Com-
merce on H.R. 7852, 8720, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 14-15 (1934) [hereinafter cited as 1934
House Hearings); 15-16 Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Banking and Cur-
rency on Stock Exchange Practices, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 6435 (1934) [hereinafter cited
as 1934 Senate Hearings). Concern over this effect on the rights of private parties led
to the adoption of a Senate floor amendment to save the contract rights of innocent
parties. See 78 CONG. REc. 8593 (remarks of Senator Hastings), 8600-01 (1934).
This change carried through to enactment. See H.R. REP. No. 1838, 73d Cong., 2d.
Sess. 37-38 (1934). Neither original bill contained language similar to that in § 29(c)
of the act, which provides further protections against the voiding of certain loans and
liens made or created in good faith. During the congressional consideration, a group
of businessmen attacked, among other things, the language of the forerunner of §
29(b). They noted its potential adverse effects upon the contract rights of innocent
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al hearings on the 1938 amendments75 to the Exchange Act, section
29(b) - and implied rights - were focused upon. Provisos ad-
ded at that time to section 29(b) excluded from the section con-
tracts in violation of rules under two newly added sections of the
Exchange Act and inserted a special short statute of limitations for
actions based upon alleged violations of rules under section 15 (c)
(1) - a general antifraud section authorizing Commission rules
in respect of over-the-counter transactions of broker-dealers."
Courts have often used section 29(b) in implying a remedy.
For example, in Kardon v. National Gypsum Co.,78 the landmark
case implying rights for violation of Rule 10b-5, the court felt that
"a statutory enactment that a contract of a certain kind shall be
void almost necessarily implies a remedy in respect of it. The
statute [section 29(b) I would be of little value unless a party to
the contract could apply to the Courts to relieve himself of obliga-
tions under it or to escape its consequences."7 The court interpreted
the provisos added in 1938 as contemplating that Congress intended
the original section 29 (b) to be interpreted as authorizing civil suits
for rescission or money damages under it."0
C. Statutory Tort
The second basis for implied rights has been the statutory tort
doctrine, which states that in the absence of legislative intent to the
contrary, civil remedies will be (or may be) afforded for injuries
caused by violation of a statute, to members of the class of persons
the statute is intended to protect.8 This doctrine has been primarly
parties and advocated that "the effect of the act on contracts made in violation of its
provisions should be governed by ordinary common law principles." 78 CONG. REC.
8580-81 (1934) (item 8 of letter).
75 See materials cited in 3 Loss, op. cit. supra note 52, at 1760 n.253.
7 6 Exchange Act § 15(c) (1), 48 Stat. 895 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §
78o(c) (1) (1964).
77 See materials cited in 3 Loss, op. cit. supra note 52, at 1760 n.253.
7869 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946) (motion to dismiss), 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D.
Pa.) (on the merits), modified, 83 F. Supp. 613 (E.D. Pa. 1947) (on request for ad-
ditional findings).7 9 Id. at 514.
80 Ibid. Professor Ruder, Civil Liability Under Rule lob-5: Judicial Revision of
Legislative Intent, 57 Nw. U.L. REV. 627 (1963), interprets the 1938 amendments as
recognizing a private right of action only for violation of § 15 (c) (1) rules.
81 Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946) (motion to
dismiss), 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa.) (on the merits), modified, 83 F. Supp. 613
(E.D. Pa. 1947) (on request for additional findings), is again a landmark case, as is
Baird v. Franklin, 141 F.2d 238 (2d Cir.), cert. -denied, 323 U.S. 737 (1944).
Kardon relied upon § 286 of the Restatement of Torts. Interestingly, the Restate-
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applied to violations of Rule 10b-5 and the proxy rules, but it has
also been applied to violations of various other provisions of the
Exchange Act, other federal securities statutes, and several federal
statutes outside the securities field. 2 This doctrine, of course, has
long been applied in negligence actions."3 The tort doctrine can
operate wherever section 29(b) may be applicable, but unlike sec-
tion 29(b), can furnish remedies in the absence of privity of con-
tract between the plaintiff and the violator. In fact, the two bases
are often merged by the courts. 4
Although the Supreme Court in Borak8" did not extensively
discuss the theoretical foundation of the implied right there in-
volved, the statutory tort doctrine was dearly one primary basis.
The Court did not mention section 29(b), perhaps because of the
lesser flexibility that it might provide in dealing with the difficult
question of the appropriate remedy (the merger was consummated
in 1957) if a violation of section 14(a)8" were shown on remand. 7
The Court examined the legislative history of section 14 (a), noting
first the congressional belief that fair suffrage should attadh to listed
securities, and second the congressional findings in 1934 that proxies
were too often solicited with inadequate disclosure.88 The Court
discussed the broad, remedial purposes of section 14(a), as evi-
denced by the wide discretion given the agency to adopt proxy solici-
tation rules as "necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for
the protection of investors,"" and the statutory declaration that vio-
lation by any person of the rules is "unlawful." The Court then de-
cided that while section 14(a) "makes no specific reference to a pri-
vate right of action, among its chief purposes is 'the protection of in-
ment, as revised, seems more permissive; if the stated requisites are found, the court
"may" imply a cause of action. RESTATmENT (SEcoND), TORTS § 286 (1965).
82 See Note, Implying Civil Remedies From Federal Regulatory Statutes, 77 HARv.
L. REV. 285 (1963).
832 HARPBR & JAMES, TORTS § 17.6 (1956); PRossmr, TORTs § 35 (3d ed.
1964).
84 See 3 Loss, op. cit. supra note 52, at 1757-61; note 68 supra.
85 J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
86Exchange Act § 14(a), 48 Stat. 895 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78n'(a)
(1964).
87 The application of § 29(b) where a proxy solicitation has violated § 14(a) pre-
sents two questions. Are the proxies contracts? If the proxies are to be voided, may a
further contract (a merger agreement, for example) approved pursuant to the proxies
also be voided under § 29(b)? These questions are bypassed if the tort doctrine is
applied.88J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 431 (1964).
891d. at 431-32.
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vestors,' which certainly implies the availability of judicial relief
where necessary to achieve that result."9
Another ground upon which the Court placed its decision was
the helpful supplement to Commission action supplied by private
enforcement of the proxy rules, the Court making an analogy to
antitrust treble damage litigation. Apparently, therefore, this aid
must be considered in determining whether to imply private rights."'
Finally, the Court said that under the circumstances before it, "it is
the duty of the courts to be alert to provide such remedies as are
necessary to make effective the congressional purpose. 92
The Commission has rather consistently asked the courts to ex-
tend implied private rights under the Exchange Act, on the grounds
that private enforcement aids its action. A primary jurisdiction doc-
trine has seldom been urged by the Commission, which is not sur-
prising in light of the absence of administrative authority to award
damages or other private relief for violations of the Exchange Act,
and the fact that often the Commission's only means of enforcement
is an application for injunctive relief.9" Section 26," furthermore,
90 Id. at 432.
91 See also Hewitt-Robins, Inc. v. Freight-Ways, Inc., 371 U.S. 84 (1962). This
was a common law action against a carrier for misrouting. On reference to the ICC,
that body had held the carrier's alleged action unreasonable. The majority of the Court
held that a cause of action was stated, that the cause of action was not extinguished by
the federal statute and that allowing misrouting actions would be fair and would have
a healthy deterrent effect upon misrouting practices, which in turn would minimize
cease and desist proceedings before the ICC.92 J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433 (1964).
93 The Commission in 1947 stated that a private plaintiff in an action under the
proxy rules should take his complaint first to the Commission. See 2 Loss, op. cit.
supra note 52, at 952-54. This is common in those cases, although the Commission's
only enforcement route, if it decides to act, is a request for injunctive relief. In Stan-
dard Fruit & S.S. Co. v. Midwest Stock Exch., 178 F. Supp. 669 (N.D. I11. 1959), the
court held that primary jurisdiction did not preclude it from granting relief requested
by a company to enjoin an exchange's trading in its securities on an unlisted basis and
without authorization under Exchange Act § 12 (f), 48 Stat. 892 (1934), as amended, 15
U.S.C. 781(f) (1964), although the Commission has pervasive powers over unlisted
trading and could have terminated the trading in question. The courts and the Com-
mission have concurrent jurisdiction to determine questions of "control," as defined in
§ 2(a) (9) of the Investment Company Act, 54 Star. 790 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 20a-2
(a) (9) (1964). See, e.g., Willheim v. Murchison, 342 F.2d 33 (2d Cit.), cert. de-
nied, 382 U.S. 840 (1965).
A noteworthy recent case concerning the primary jurisdiction doctrine and suits by
private parties under Rule 10b-5 is Fischer v. Kletz, CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 5 91687
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 1966). The court held the doctrine did not preclude it from pro-
ceeding in the case, although the ICC was also concerned. Cf. Klastorin v. Roth, 353
F.2d 182 (2d Cir. 1965).
The act vests sole discretion in the Commission to cancel the registration of an in-
active broker-dealer. Parrott v. Cary, 234 F. Supp. 572 (D. Colo. 1964).
Under Exchange Act § 15(b), 48 Star. 895 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. 5
78o(b) (1964); Exchange Act § 19(a), 48 Star. 898 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C.
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states that action or inaction by the agency shall not be construed
as approval of any security or transaction therein and that agency
action or inaction on a statement or report is not a finding that the
statement is true and accurate on its face."
It is against the background of section 29 (b) and the statutory
tort doctrine that the rule-making authority must be measured.
IV. THE RULE-MAKING POWERS OF THE AGENCIES
Before matching the agencies' exemptive and general rule-mak-
ing authority against section 29 (b) and the statutory tort doctrine,
it may be useful to examine the agencies' powers in some detail.
A negation authority can probably be constitutionally delegated
to an agency, 6 and Congress may have indirectly delegated that dis-
§ 78s(a) (1964); Exchange Act § 15A, 52 Star. 1070 (1938), as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§ 780-3 (1964), Commission administrative disciplinary proceedings can be brought
against broker-dealers, exchanges, and registered securities associations that do not com-
ply with the Act and the Commission's rules. On the other hand, if a broker-dealer or
exchange is not involved, enforcement of § 14 and Rule lOb-5, perhaps the two most
important requirements of the act, is available only through applications for injunctive
relief or criminal references, although the Commission has the standard investigative
and administrative subpoena powers.
In the 1964 amendments, the agencies were given new authority to conduct admin-
istrative hearings and issue orders requiring compliance with several sections of the
statute; however, such orders require court enforcement. See Phillips & Shipman, supra
note 65, at 778-81. Statutory authorization to institute an administrative proceeding
does not limit the agency's right to request injunctive relief. Ibid.
In Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963), the Court considered,
inter alia, the possible incompatibility of the objectives and duty of exchange self-regu-
lation with the maintenance of an antitrust action. Concerning primary jurisdiction and
the antitrust statutes, see materials cited note 2 supra.
94 Exchange Act § 26, 48 Star. 902 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78z (1964).
See also J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964); Klastorin v. Roth, supra note 93.
9 Securities Act § 23, 48 Star. 87 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77w (1964) is similar.
96 Congress can itself negate implied rights. Section 29(b) can be restricted, as it
is in certain respects, and the tort doctrine cannot operate in the presence of strong neg-
ative intent. By committee report language, Congress negated implied rights in one area
of the 1964 amendments. See Phillips & Shipman, supra note 65, at 754-55. See also
Joseph, supra note 44, at 176-77.
The constitutionality of the act and its delegations of rulemaking powers has been
upheld, whenever challenged. See R. H. Johnson & Co. v. SEC, 198 F.2d 690 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 855 (1952); Charles Hughes & Co. v. SEC 139 F.2d 434
(2d Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 786 (1944); Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136
F.2d 231 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751 (1943); 2 Loss, op. cit. sapra note 52,
at 871.
Congress has delegated powers to the agencies to provide exemptions from § 16(b),
an express liability section. See Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., supra; note 125 infra; notes
174-79 infra and accompanying text.
Furthermore, as discussed below, there may be circumstances where it arguably
would at least be desirable for the agency to have the power, subject to intensive judicial
review.
A cause for concern does come from the cases holding that a legislative body cannot
delegate to an agency the power to determine whether the violation of a regulation will
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cretion to the Commission in two areas of broker-dealer regulation."7
However, nothing in the Exchange Act or its legislative history"8
spells out or dearly implies an agency power to negate implied
rights by rule or by order.9
be a crime or empowering the agency to set, within limits, the amount of a fine. See
JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINIsTRATiVn AcrION 110 (1965).
If there is any serious constitutional question, it may create a presumption against
inherent power in the agency or implied delegation. Cf. id. at 72-73; Smolowe v. De-
lendo Corp., supra.
One analogy is furnished by the wage control legislation during World War II and
the Korean War allowing the President to prescribe the extent to which wage payments
in excess of those specified under the statute should be disregarded by governmental
agencies in determining the allowable costs of the employer for purposes of other laws
or regulations. Exercise of this authority to disallow deductions or inclusions in cost
of goods sold under the Internal Revenue Code led to constitutional challenge - but
not on grounds of unduly broad delegation. Rather, the constitutional challenge was
to the authority of Congress to levy the tax without allowing the taxpayer the benefit
of the deductions or inclusion in cost of goods sold. For cases involving challenges
(unsuccessful) to the Korean War legislation, see Pedone v. United States, 151 F. Supp.
288 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 829 (1957); Sidney Zehman, 27 T.C. 876
(1957), aff'd per curiam, 253 F.2d 424 (6th Cir. 1958).
9 7 Exchange Act §§ 15(c) (1)-(2), 48 Stat. 895 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C.
55 78o(c) (1)-(2) (1964), which authorize the Commission to promulgate antifraud
rules applicable to over-the-counter transactions of broker-dealers, overlap. Exchange
Act § 29(b), 48.Stat. 903 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78cc (1964) is inappli-
cable to rules under the latter but not the former. It might in addition be held that,
despite the narrowness of the exclusionary language in § 29(b), the statutory tort doc-
trine does not apply to violations of § 15 (c) (2) rules. The legislative history does
not expressly forbid the application of the statutory tort doctrine, but Congress' specific
focus upon § 15(c) (2) and its negative declaration on implied rights and 5 15(c) (2)
rules may be enough to preclude the tort doctrine; but see Kardon v. National Gypsum
Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946) (motion to dismiss), 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D.
Pa.) (on the merits), modified, 83 F. Supp. 613 (E.D. Pa. 1947) (on request for addi-
tional findings). The short statute of limitations in § 29(b) applicable to actions
under the section with reference to violation of § 15(c) (1) rules would similarly ap-
pear to be applicable to an action for violation of § 15(c) (1) rules based on the tort
theory. This question is further complicated by Rule lOb-3, which incorporates the
15(c) (1) rules. See 3 Loss, SEcURiTIEs REGULATION 1427 n.19 (2d ed. 1961).
The rulemaking jurisdictions of the Commission, the exchanges, and the National
Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. also overlap. If no implied private rights of ac-
tion under the Act result from violations of the rules and requirements of the self-
regulators - a question discussed in part II of this article - the Commission often can
determine whether implied private rights under the act will flow from regulation.
As also discussed in part II, there may be some doubt whether violations of §
15(b) (10) rules create implied rights.
98 In the version of the 1938 amendments reported by the Senate Committee, the
applicability of § 29(b) to contracts made in violation of certain rules would have been
forbidden unless the Commission provided otherwise. S. REP. No. 1455, 75th Cong.,
3d Sess. 10-11 (1938). See also 3 Loss, op. cit. supra note 97, at 1760 n. 253. In
the bill as reported by the House Committee and as enacted, the proposed discretionary
authority was removed and several other changes were made.
This proves nothing. Without clear authority, an agency cannot move into § 29 (b)
what Congress has excluded.
99 The agencies have authority in § 12 (h) to exempt persons from several important
sections of the act by rule or order. Exchange Act § 12(h), 48 Stat. 892 (1934), as
amended, 15 U.S.C. § 781(h) (1964). See notes 105, 110 infra and accompanying text
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The agencies administering the Exchange Act have great flexi-
bility in establishing what is-required in the way of reporting and
proxy solicitation practices. Congress delegated flexibility so that
the agency would be vested with "power to eliminate undue hard-
ship and to prevent and punish evasion."1 '
Most of the sections of the Exchange Act imposing duties on
broker-dealers, companies, and others either (1) state that it shall be
unlawful to do or fail to do certain things in violation of implement-
ing agency rules, or require adherence to such rules, (2) specify
the outer limits of the rules an agency may adopt, or (3) declare
the congressional purposes and set the standard under which the
agency is to work in adopting rules - usually public interest or for
the protection of investors. 1' Most sections, therefore, have force
only to the extent the agency adopts implementing rules."0 2 Section
23 (a) 103 empowers each agency "to make such rules and regulations
as may be necessary for the execution of the functions vested in
them by [the Exchange Act], and.., for such purpose [to] classify
issuers, securities, exchanges, and other persons or matters within
their respective jurisdictions."' 4  Several sections - including sec-
tion 12 (h), added by the 1964 amendments - also allow, under
stated general standards, the agency to remove companies and per-
sons, or classes thereof, from certain substantive sections of the Ex-
change Act - including sections 12 (g), 13, 14, and 16.105 This
The validity of a negation order turns on the same considerations as does the validity of
a negation rule; negation orders are thus not separately discussed.
100 S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1934), relied upon in Kornfeld v.
Eaton, 217 F. Supp. 671, 679 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) affd, 327 F.2d 263 (2d Cit. 1964).
1 0 1 See Baird v. Franklin, 141 F.2d 238, 244 n.4 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S.
737 (1944).
102 Note, however, that in Baird v. Franklin, 141 F.2d 238 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
323 U.S. 737 (1944), Judge Clark found that violations of two sections of the act
seemingly required implementing regulations for effectiveness, although neither section
at the relevant dates had been so implemented.
103 Exchange Act § 23(a), 48 Stat. 901 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78w(a)
(1964).
104 Exchange Act §§ 12(g), (h), 48 Stat. 892 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. 5§
781(g), (h) (1964), also contain classification authority.
205Exchange Act § 12(g), 48 Stat. 892 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 781(g)
(1964); Exchange Act § 13, 48 Star. 894 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78m
(1964); Exchange Act § 14, 48 Star. 895 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78n
(1964); Exchange Act § 16, 48 Stat 896 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78p
(1964). See Phillips & Shipman, An Analysis of the Securities Acts Amendments of
1964, 1964 DUKE L.J. 706, 746-47. For a narrow interpretation of § 12 (h) powers
insofar as § 16(b) is concerned, see Kramer, An Examination of Section 16(b), 21
Bus. LAw. 183 (1965).
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can be done in whole or in part, on terms and conditions, and for
limited periods.
Whenever the statute uses "technical, trade, and accounting
terms," the agency may, under section 3 (b),"' define them by rule
"insofar as such definitions are not inconsistent [with the Exchange
Act]." ''  The legislative history indicates that the definitions will
stand so long as they are not "dearly inconsistent with the legisla-
tive intent."' 8
The agency's discretion in shaping its rules and in providing ex-
emptions can affect civil liabilities in several ways. The agency can,
acting within the standards set by the Exchange Act, set modest re-
quirements for companies and other persons subject to its jurisdic-
tion, and that action would be beyond challenge in court. The Com-
mission's proxy rules also, validly it would seem, relieve manage-
ment and the issuer of liabilities for the contents of insurgents' ma-
terials mailed by the issuer and of shareholders' statements included
in management's proxy statement if the mailing or inclusion is re-
quired by the rules.' Furthermore, section 12(h) allows the
agency, if the applicable general standards are met, to exempt com-
panies and persons from sections 12(g), 13, 14, and 16 by order
or by rule."0 The agency may thus be empowered, in some cases,
to provide retroactive exemptions from these sections and by elimi-
nating violations of the act, also provide immunity from civil liabil-
ity."' Lastly, if a conditional exemption from a section of the stat-
106 Exchange Act § 3(b), 48 Stat. 882 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78c
(1964).
107 Other definitional powers are found in 5 12(g) (5). See Phillips & Shipman,
supra note 105, at 724, 730.
108 H.R. REP. No. 1838, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (1934).
109 See 2 Loss, op. cit. supra note 97, at 913-15.
110 See materials cited note 105 supra.
Ill The Commission has provided retroactive exemptions under the Investment Com-
pany Act. 3 Loss, op. cit. supra note 97, at 1760 n.253. Several of the Commission's
rules providing exemptions from § 16(b) have been retroactive. See, e.g., the prior
version of Rule 16b-9 (SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7118, August 19,
1963), upheld in Max Factor & Co. v. Blau, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 5 91359 (S.D.
Cal. 1964), aII'd, 342 F.2d 304 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 892 (1965). In its
most recent rules providing exemptions from § 16(b), the Commission proposed, and
decided against, making the liberalizing amendments retroactive. SEC Securities Ex-
change Act Release No. 7826, February 17, 1966. There apparently can be no good
faith reliance, within the meaning of provisions such as Exchange Act § 23 (a), 48 Stat.
901 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. 5 78w(a) (1964) on the retroactive portion of
an invalid exemption. Cf. text accompanying notes 174-79 infra. Section 23 (a) and
similar protections in other federal securities statutes are discussed in 3 Loss, op. cit.
supra note 97, at 1842-49.
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ute is provided, a violation of the conditions may not be a violation
of the statute."
Three sections, 12(h), 3(a) (12)11 and 16(b), authorize ex-
emptions from the express private right created in section 16(b),"
although no comparable sources exist with respect to sections 9 (e)
and 18." Section 16(b), it should be pointed out, makes nothing
illegal or unlawful; and in determining whether the acts referred
to in the section create civil liability, it is, generally speaking, im-
material whether a section of the Exchange Act has been violated." 6
If there is a cause of action under section 9 (e) or 18, a violation of
another section of the statute will necessarily be present."'
Of the three sections furnishing power to exempt from section
16(b), section 12 (h) has already been mentioned." 8 Section 3 (a)
(12) authorizes exemptions, as the agency deems necessary or ap-
propriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors, of
ccsecurities" from section 16 and certain other sections." 9  Section
112 The exemption may be drafted so that a failure to meet the conditions automat-
ically subjects the person to the statute or an implementing rule. When the exemption
is from § 12 (g) (which requires certain over-the-counter companies to register and
thus become subject to §§ 13, 14, and 16), there is an interesting question whether a
violation of the conditions would automatically cause the company to be subject to 55
13, 14, and 16. See Phillips and Shipman, supra note 105, at 722-23.
113 Exchange Act § 3(a) (12), 48 Star. 882 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. 5
78c(3) (a) (12) (1964).
"14 Exchange Act § 16(b), 48 Star. 896 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b)
(1964).
"
5 fExchange Act § 9(e), 48 Star. 889 (1934), 15 U.S.C. 78i (1964); Exchange
Act § 18, 48 Stat. 897 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78r (1964). The agencies
have considerable control over the papers required to be filed under the act and by re-
quiring or not requiring papers, potential § 18 liability is affected. Sections 3 (a) (12)
and 9(f) combine to give the Commission authority to exempt from § 9(a); §§ 9(b)
and 9(c) are operative only as implemented by Commission rules. This authority af-
fects potential liability under § 9(e). It is also possible, though seemingly unlikely,
that §§ 3 (a) (12) and 9(f) combine to give the Commission authority to exempt vio-
lations of §§ 9(a)-(c) from § 9(e).
"1
6 See 2 Loss, op. cit. supra note 97, at 1040-44. Some cases have, however, in
borderline areas looked to subjective factors in determining whether a person is an in-
sider and whether there has been a "purchase" or a "sale" and in computing profit. See,
e.g., Blau v. Lehman, 368 U.S. 403 (1962); Heli-Coil Corp. v. Webster, CCH FED.
SEc. L. REP. 5 91578 (3d Cit. 1965); Max Factor & Co. v. Blau, CCH FED. SEc. L.
REp. 5 91359 (S.I. Cal. 1964), affd, 342 F.2d 304 (9th Cit.), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
892 (1965). This willingness, which appears to be increasing, may be partially attrib-
utable to the improving efficacy of Rule lob-5 to handle actual misuse of inside infor-
mation.
1'7 Section 9(e) is triggered by willful violations of §§ 9(a)-(c). As to § 18, see
note 57 supra and Exchange Act § 32(a), 48 Star. 904 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C.
5 78ff(a) (1964).
118 See text accompanying notes 104-05 supra.
119 This authority played a significant role in Kornfeld v. Eaton, 217 F. Supp. 671
(S.D.N.Y. 1963), aff'd, 327 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1964).
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16(b) removes from its operation "any transaction or transactions
which [the agency] by rules and regulations may exempt as not
comprehended within the purpose of this subsection."' 2 °
It is the exemptions from section 16(b) that have, to date,
tested the Commission's exemptive powers. The validity of the
pre-1960 version of Rule 16b-3, 2' which entirely exempted from
section 16(b) many purchases of stock under restricted stock option
and certain other employee plans, was seriously questioned by sev-
eral courts;... one court dedared it invalid."2 3 The Commission's
1960 revision contracted the exemption. The Second Circuit has
upheld Rule 16b-6, which is more limited than the pre-1960 ver-
sion of Rule 16b-3.' 24 In reviewing rules providing exemptions
from section 16(b), the courts have often made a searching inde-
pendent inquiry to determine whether the rule is consistent with
the purposes of the Exchange Act.2 '
V. THE RULE-MAKING POWERS AND SECTION 29(b)
When these general rule-making powers are matched against
the self-executing language of section 29(b) 126 an agency hoping
that its negation rule will erase implied rights flowing from that
section will find little comfort. The section specifies in plain terms
an effect of the violation of any rule or any section of the Exchange
Act. Though not conclusive, the fact that the statute gives the
agency three explicit rule-making powers to apply to section 16(b),
and none to apply to section 29(b), is a shaky literal beginning.
Section 23(a) creates a far-reaching classification power, but the
agencies can use it only on matters "within [the agendes'l respec-
tive jurisdictions" and as "necessary for the execution of the func-
120 Exchange Act § 16(b), 48 Stat. 896 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b)
(1964).
12117 C.F.R. § 240.16b-3 (1964).
122 See 2 Loss, op. cit. supra note 97, at 1114-18; 3 id. at 1846-49.
123 Ibid.
124 Kornfeld v. Eaton, 217 F. Supp. 671 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), afj'd, 327 F.2d 263 (2d
Cir. 1964).
125 Green v. Dietz, 247 F.2d 689 (2d Cir. 1957); Kornfeld v. Eaton, supra note 124;
Perlman v. Timberlake, 172 F. Supp. 246 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). Also, compare the opin-
ions in Max Factor & Co. v. Blau, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 5 91359 (S.D. Cal. 1964),
alf'd, 342 F.2d 304 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 892 (1965), with Heli-Coil Corp.
v. Webster, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 5 91578 (3d Cit. 1965).
126 Exchange Act § 29(b), 48 Stat. 904 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(b)
(1964).
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tions vested in" them.' Section 3 (b) 12  is of little or no help, for
it is hard to find a key technical, trade, or accounting term in sec-
tion 29(b). Furthermore, the courts - which must, rather than
the agencies, adjudicate causes of action under the section - have
been applying section 29(b) since 1941. The experience of the
Commission with its rules furnishing exemptions from section
16(b) provides a further warning that private rights of action will
be protected. If section 29(a) voids stipulations binding private
parties to waive their rights under the statute, section 29 (b) can be
interpreted as voiding an attempt by an agency to waive the rights
of private parties for them.
In short, section 29(b) and the act contemplate that the agency
can, in accordance with the standards of the act, adopt the rules it
finds necessary and desirable and thus shape the requirements of
the statute, but that section 29(b) is to be applicable, under its
terms, to all violations of the act and its rules, as so molded. Just
as the Exchange Act does not allow the agency an option to deter-
mine the severity of criminal penalties or whether violations of some
or all of its rules will or will not be crimes,'29 the act is designed to
give the agency no option concerning the interaction of its rules
and section 29(b). Agency rules purporting to override section
29(b) should, therefore, be considered void for want of agency
jurisdiction. This is not to say that given the clearest showing that,
because of special circumstances, application of section 29 (b) will
cause the act "to destroy itself,"' 0 the courts should not create an
exception. But curtailment of this explicit investor protection -
itself a congressional policy judgment - seemingly would require
even more than would be required to curtail the tort doctrine.
VI. THE RULE-MAKING POWERS AND THE STATUTORY
TORT DOCTRINE
An agency attempt to negate the statutory tort doctrine is an
attempt to prevent the courts from applying a doctrine created and
127Exchange Act § 23(a), 48 Stat. 901 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78w(a)
(1964).
128 Exchange Act § 3(b), 48 Stat. 882 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(b)
(1964).
129 Such a delegation would raise constitutional problems. See JAFFE, Op. Cit. supra
note 96, at 110. However, the existing scheme, under which there is an explicit defini-
tion of crimes, necessarily accomplishes a delegation concerning the institution of crim-
inal proceedings, as a failure of the agency to make criminal references under Exchange
Act § 21(e), 48 Star. 899 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. 78u(e) (1964) effectively
relieves the party from possible prosecution.
130 See note 143 intra.
1966]
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
shaped by them - albeit to violations of statutes. Specific expressed
congressional intent. concerning implied private rights pursuant to
the doctrine is usually lacking; indeed, such intent is said to be rele-
vant only if there is a plain negative intent. 3 ' The broad purpose
of the statute, including the persons and interests to be protected,
is crucial, as shown by the United States Supreme Court's exami-
nation of section 14 (a)"' and its legislative history in J.1. Case Co.
v. Borak.'33 There the Court found that the language of section
14(a) and the fact that one of its stated purposes was the protection
of investors "clearly implies the availability of judicial relief where
necessary to achieve that result."'34  This comes close to a finding
of clearly implied affirmative congressional intent. Implied rights
have been considered, in Borak and other cases, as arising under the
Exchange Act for the purposes of applying the jurisdiction, venue,
and service-of-process provisions of section 27."' Nevertheless,
specific congressional intent concerning implied rights is less of a
consideration under the tort doctrine - both in creation by the
courts of implied rights and in determining the weight to be given
to agency attempts to negate them - than under section 29(b).
In applying the tort doctrine, the focus shifts from the rather specific
affirmative congressional intent manifested in section 29(b) to an
inquiry of the role of court and agency in effectuation of more
broadly stated congressional purposes.
A negation rule purporting to overrule the tort doctrine is an at-
tempt by the agency to promulgate an exclusive primary jurisdiction
doctrine ousting the courts from a part of their traditional jurisdic-
tion and depriving private parties of all implied rights of recovery
under the Exchange Act, for there is no administrative mechanism
for awarding private relief.'36 As might be expected, nothing in
the Exchange Act directly touches upon this. The shortcomings of
section 23 (a) in classifying persons out of implied rights have al-
131 See Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946) (motion
to dismiss), 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa.) (on the merits), modified, 83 F. Supp. 613
(E.D. Pa. 1947) (on request for additional findings).
13 2 Exchange Act § 14(a), 47 Stat. 895 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a)
(1964).
133 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
134J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964).
135 See cases cited note 48 supra.
136 Primary jurisdiction is covered in 3 DAVIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 55 19.01-.09
(1958); JAFFE, op. cit. supra note 96, at 121-51. The possibility of the agency's seek-
ing relief for private persons in court, especially under negation rules phrased as are
the Comptroller's, may remain. See text accompanying note 65 supra. See also notes
93 supra and 143, 147 infra.
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ready been mentioned.'37 The considerable flexibility of the agen-
cies in promulgating implementing rules does not cover the effect
in private suits of violations of the rules and the Exchange Act.
Section 3 (b) again furnishes no assistance to an agency, for the tort
doctrine is not dependent upon a technical, trade, or accounting term
in the Exchange Act. Nothing in the act, however, specifically for-
bids an agency to negate the tort doctrine, although section 271"'
is the hardest of hurdles for a negation rule.
The Borak case might be interpreted as a declaration that the
standards and purposes permeating the Exchange Act - public in-
terest and protection of investors - always require application of
the tort doctrine 3' to provide relief whenever an investor or other
person whose interests are protected by the act is injured by its vio-
lation. If so, questions whether the agency ever has jurisdiction to
issue negation rules and of the intensity of judicial scrutiny of the
rules (if the agency has some jurisdiction) become immaterial. The
agency must operate within the purposes of the Exchange Act, 4
and if the purposes at this time automatically require application of
the doctrine to protect investors and others, jurisdiction and inten-
sity of review become unimportant; no amount of deference - short
of total abdication - by the courts to the agency could save the
rule. Certainly, a main purpose of almost the entire Exchange Act
is protection of investors,14' a purpose relied upon in Borak as
"dearly" implying a private right. Yet, as discussed below,'42 given
a showing that in a special situation, implied rights result in a net
detriment to enforcement rather than a supplement or the "neces-
137 See text accompanying note 127 supra.
138Exchange Act § 27, 48 Stat. 902-03 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa
(1964).
139 Subject to the defenses that have been applied and subject to Borak's reference
to "appropriate relief," which supplies needed flexibility, especially in proxy cases.
140 See materials cited supra note 125. In addition, see 78 CONG. REc. 8091 (1934)
(remarks of Mr. Lea):
There is a broad power in the bill, but there are several standards, and in
attempting to determine what those standards are the courts have a right to
resort to all sections of the bill.... The standards of the Commission must
be those which are consistent with the purposes of the bill.
S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1934), states that:
Accordingly, it is essential to entrust the administration of the Act to an
agency vested with the power to eliminate undue hardship and to prevent and
punish evasion. Of course, well defined limits must be indicated within which
the authority of such administrative authority may be exercised.
141 See Baird v. Franklin, 141 F.2d 238, 244 n.4 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S.
737 (1944).
14 2 See text accompanying notes 149-65 infra.
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sary supplement" found in Borak, the cases on primary jurisdiction
- especially the Supreme Court's early decision in Texas & Pac. Ry.
Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co.4 ' - would supply precedent for a
court's restricting the Borak rationale. Proper purpose can thus con-
ceivably be present, but should the possibility of proper agency pur-
pose create agency jurisdiction to command the restriction of the
jurisdiction of the courts?
The question then is how agency rule-making commands to the
courts concerning implied rights should be handled. Should the
143 204 U.S. 426 (1907). A shipper, claiming a properly published rate was un-
reasonable, brought a common law action against the carrier in a state court. Though
the Interstate Commerce Act stated that such remedies were not abrogated, the Court,
reversing the state court, held the action would not lie and that only the ICC could de-
termine reasonableness. The Court found that if - without previous action by the ICC,
which had the authority to award reparations - courts could make decisions on reason-
ableness, there would be no uniform standard of rates, and this would render enforce-
ment of the statute impossible. The most frequently quoted language in the opinion
is that concerning the provision saving common law remedies. The Court held this
could not contemplate a right absolutely inconsistent with the Act as "the Act cannot
be held to destroy itself." Id. at 446. The case and the primary jurisdiction doctrine
in its various forms are discussed in 3 DAVIs, op. cit supra note 136, at 55 19.01-.09;
JAFFE, op. cit. supra note 96, at 121-51. See also notes 91, 93, and 136 supra.
In Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963), the Court held that
the act will be considered to have impliedly repealed the antitrust laws "only if neces-
sary to make [the act] work, and even then only to the minimum extent necessary."
In Wills v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 360 (S.D. Cal. 1961), a pro-
spective passenger refused air transportation showed a violation of the Federal Aviation
Act and, under an implied rights theory, was awarded compensatory damages of $1.54
and exemplary damages of $5,000. Plaintiff's prayer for injunctive relief against the
airline was held, however, to require referral to the CAB.
In Southwestern Sugar & Molasses Co. v. River Terminals Corp., 360 U.S. 411
(1959), the question of validity of a clause, in a tariff filed by a carrier with the ICC,
purporting to limit common law liabilities for negligence was held to raise an adminis-
trative question for reference to the ICC for obtaining its views, as the transfer of risk
may have affected the rate. In Dixilyn Drilling Corp. v. Crescent Towing & Salvage Co.,
372 U.S. 697 (1963), the Court held, in a per curiam opinion, that an agreement by
a barge owner in a towage contract to assume liability for all losses in towage, including
any resulting from the tower's negligence, would not exempt the tower from liability, as
between the two parties, for the tower's negligence. The Court, limiting Southwestern
Sugar to its facts, relied upon earlier cases invalidating exculpatory clauses.
A high water mark for agency action - or more precisely, inaction - successfully
limiting common law liability to private parties is Lichten v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 189
F.2d 939 (2d Cit. 1951). The filing with the CAB by the airline of a tariff disclaim-
ing all liability for certain losses was held to require the application of primary juris-
diction to a suit by a passenger for the value of jewelry in lost baggage. The majority
found this required though the CAB has no reparations authority.
Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, 383 U.S. 53 (1966) (5-4 decision), held that
the NLRB does not have exclusive jurisdiction concerning alleged defamatory statements
by a union and its officers during an organizing campaign and that an officer of the em-
ployer could maintain a civil action under state law for allegedly defamatory statements
circulated by the union and its officers, provided they were circulated with malice and
caused damage to the plaintiff. The majority felt that such suits would not interfere
with the jurisdiction of the NLRB (which can award no damages to the defamed indi-
vidual) over the merits of the labor controversy.
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courts consider the agency totally without jurisdiction in the area,
giving it only the traditional role of a party which may be able to
furnish the courts with helpful and informed views and arguments
to aid them in making their own implied rights determinations?
Another possibility is to consider that the agency has inherent rule-
making jurisdiction in proper cases to restrict the tort doctrine and
section 2744 but that the courts will, in a manner similar to that
often followed in reviewing rules furnishing exemptions from sec-
tion 16(b), independently and rigorously review the validity of any
rule in light of its effectuation of congressional purposes. The ef-
fects of these two approaches would be about the same insofar as the
statutory tort doctrine is concerned, as automatic ultra vires treat-
ment of a rule negating the tort doctrine would leave available the
judicial discretion inherent in the doctrine.'45 A third possibility is
(by rough analogy to the second Chenery case' 46) for the courts
to hold that the agency has inherent rule-making jurisdiction and
to defer considerably to the agency's judgment.
An agency rule purporting to direct the courts to imply a private
right would be considered automatically ultra vires, even if the
agency's rule were based, for example, upon the best of findings
that implied rights are a necessary supplement to its enforcement
action. The courts are as well qualified as the agency to interpret
section 29(b). The statutory tort doctrine has been created and
developed by the courts, not the agencies. The courts hear the
cases, decide questions of fact, and shape the remedies, as is recog-
nized in section 27. The courts have eminent qualifications to dis-
cern the congressional purposes of the Exchange Act and the in-
terests and classes of persons intended to be protected as well as to
determine the fairness of allowing one private party to recover from
another for injuries caused by violations of the Exchange Act.'47
144 Exchange Act § 27, 48 Stat. 902-03 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa
(1964).
14r If an exemption from an express liability is voided, Exchange Act § 23 (a), 48
Star. 901 (1934) as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78w (a) (1964) may offer assistance if the
invalid rule attempted to provide an exemption from Exchange Act § 16 (b), 48 Stat.
896 (1934) as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1964). See text accompanying notes
174-79 infra.
146 SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947) (review of legal conclusions of
an order), discussed in 4 DAvis, op. cit. supra note 136, § 30.09; JAFFE, op. cit. supra
note 96, at 581-83. Cf. SEC v. New England Elec. Sys., 34 U.S.L. WEEK 4393 (U.S.
May 16, 1966).
147 Here, the qualifications of the courts outweigh the technical expertise of the
agency. For a discussion of comparative qualifications, see 4 DAVIS, op. cit. supra note
136, at § 30.09; JAFFE, op. cit. supra note 96, at 576-85. See also notes 93, 136, 143,
and 146 supra.
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An agency rule purporting to negate may be based on one or
more of the same factors. The agency may conclude that strike suits
by persons without meritorious causes of action will be an unbear-
able problem to those it regulates, a judgment implicitly rejected in
Borak. The agency may simply not believe in Borak and be an-
tagonistic to the concept of private recoveries. The agency may
believe that it is the better judge of fairness or that the courts can-
not be entrusted to fashion sensible relief. Or the agency may feel
that it is a better interpreter of section 29(b) or of congressional
purposes or intent or that it can better discern the interests and
classes of persons that the act is intended to protect. Negation rules
based on many of these grounds would, of course, be inconsistent
with congressional purposes, but even more basically, negation rules
based on any of these grounds should be considered outside the
agency's area of jurisdiction. The congressional purposes are found
in the Exchange Act and its legislative history, as is the lack of a
negative intent on application of the tort doctrine. The agency's
rules cannot change either and must carry out, not frustrate, con-
gressional purposes. The Comptroller's rules appear to recognize
this, as they do not state an agency purpose not to protect investors,
which would be impermissible under the standards of the Exchange
Act. Nor do they purport to announce the discovery of a negative
congressional intent on implied rights. The rules only state an
agency intent of no private enforcement, and it has been congres-
sional purpose rather than agency intent on implied rights that has
been decisive in applying the tort doctrine.
The agency's views on congressional purposes, interpretation of
section 29 (b), fairness, the dangers of strike suits, and similar mat-
ters may be valuable to the courts; but the comparative qualifica-
tions 48 of court and agency on these considerations should not lead
to a judicial creation of inherent agency rule-making power to oust
the courts from their traditional jurisdiction exercised under sec-
tion 27.
However, a negation rule may be based upon an ostensible find-
ing, belief, or apprehension that the implication of private rights
would be a net detriment to enforcement. As noted, a clear show-
ing in a special situation of net detriment to enforcement should be
grounds for a court to limit implied rights. Does this change the
picture? But first, how would a net detriment arise? Borak found
private actions a "necessary supplement" to the Commission's proxy
14 8 See note 147 supra.
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rules. The Senate Report 49 on the Exchange Act pointed out, in
discussing express private rights, the inadequacies of relying solely
on criminal penalties and noted further that "if an investor has
suffered loss by reason of illicit practices, it is equitable that he
should be allowed to recover damages from the guilty party."'5 °
On the other hand, the agency may feel that a substantive rule
must necessarily be broad and general and that while its discretion
in administering the rule can be trusted to avoid unfairly penalizing
those who in good faith attempt to comply, but fail, the possibility
of civil recoveries by private plaintiffs against such violators would
preclude the agency's adoption of the rule in that form. 5' Or,
the agency may believe that. private plaintiffs' actions will result
in adverse court decisions on the scope of the statute or the agency's
rules. Neither ground is persuasive. The agency has a uniquely
good set of tools for dealing with the problems that may be
created by a broad, general rule. The rule can be - and often
should be in any event - made more definite by examples in the
rule. 2 or by explanatory releases. 53 Procedures in the rule for ad
149 S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934).
-15 Id. at 12.
15 1 In Nashville Milk Co. v. Carnation Co., 355 U.S. 373 (1958), the question was
one of construing the Robinson-Patman Act and the Clayton Act to determine whether
private causes of action could be brought under the latter for sales at unreasonably low
prices for the purposes of destroying competition or eliminating a competitor which are
forbidden only by § 3 of the former. Mr.' Justice Harlan, writing for the majority, con-
strued the two statutes and concluded no private action would lie. He said:
It is not an idle conjecture that the possibility of abuse inherent in a private
cause of action based upon this vague provision was among the factors which
led Congress to leave the enforcement of the provisions of § 3 solely in the
hands of the public authorities, except to the extent that violation of any of its
provisions also constituted a violation of § 2 of the Clayton Act... Id. at
378-79 (Footnotes omitted).
In United States v. National Dairy Prods. Corp., 372 U.S. 29 (1963), the Court found
this language of § 3 sufficiently dear, in a challenge to its constitutionality, to support
a criminal indictment charging its violation by making sales below cost for the purpose
of destroying competition. On trial and appeal, the government won its case. National
Dairy Prods. Corp. v. United States, 350 F.2d 321 (8th Cit. 1965). However, the Su-
preme Court has vacated the judgment and remanded the case for further consideration
in light of its decision in Dennis v. United States, 34 U.S.L. WEEK 4556 (U.S. June 20,
1966), concerning the rights of defendants to inspect grand jury testimony. National
Dairy Prods. Corp. v. United States, 34 U.S.L WEEK 3426, 3428 (U.S. June 20, 1966).
As pointed out in the text accompanying notes 151-57 infra, an agency administer-
ing the Exchange Act has clarifying and other limiting tools superior to those available
in the administration of the antitrust statutes, and, in addition, single rather than treble
damages are at stake in implied rights actions under the Exchange Act.
152The Internal Revenue Service employs examples effectively. The sixteen ex-
amples in Treas. Reg. § 1.355-1(d) (1955) may represent the most extensive use by
the Service. Examples and specific prohibitions can be used in addition to general pro-
scriptions and can be designed so as not to limit the salutary reach of a general proscrip-
tion in the inevitable situations where the ingenious devise ways to avoid the letter of
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hoc exemptions.. and provisions that good faith attempts to comply
will be deemed compliance (a technique adopted by the FRB in its
margin rules) 55 can also be used where necessary. As to the sec-
ond ground, some of the landmark cases liberally construing the
Exchange Act and the Commission's rules have been brought by
private plaintiffs.'56 Moreover, the filing of amicus curiae briefs
and applications for intervention... are available to the agency. In
any event, the additional enforcement muscle provided by private
plaintiffs is much more important to an agency that wants the Ex-
change Act and its rules effectively enforced than the possibility
that some of the legal arguments of some of the private plaintiffs
may not be as good as those the agency presents in its own court
actions.
Suppose the agency says a negation clause was inserted in a
given substantive rule that is quite definite in the requirements it
imposes simply because of intense industry opposition to the rule,
absent negation? Congress apparently made a similar compromise
in 1938 when it added sections 15(c) (2)158 and 15(c) (3), 159
which authorize Commission rules reasonably designed to "prevent"
fraudulent conduct by broker-dealers in over-the-counter transactions
and imposing financial responsibility requirements upon broker-
dealers doing any over-the-counter business. After industry oppo-
sition during the congressional hearings to the sections - especially
section 15 (c) (2) - and implication of private rights upon viola-
tions of rules under them, Congress did not delete the sections, al-
though they were modified. Congress did, however, remove vio-
specific prohibitions. See, e.g., Rule 15cl-2(c), 17 C.F.R. § 240.15cl-2(c) (1964)
(states expressly that Rule 15cl-2, the general antifraud rule under § 15 (c) (1), is not
limited by other, specific rules under the section).
153 See, e.g., SEC Securities Act Release No. 4818, Jan. 21, 1966 (clarification of
Rule 154 under Securities Act).
15 4 See, e.g., Rule 15c3-1 (b) (3); Rule 14a-1l (c).
155 12 C.F.R. § 220.6(k), 221.3(h) (1963).
1 56 E.g., Baird v. Franklin, 141 F.2d 238 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 737
(1944); Union Pac. R.R. v. Chicago & Nw. Ry., 226 F. Supp. 400 (N.D. Ill. 1964);
Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946) (motion to dis-
miss), 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa.) (on the merits), modified, 83 F. Supp. 613 (E.D.
Pa. 1947).
157 On the Commission's experience and practice, see 3 Loss, SECURITIEs REGULA-
TION 1935-36 (2d ed. 1961).
15 8 Exchange Act § 15(c) (2), 48 Stat. 895 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78o
(c)(2) (1964).
15 9 Exchange Act § 15(c) (3), 48 Star. 895 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78o
(c)(3) (1964).
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lations of rules under the two sections from section 29 (b) .0 What
weight should be given to this pragmatic argument, one which, inci-
dentally, an agency may hesitate to articulate? If an agency is de-
nied negation power and actually fails to adopt a rule because of
the implied rights that would flow from it, investors are the losers.
The argument could not justify the wholesale negation attempted
by the Comptroller, but it could have some practical appeal on
specific rules in frontier areas of regulation. On balance, however,
this argument must, if the agency should choose to advance it, be
given no force. Where Congress has created and delegated power
to an agency, the necessary expectation and standard must be that
the agency will have the independence effectively to exercise the
authority according to the delegation standards and congressional
purposes. The private rights of investors harmed by violations
should not be sacrificed to take the pressure off an agency in pro-
mulgating what by definition is a desirable rule.
Though the three foregoing possibilities seem to offer no sup-
port for a conclusion that implied rights could be a net detriment to
enforcement, they are obviously not exhaustive. Regulation under
the Exchange Act will probably continue to be fast-moving, as it has
been since the 1930's.161 Though implied rights have, to date, been
a decided advantage in the enforcement and attainment of the con-
gressional purpose, in special circumstances the opposite may be
true. For example, the Comptroller administers the National Bank
Act6 2 as well as a portion of the Exchange Act. Although neither
the FRB nor the FDIC adopted a negation rule, the Comptroller
may be able to show that because of something unique in banking
regulation, implied rights under the Exchange Act would constitute
a net detriment to his enforcement of the National Bank Act or the
act. Also, section 19(b) (9) 163 - which authorizes the Commis-
160 See the provisos in § 29(b) ; materials cited in 3 Loss, op. cit. supra note 157, at
1760 n.253.
16 1 For example, Rule 10b-5 was not adopted until 1942. See 3 Loss, op. cit. supra
note 157, at 1426-27. The vast changes in the proxy rules from 1935-1960 are sum-
marized in 2 Loss, op. cit. supra note 157, at 869-71.
162 General Elec. Credit Corp. v. James Talcott, Inc., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 5
91633 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 1966) decided that, in an action against a national bank un-
der the Securities Act and the Exchange Act, the venue provisions under the National
Bank Act (which provide that a national bank may be sued only in the judicial district
in which it was established), rather than the venue sections of the two federal securities,
statutes, would govern. Cf. SEC v. National Sec., Inc., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 5 91646
(D. Ariz. Feb. 14, 1966); Fischer v. Kletz, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 5 91687 (S.D.N.Y.
Jan. 13, 1966).
163 Exchange Act § 19(b) (9), 48 Stat. 898 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. 78s
(b)(9) (1964).
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sion to effect changes in exchange rules concerning "the fixing of
reasonable rates of commission . . . and other charges" - could
produce problems."6 4 If the section were construed to give individ-
ual investors an implied private right to challenge exchange com-
mission rates as unreasonable or discriminatory - an unlikely but
not impossible private cause of action to imply under the Exchange
Act - the Commission should be held to have primary jurisdiction,
requiring at a minimum giving the Commission an opportunity to
conduct an appropriate proceeding and to furnish its views to the
court.
1 6 5
164 Ibid.
165 Primary jurisdiction and antitrust are discussed in the materials cited in note
2 supra. If Kaplan v. Lehman Bros., TRADE REG. REP. (1966 Trade Cas.) 5 71697
(N.D. Ill. Feb. 25, 1966) is followed, the antitrust laws will bow considerably to the
Commission's § 19(b) (9) authority.
Implication of a private right under the Act by reference to § 19(b) (9) is unlikely,
for § 19(b) authorizes the Commission to request the alteration or supplementation of
exchange rules and to alter or supplement, after notice and opportunity for hearing, if
the exchange does not act. The Kaplan case indicates that commission rates are almost
completely in the Commission's jurisdiction. However, Baird v. Franklin, 141 F.2d
238 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 323 U.S. 737 (1944), extensively discussed in part II,
created an implied private right out of a statutory direction to the Commission; the di-
rection, however, left the Commission with no discretion, and Judge Clark viewed §
19 (a) (1) (Commission authority to discipline exchanges) as not creating an implied
private right. Id. at 245. Section 36 of the Investment Company Act, 54 Stat. 789
(1940), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §5 80a-1 to -52 (1964), which authorizes Commission
requests for injunctive relief against persons alleged to have committed gross abuses of
trust or gross misconduct, has been held by one court to create an implied private right;,
the question of implied rights under that section is unsettled, however. For a discussion
of § 36, see Eisenberg & Phillips, Mutual Fund Litigation - New Frontiers for the In-
vestment Company Act, 62 COLuM. L. REV. 73 (1962); Eisenberg & Lehr, An Aspect
of the Emerging "Federal Corporation Law": Directorial Responsibility Under The In-
vestment Company Act of 1940, 20 RUTGERS L. REV. 181 (1966).
In Taussig v. Wellington Fund, Inc., 187 F. Supp. 179 (D. Del. 1960), aff'd, 313
F.2d 472 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 806 (1963), the stockholders of a mutual
fund relied upon, inter alia, § 35 (d) of the Investment Company Act and the common
law doctrine of unfair competition in requesting relief including the enjoining of an-
other mutual fund from the use of a portion of the name of their mutual fund in the
other mutual fund's name. Section 35 (d) forbids a mutual fund or any other regis-
tered investment company to adopt as a part of its name or title "any word or words
which the Commission finds and by order declares to be deceptive or misleading." (Em-
phasis added.) The court of appeals considered at some length the question whether
the section creates an implied private right, the majority concluding that it is "legally
debatable" but certainly "not frivolous." Thus, the district court's finding of pendent
jurisdiction over the common law claim was upheld. See also notes 93, 136, 143, 146,
and 147 supra and accompanying text. Cf. Studebaker Corp. v. Gittlin, CCH FED. SEC.
L REP. 5 91657 (2d Cir. April 5, 1966) (private action under proxy rules to enjoin
state court proceedings; despite the anti-injunction statute, the court affirmed the grant-
ing of the injunction, equating the Commission's right and the right of the private party).
Finding an implied private right under the Act, but making use of an appropriate
primary jurisdiction doctrine, would allow the Commission to retain effective jurisdic-
tion but force it publicly to go on record and perhaps to hold proceedings periodically.
The approach could be a flexible and salutary tool available to the courts if it is decided
that while there is antitrust immunity, individual investors and classes of investors
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As discussed earlier,"' negation rules based upon anything other
than net detriment to enforcement should be considered outside the
agency's jurisdiction, and precedent and protocol would indicate that
rules purportedly based upon that ground should be treated the
same way. The general scheme of the Exchange Act is that the
courts pass upon the jurisdiction and actions of the agencies and
not that the agency contracts the jurisdiction of the courts. Implied
rights have traditionally been considered in the province of the
courts and have been shaped by them, not the agencies. Where,
however, net detriment may be'a ground - which may be the case
on the extant rules, although none is supported by a public an-
nouncement of reasons - agency expertise presents a new dimen-
sion. The courts, in passing upon the relationship of the antitrust
and the regulatory laws, must decide questions similar to those in-
volved in reviewing the interaction of the statute and the judicially-
created tort doctrine,' but the agency's knowledge of the problems
of administering its own statute is a significant consideration. Is it
significant enough to warrant the creation of inherent agency rule-
making power to negate, and thus restrict the grant of jurisdiction
to the courts in section 27,168 a grant to which Borak paid consider-
able attention? Is the traditional approach - treating implied
rights as being wholly within the courts' jurisdiction - too inflex-
ible?
Under the traditional approach to implied rights, an agency
negation rule would be considered automatically ultra vires, and ju-
dicial discretion in applying the tort doctrine would be counted upon
to give proper effect to any valid net-detriment-to-enforcement con-
sideration underlying the rule. Erasure of section 29(b) rights can
seemingly be accomplished only in this manner; so far, section 29
(b) and the tort doctrine have usually travelled together, and sepa-
rate treatment at this juncture would seem anomalous. Moreover,
should have an effective avenue of complaint - at least to require appropriate formal
or semiformal Commission procedures concerning changes on a prospective basis.
166 See text accompanying notes 147-48 supra.
167 In Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963), the Court measured
the effects of the application of the antitrust laws to the NYSE's actions in that case
upon the scheme of self-regulation and Commission regulation under the Act before
finding the lack of antitrust immunity. The Court found that the aims of the Exchange
Act were defeated, rather than furthered, by the NYSE's conduct complained of in the
case. Id. at 361-67.
168 Exchange Act § 27, 48 Star. 902-03 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa
(1964).
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it has been seen that there are many totally invalid reasons why an
agency may wish to negate the tort doctrine.
The traditional implied rights approach to negation rules would
not interfere with the work of the agencies. For one thing, an
agency's substantive rules are not at issue; the legal duties to the
government are the same whether or not implied private rights flow
from violations. If the agency's reasons for desiring an exception
to the implied rights doctrine are valid and consistent with the con-
gressional purposes, they will undoubtedly be honored by the courts.
And as discussed below,'69 certainty to potential defendants is no
consideration; if the courts were to create agency jurisdiction but
independently scrutinize negation rules for consistency with congres-
sional purpose, rules declared invalid would furnish no shield under
section 23 (a) 70 for violations of the Exchange Act occurring before
invalidation. Agencies can, furthermore, use rule-making and other
releases to announce, in advance and in advisory form, the position
they will urge in court on implied rights issues. Indeed, use of this
procedure might encourage a "full disclosure" by the agency of the
reasons why it believes a specific situation should require a reversal
of the Borak rationale.
There appears to be no good reason why the courts should
manufacture for the agencies an inherent rule-making power for the
latter to use in turn to override section 27 and command the courts
to relinquish their traditional independent jurisdiction in handling
the tort doctrine. Indeed, protection of investors - a main purpose
of the Exchange Act - will best be accomplished by the traditional
approach. That approach will assure investors that their rights un-
der the statutory tort doctrine - a fruitful and dynamic marriage
of congressional purpose and judicial alertness to its effectuation' 7 '
- will be negated only where an independent inquiry reveals actual
special considerations that cause private, actions to be a net detri-
ment rather than a supplement or a "necessary supplement" to
agency action.
169 See text accompanying notes 172-79 inifra.
17OExchange Act § 23(a), 48 Star. 901 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. 78w(a)
(1964).
17 1 It is for the federal courts "to adjust their remedies so as to grant the nec-
essary relief" where federally secured rights are invaded. "And it is also well
settled that where legal rights have been invaded, and a federal statute pro-
vides for a general right to sue for such invasion, federal courts may use any
available remedy to make good the wrong done." Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678,
684 (1946).
J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433 (1964).
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VII. THE FINAL CONSIDERATION: EFFECT OF GOOD FAITi
RELIANCE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 23 (a)
A final - and crucial - issue turns on the declaration in
section 23(a) that "no provision [of the Exchange Act] impos-
ing any liability shall apply to any act done or omitted in good faith
in conformity with any rule or regulation [of the applicable
agency].... "172  This results even though the rule or regulation
may, after the act or omission, "be amended or rescinded or be de-
termined by judicial or other authority to be invalid for any rea-
son.""7 Do all negation rules necessarily give immunity for viola-
tions occurring before the first judicial holding of invalidity?
Section 23 (a) has been given broad scope in cases involving in-
valid or questioned Commission rule-making exemptions from sec-
tion 16(b).174 In those cases, the courts have held or assumed that
private parties need not inquire into the legal basis for a rule as long
as it remains unrevoked and there is no judicial holding of in-
validity.17
5
The sectiod 16(b)176 cases are distinguishable in two respects,
however. Section 16(b) does not make anything unlawful or im-
pose legal duties on an insider. It only creates a civil cause of action
in an insider makes a profit from specified short-swing trading. In
the section 16(b) cases, the parties relying upon the exemptive
rules were, therefore, not legally bound to buy or sell stock - the
acts creating civil liability - and they usually or often would have
timed their transactions differently but for good faith reliance upon
the exemptive, rules. As a leading case put it in determining that
a defendant would be entitled to protection under section 23(a):
"defendant's continued participation... and his ultimate exercise of
the option ... followed by his immediate sale of the stock, would
not have occurred were it not for his good faith reliance on the SEC
17 2 Exchange Act § 23(a), 48 Star. 901 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. 78w(a)
(1964).
173 Ibid.
174 See 3 Loss, op. cit. s pra note 157, at 1842-49. Where a rule is declared in-
valid before the defendant commits the act for which liability is imposed, 5 23(a) fur-
nishes no immunity. B. T. Babbit, Inc. v. Lachner, 332 F.2d 255, 259 (2d Cir. 1964).
For a discussion of the problems of persons in districts and circuits other than the one
in which the rule is held invalid, see 3 LoSS, op. cit. supra note 157, at 1849.
175 Ibid.
176 Exchange Act § 16(b), 48 Stat. 896 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b)
(1964).
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regulation defining an officer.",177 A negation rule, on the other
hand, purports to relieve one who violates a statutory duty from
liabilities to those he injures; it does not relieve the violator from
his duties to comply with the Exchange Act or place him outside
the reach of governmental enforcement machinery. Thus, the only
possible reliance upon a negation rule can be a feeling that compli-
ance is not important if only the agency can act. This is hardly the
kind of reliance present in the section 16 (b) cases. In the language
of section 23(a), a violation of the Exchange Act cannot be "done
or omitted in good faith in conformity with" a negation rule.1
7 1
There is no unfairness in automatic invalidation of a negation rule
and finding that immunity under section 23(a) is unavailable.
Moreover, the voiding of a negation rule dearly should not cause
the implementing rule to fall. None of the negation rules contains
a statement of agency intent trying to tie the two together, and even
if such an intent were stated, it should be disregarded. The job of
the agencies is to implement the Exchange Act and not to attempt
to construct implementing rules that collapse when bootstrapping
experiments with negation rules fail.
The section 16(b) cases were also devoid of allegations of false
or misleading statements, fraud, or actual misuse of inside informa-
tion by the defendants. If a violation purported to be removed from
section 29 (b) and the tort doctrine involves fraud or a false or mis-
leading statement or report, "good faith" may be lacking, especially
if an element of scienter is present.1
7 1
If this analysis is correct, potential defendants, obligated in any
event to comply with the Exchange Act and subject to, governmental
enforcement remedies for violations, must regard a negation rule as
going no further than furnishing some assurance that in any action
177 Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. Rathman, 106 F. Supp. 810, 814 (S.D. Cal. 1952),
cited with approval in Greene v. Dietz, 247 F.2d 689, 694, 695 (2d Cir. 1957).
178 Exchange Act § 23 (a), 48 Stat. 901 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78w(a)
(1964).
179 In one of the § 16(b) cases, Van Aalten v. Hurley, 176 F. Supp. 851 (S.D.N.Y.
1959), the court favorably noted the defendants' compliance with the reporting require-
ments of § 16 (a). The recent decisions of the Supreme Court refusing to give some of
its overruling constitutional criminal law opinions retrospective effect in habeas corpus
applications (Tehan v. United States, 382 U.S. 406 (1966); Linkletter v. Walker, 381
U.S. 618 (1965)) seem inapposite in applying § 23(a). Section 23(a) specifies when
an invalid rule can furnish protection, and a defendant unable to meet § 23 (a)'s re-
quirements appears to have no constitutional grounds for complaint. Furthermore, for
the reasons stated in the text, reliance on a negation rule is weak, at best, whereas reli-
ance by law enforcement officials and prosecutors upon prior decisions of the Court was
strong in the situations ruled upon in Tehan and Linkletter, supra, especially in the
former.
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brought against them by private plaintiffs, the agency will appear on
their side to urge that a special circumstance which prompted the
agency to promulgate the rule should be regarded by the court as
justifying a judicially created exception to the implied rights
doctrine.
PART II
IMPLIED RIGHTS UNDER THE EXCHANGE ACT
FOR VIOLATIONS OF SELF-REGULATORY
REQUIREMENTS
The* second portion of this article discusses the efforts of private
plaintiffs to find implied rights under the Exchange Act for viola-
tions by broker-dealers and companies of the rules and require-
ments of the exchanges and the National Association of Securities
Dealers, Inc. (NASD), private organizations which under the act
require significant investor protections and which play an integral
part in securities regulation in America. This part also briefly dis-
cusses the rule-making authority of the Commission and of the self-
regulators to negate any such private rights that might be implied
by the courts.
Again, a recent development best poses the question. In Colo-
nial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co.,' decided March 10, 1966 by the
Second Circuit, the issue was whether an alleged breach of the
most far-reaching of the self-regulators' requirements, that member
firms observe just and equitable principles of trade, could form the
basis of an implied right under the Exchange Act. The Second Cir-
cuit, after the most thorough judicial consideration to date of im-
plied rights for violations of the requirements of the self-regulators,
held a good federal claim was not stated. The court, however,
carefully left open the possibility of implied rights under the Ex-
change Act for violations of other self-regulatory requirements -
for example, those that "play an integral part in SEC regulation."
In its dictum - that there is a possibility of implied rights without
a showing of a violation of the act or Commission rules - the
opinion is a sophisticated groundbreaker.
Much of this portion is devoted to an analysis of the Colonial
180 Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache &-Co., 358 F.2d 178 (2d Cir.), Petition for cert.
filed, 34 U.S.L WEEK 3400 (U.S. May 17, 1966).
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Realty opinion. Preceding that, however, the rather complex statu-
tory scheme of Commission regulation and self-regulation is dis-
cussed, some considerations of policy and construction are outlined,
the effect given to violations of self-regulatory requirements under
state law is analyzed, and the pre-Colonial Realty cases under the
Exchange Act are discussed. Following the analysis of the Colonial
Realty opinion is the brief discussion of the authority of the Com-
mission or the self-regulators to negate, by rule, any implied rights
for violations of self-regulatory requirements that the courts might
imply. A suggested test is included in the conclusion.
I. THE STAkTUTORY SCHEME
A. Registration and Requirements of the Self-Regulators
As required and sanctioned by the Exchange Act, the rules of
the nation's registered securities exchanges and the NASD impose
a host of requirements on their member broker-dealer firms.'
In 1934, Congress proceeded on the theory that exchanges
should be treated as "public institutions" and not "private clubs."
The House Committee felt that "the great exchanges of this country
upon which millions of dollars of securities are sold are affected
with a public interest in the same degree as any other great util-
ity."" The unique system of governmental control- initiative in
the exchanges, governmental oversight, and governmental power in
reserve - is summarized in this statement from the House Report:
The Commission is empowered, if the rules of the exchange in any
important matter are not appropriate for the protection of investors
or appropriate to insure fair dealing, to order such changes in the
rules after due notice and hearings as it may deem necessary. The
exchanges may alter their rules if more effective means are dis-
covered to meet the same or new problems. Although a wide
measure of initiative and responsibility is left with the exchanges,
reserved control is in the Commission if the exchanges do not
meet their responsibility. It is hoped that the effect of the bill will
be to give to the well-managed exchanges that power necessary to
181 For good discussions of self-regulation, see SEC, Report of Special Study of Se-
curities Markets of the Securities and Exchange Commission, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th
Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 4, at 495-739 (1963) [hereinafter cited as "Special Study"]; 2
LOSS, op. cit. supra note 157, at 1165-83, 1358-91; Jennings, Self-Regulation in the
Securities Industry: The Role of the Securities and Exchange Commission, 29 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 663 (1964); Westwood & Howard, Self-government in the Secu-
rities Business, 17 LAw & CONTEmP. PRoB. 518 (1958). For changes made by the
1964 amendments, see Phillips & Shipman, An Analysis of the Securities Acts Amend-
ments of 1964, 1964 DuxE .. J. 706, 797-845.
18 2 H.K. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1934), reprinted 78 CONG. REc.
7701, 7706 (1934).
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enable them to effect themselves needed reforms and that the oc-
casion for direct action by the Commission will not arise.1 13
(1) Registration of Exchanges Under Sections 5 and 6.-Sec-
tion 5 of the Exchange Act' requires exchanges to register with
the Commission. Under section 6(a) (1),"s the exchange must,
as a prerequisite to registration, file an agreement to comply, and
enforce, so far as is within its powers, compliance by its members
with the act and Commission rules.
Section 6(b)... states that "no registration [of an exchange]
shall be granted or remain in force unless the rules of the exchange
include provision for the expulsion, suspension, or disciplining of
a member for conduct or proceeding inconsistent with just and
equitable principles of trade. .. ."' Under the section, the ex-
change rules must declare the willful violation of the Exchange Act
or agency rules to be such inconsistent conduct. The non-waiver
language in section 29 (a)... includes this rule within its voiding of
any provision "binding any person to waive compliance with any
provision [of the Exchange Act or agency rules thereunder], or of
any rule of an exchange required thereby . 1.8.9,'
Section 6(c)9 declares that nothing in the Exchange Act pre-
cludes an exchange from adopting and enforcing any rule not incon-
sistent with the act or agency rules or the law of the state in which
the exchange is located. Section 6(d). 9 instructs the Commission
to approve an exchange's registration application if it appears that
the exchange can comply with the Exchange Act and agency rules
"and that the rules of the exchange are just and adequate to insure
fair dealing and to protect investors. ..."'
(2) Registration of National Securities Associations Under Sec-
tion 15A.-Similar requirements govern the registration of national
183 Ibid.
18448 Star. 885 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78e (1964).
3SExchange Act § 6(a)(1), 48 Stat. 885 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(a) (1)
(1964).
180 Exchange Act § 6(b), 48 Stat. 885 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b) (1964).
187 Ibid. (Emphasis added.) The term "member" is given a broad definition in
the Exchange Act. See Exchange Act § 3(a) (3), 48 Star. 882 (1934), as amended,
15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (3) (1964)..
188 Exchange Act § 29(a), 48 Stat. 903 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. 5 78cc(a)
(1964).
189 Ibid. The language is discussed in 3 Loss, op. cit. supra note 157, at 1812.
9 oExchange Act § 6(c), 48 Stat. 885 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(c) (1964).
191 Exchange Act § 6(d), 48 Stat. 885 (1934), 15 U.S.C. 5 78f(d) (1964).
192 Ibid.
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securities associations - organizations of over-the-counter broker-
dealers designed to provide self-regulation in the over-the-counter
markets comparable to that the exchanges furnish concerning their
members. The formation of these organizations is authorized by
section 15A, added in 1938 by the Maloney Act." 3 The NASD,
the only securities association registered or ever to apply for regis-
tration under the act, counts among its members 3,865 of the 4,543
broker-dealers registered with the Commission.' Since registration
with the Commission is required for virtually all broker-dealers (in-
cluding exchange members)' 95 doing any over-the-counter business,
all NASD members are subject to regulation by the Commission
and the NASD. Many NASD members are also members of one
or more exchanges.
When the Maloney Act was passed, the congressional commit-
tees discussed at some length their philosophy of self-regulation.
The following excerpt from the reports shows the contrast between
the Commission's regulation by law and the self-regulatory controls,
the dependence upon the government to supervise and exercise sup-
plementary direct powers, and the similarities between exchange
and NASD functions:
The committee believes that there are two alternative programs
by which this problem could be met. The first would involve a
pronounced expansion of the organization of the Securities and
Exchange Commission; the multiplication of branch offices; a large
increase in the expenditure of public funds; an increase in the
problem of avoiding the evils of bureaucracy; and a minute, de-
tailed, and rigid regulation of business conduct by law. It might
very well mean expanding the present process of registration of
brokers and dealers with the Commission to include the proscrip-
tion not only of the dishonest, but also of those unwilling or un-
able to conform to rigid standards of financial responsibility, pro-
fessional conduct, and technical proficiency. The second of these
alternative programs, which the committee believes distinctly
preferable to the first, is embodied in S. 3255. This program is
based upon cooperative regulation, in which the task will be large-
ly performed by representative organizations of investment bank-
ers, dealers, and brokers, with the Government exercising appropri-
ate supervision in the public interest, and exercising supplementary
powers of direct regulation. In the concept of a really well or-
ganized and well-conducted stock exchange, under the supervision
193 See 2 Loss, op. cat. supra note 157, at 1359-91; Phillips & Shipman, supra note
181, at 797-845; §§ 15A(b) (8)-(9), 15A(e).
19431 SEC ANN. REP. 58, 69 (1965) (figures as of June 30, 1965).
195 See 2 Loss, op. cit. supra note 157, at 1288-1301; Phillips & Shipman, supra
note 181, at 801-02.
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provided by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, one may per-
ceive something of the possibilities of such a program. 1 6
In its report on the 1964 amendments, 9 ' the Senate Committee
again spoke on self-regulation, once more distinguishing between
the illegal and the unethical:
A significant part of the regulation of the securities markets
provided in the Securities Exchange Act is based upon the concept
of self-regulation by industry organizations, under the supervision
of the Commission. This philosophy was notably reaffirmed in
1938, when Congress enacted section 15A of the act. This ex-
tensive reliance on self-regulation rests on two principal premises;
first, it provides an alternative to a much more pervasive direct
regulation by the Government, which would be expensive to the
taxpayers and burdensome to the industry, and it also provides a
more sensitive and effective device for regulation in the area of
unethical as distinct from illegal conduct.'98
Similar characterizations of self-regulation appear in the Special
Study and elsewhere. 9
(3) Rules and Requirements Promulgated by the Self-Regu-
lators.-Because section 6(b) specifies that a willful violation of
the Exchange Act or Commission rules is, in addition, a violation
of just and equitable principles,"' the self-regulators must aid in
the enforcement of the law, but they are also expected to move
beyond the Commission's legal requirements.
In addition to the general rule requiring adherence to just and
equitable principles of trade (the section 6(b) rule), the self-regu-
lators have many other rules, some of which overlap with the
section 6 (b) rule, adopted primarily for the protection of investors.
A well-known example is the rules of many exchanges forbidding,
with some exceptions, member firms from voting street-name stock
396S. REP. No. 1455, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 3-4 (1938); H.R. REP. No. 2307, 75th
Cong. 3d Sess. 4-5 (1938).
197S. Rip. No. 379, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 42 (1963).
198 Ibid. This was said in connection with required membership in a registered
securities association, deleted in the House. See notes 268-78 infra and accompanying
text.
199 Special Study, pt. 4, at 693-728. In Avery v. Moffatt, 187 Misc. 576, 592, 55
N.Y.S.2d 215, 228 (Sup. Ct. 1954), an action under state law for damages for allegedly
wrongful action of an exchange in suspending members, the court said:
I here is a large area for the operation of exchange rules on the level of busi-
ness ethics rather than law, and in that sphere the statute leaves it to the ex-
changes to carry on the necessary work of prevention and discipline.
200 See, however, note 232 infra.
1966]
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
2011
except in accordance with the instructions of beneficial owners.
Exchanges also sign listing agreements with companies listing their
securities for trading. The agreements contractually bind the issuer
to do certain things (such as make prompt disclosure of material
events) for the benefit of investors, and exchange policies or guides
are often implemented so as to give investors additional protec-
tions. °
(4) Commission Power Over Rules and Requirements of Self-
Regulators.-Under the Exchange Act the Commission's powers
over the rules and requirements of the self-regulators - in addition
to the Commission's authority to issue its own rules"' - are exten-
sive. Under a standard essentially of public interest and protection
of investors, the Commission can, aside from its power over initial
registration, disapprove proposed alterations in, or additions to,
NASD rules and abrogate existing rules of that organization." 4 In
four areas concerning the organization and operation of the associa-
tion as such, but not business or selling practices of members, the
Commission can alter or supplement NASD rules." 5 The pattern
of authority over exchange rules differs somewhat. The Commis-
sion may not veto action of an exchange in adding to or changing
201 See 2 Loss, op. cit. supra note 157, at 624-30; Lowenfels, Implied Liabilities
Based Upon Stock Exchange Rules, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 12, 25-28 (1966); Phillips &
Shipman, supra note 181, at 789-95 (effects of 1964 amendments).
202 For the listing agreements currently'in use by the two largest exchanges, see CCH
AmER. STOCK EXCH. GUIDE 8955 (Listing Form L); N.Y. STOCK. EXcH. Co. MAN-
UAL A-17 to A-28. An example of implementation of a policy is the NYSEs require-
ment that, with some exceptions, proxies be solicited for all meetings of owners, even
if the company came on the exchange at a time when the listing agreement contained
no such requirement. The sanction for noncompliance by such a company is delisting.
See also Securities Exchange Act § 14(c), 48 Stat. 895 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. 5
78n(c) (1964); Kroese v. New York Stock Exch., 227 F. Supp. 519 (S.D.N.Y. 1964);
2 LOSS, op. cit. supra note 157, at 1027-28; Phillips & Shipman, supra note 181, at
789-95 (changes in statute made by 1964 amendments).
203 Some of the more important sections are: Exchange Act §§ 8(b), (c), 48 Stat.
888 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78h(b), (c) (1964); Exchange Act 5§ 9(b),
(c), 48 Star. 889 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78i(b), (c) (1964); Exchange Act § 10, 48
Star. 891 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1964); Exchange Act § 11, 48 Stat. 891 (1934),
as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78k (1964); Exchange Act § 15(c), 48 Star. 895 (1934),
as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c) (1964).
204 Exchange Act § 15A(j), 52 Star. 1070 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(j) (1964);
Exchange Act § 15A(k) (1), 52 Stat. 1070 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(k) (1)
(1964).
205 Exchange Act § 15A(k) (2), 52 Star. 1070 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(k) (2)
(1964). The procedure (which includes notice and opportunity for hearing) and
standard, as well as the effect of the 1964 amendments, are briefly discussed in Phil-
lips & Shipman, supra note 181, at 844.
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its own rules;2 . but on a wide variety of subjects, including many
business and selling practices, the Commission may, under section
19(b) ,27 alter or supplement exchange rules.20 8
The Commission reviews NASD disciplinary action against its
members and their associated persons for violations of NASD
rules.209 In a review proceeding, which may be de novo, the Com-
mission can set aside or decrease, but not increase, any penalty.21
Commission review authority also exists for NASD denials of mem-
bership or registered representative status.211 There is no similar
Commission authority to review specific disciplinary and denial ac-
tions of an exchange.212
If an exchange violates the Exchange Act or Commission rules
or fails to enforce, so far as is within its power, compliance there-
with by a member firm or a company with a security listed thereon,
its registration may be suspended or revoked under section 19
2 06 Exchange Act § 6(a) (4), 48 Stat. 885 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(a) (4)
(1964), requires, as a condition of registration, an agreement that copies of amend-
ments will be filed with the Commission forthwith upon adoption. Recently adopted
SEC Rule 17a-8, 17 C.P.R. § 24 0.17a-8 (Supp. 1965) requires advance "reporting"
three weeks before action by members or the governing body. Silver v. New York
Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963) (see text accompanying notes 215-21 infra)
may imply that §§ 19(b) and 6(a) (4) in combination allow the Commission to disap-
prove in advance, although a literal reading of the sections indicates the Commission's
only statutory recourse is to alter or supplement under section 19 (b).
207 Exchange Act § 19(b), 48 Star. 898 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)
(1964).
208 See 2 Loss, SEctJnR Es REGuLAION 1179-83 (2d ed. 1961). The Commis-
sion must first request the exchange to alter or supplement. If the exchange does not
act, the Commission moves by notice and opportunity for hearing. If it finds the change
.necessary or appropriate for the protection of investors . . .", the Commission then
either issues its own order or its own rule changing the rules of the exchange. The
procedure for allowing the Commission to alter or supplement by its own rule, if it
chooses, was purposely inserted to restrict judicial review if such a choice is made. See
78 CONG. REC. 8087-93 (1934). See also H.R. REP. No. 1838, 73d Cong., 2d Sess.
37 (1934). But see 2 Loss, op. cit. supra, at 1183 n.40.
209 See 2 Loss, op. cit. supra note 208, at 1371-80; Phillips & Shipman, supra note
181, at 834-36, 841-43 (changes made by 1964 amendments).
210 2 Loss, op. cit. supra note 208, at 1371-80.
2112 Loss, op cit. supra note 208, at 1371-87; Phillips & Shipman, sapra note 181,
at 829-32, 834-36, 841-43 (changes made by 1964 amendments).
212 See Special Study, pt. 4, at 719-28; 2 Loss, op. cit. supra note 208, at 1178. The
Court's opinion in Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 364 n.16 (1963),
may have interpreted § 19(b) broadly enough to allow the Commission to alter or sup-
plement exchange rules on disciplinary procedures. The reference there, however, con-
cerned nonmembers, and § 28(b) might present an obstacle to the use of § 19(b)
powers concerning member disciplinary procedures.
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
(a) (1 ).21' The NASD is subject to an even more comprehensive
suspension and revocation power.214
B. Statutory Duty of Self-Regulators To Enforce Their
Requirements
The statutory duty of self-policing by exchanges has been con-
sidered by the federal courts in antitrust and implied private rights
contexts. In 1963, the Supreme Court considered the extent to
which the self-regulatory scheme gives the NYSE antitrust im-
munity. The case, Silver v. New York Stock Exchange,21 was a
treble-damage action against the NYSE for damages resulting when
it ordered its members, pursuant to its rules, to terminate direct wire
connections with the plaintiff firms, whch were not NYSE members.
Advance notice and a requested opportunity for hearing were not
given the plaintiffs. The Court noted that the NYSE's action was
a per se violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act unless the Ex-
change Act supplied immunity. 1
After referring to the absence of an express repealer in the Ex-
change Act, the Court held the act impliedly repeals the antitrust
laws "only if necessary to make the Securities Exchange Act work,
and even then only to the minimum extent necessary." '  Pointing
out that specific actions of the type before it were not subject to
Commission review and that the purposes of the Exchange Act were
frustrated, not furthered, by the NYSE's actions complained of in
the case, the majority of the Court found the actions without anti-
trust immunity. 1'
In reviewing the rules of the NYSE under which it acted and
the scope of self-regulation generally, the Court recognized the im-
2 1 3 Exchange Act § 19(a) (1), 48 Stat. 898 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78s
(a) (1) (1964). The Commission must find, after notice and opportunity for hearing,
the violation and that disciplinary action is necessary or appropriate for the protection
of investors. Judge Clark's dissenting opinion in Baird v. Franklin, 141 F.2d 238,
240 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 737 (1944), indicates that § 19(a) (1) itself
affords no implied private right of action against an exchange, although he did find an
implied right for investors damaged by an exchange's failure to discharge the duty im-
posed by § 6(b). See also 2 Loss, op. cit. supra, note 208, at 1175-78.
214 § 15A(1) (1) (including as grounds failure to enforce compliance with own
rules or engaging in any other activity tending to defeat the purposes of § 15A). See
also Phillips & Shipman, supra note 181, at 839-40 (discussion of a new suspension
power added by 1964 amendments). Virtually the same standards and procedural safe-
guards contained in § 19 (a) (1) (see immediately preceding note) are present.
215373 U.S. 341 (1963).
216Id. at 347-49.
217 Id. at 357.
2181 at 357-63.
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portant role played by self-regulators. Referred to was "the feder-
ally mandated duty of self-policing by exchanges." 219  The Court,
rejecting the district court's narrow approach to NYSE regulation
of trading in over-the-counter securities by member firms, found
that the rules applied were germane to the "duty, implied by sec-
tion 6(b) and section 6(d), to have rules governing members'
transactions and relationships with nonmembers. ' 220  The opinion
thus did not downgrade the role of self-regulators, although noth-
ing in it equates NYSE rules with statutory provisions.22' Indeed,
the absence of a statutory requirement to handle notice and oppor-
tunity for hearing as the NYSE did and the absence of governmen-
tal review by the Commission of specific NYSE actions under the
latter's rules were key considerations.
The crucial importance of the self-regulators in effective inves-
tor protection under the Exchange Act was recognized in 1944 by
the Second Circuit in Baird v. Franklin,222 a landmark implied rights
case and the one most directly relevant to the question of implied
rights for violations of self-regulatory requirements. There, two
customers of an insolvent NYSE member sued the NYSE for losses
allegedly sustained by them by reason of conversion of their securi-
ties by the senior partner of the member. The losses were alleged
to have resulted from the NYSE's failure to take action against the
firm upon learning of mishandling of assets of the NYSE Gratuity
Fund by the senior partner. The majority upheld the district court's
judgment against the plaintiffs,223 holding requisite causation to be
absent, although they acceded "to the view that the Stock Exchange
violated a duty when it failed to take disciplinary action against
Richard Whitney on November 24, 1937, after there was reason to
believe that the latter had converted he plaintiffs' securities., 224
Judge Clark dissented225 on the causation holding and explained
why there was an implied right under the Exchange Act. He found
219 Id. at 352.
2201d. at 353-57.
22 1 The dissenting opinion did, however, refer to a delegation of governmental pow-
ers. Id. at 371. This raises the old chestnut whether the self-regulators derive their
powers under state law (the same as other corporations or voluntary associations), re-
ceiving something of an antitrust umbrella from the Act and being subject to its re-
strictions, or whether they derive power from the Act. See Westwood & Howard, supra
note 181, at 529-30.
222 141 P.2d 238 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 323 U.S. 737 (1944).
22 3 Id. at 239.
224 IbM.
225 Id. at 240.
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the mishandling a violation of the Exchange Act, and hence of just
and equitable principles and noted other violations of just and equit-
able principles by the senior partner. He construed section 6(b)
as placing a duty on the NYSE to enforce the section 6(b) rule,
stating that "any other construction would render the provision
meaningless." '226 Holding that the purpose of sections 6(b) and
6(d), when read together, was to insure fair dealing and to protect
investors, he stated that an implied right was available under the
act pursuant to the statutory tort doctrine."' On the implied right,
he said:
Section 2 [of the act] also states that another goal of the statute
is to make the control of securities transactions "reasonably com-
plete and effective." If these aims are to be followed by the Act,
then, if the investing public is to be completely and effectively
protected, section 6(b) must be construed as granting to injured
investors individual causes of action to enforce the statutory duties
imposed upon the exchanges.228
Pettit v. American Stock Exchange2 9 extended Baird v. Frank-
lin 280 in two respects. In Pettit the trustee in bankruptcy of a com-
pany with shares listed on the American Stock Exchange sued the
exchange, alleging that its violation of the section 6 duty allowed
the consummation of a scheme to defraud the company in connec-
tion with shares of its stock issued for insufficient consideration and
distributed through a specialist on the exchange. The court held a
good cause of action was stated even if the exchange had no knowl-
edge of the violations of its members. The court said the Baird case
recognizes a cause of action for negligent violation of section 6,
which was sufficiently alleged.
Though the exact pattern of section 6 is not followed in sec-
tion 15A,23' the NASD is seemingly subject to at least as stern a
statutory duty as exchanges and would be liable in a private action
where an exchange would be.28 ' Moreover, the duty of self-regula-
2261d. at 244.
227 He thus found it unnecessary to consider the force of the plaintiffs' theory that
they were third party beneficiaries under § 6(a) (1). Ibid.
228 ld. at 244-45.
229217 F. Supp. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
280 141 F.2d 238 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 737 (1944).
231Exchange Act § 15A, 52 Stat. 1070 (1938), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3
(1964).
2832 The statutory framework supplies a firm base for the clearly desirable answer
equating the NASD and the exchanges on this score. Section 15A(b) (8) requires,
for registration, that the association's rules be designed "to promote just and equitable
principles of trade .. " Section 15A(b) (9) also requires that the rules provide for
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tors to use reasonable diligence in enforcing should, and probably
does, extend to all their rules and requirements.233
C. Violations of Self-Regulatory Requirements As Violations
of the Exchange Act or Agency Rules
On the other hand, it seems dear that nothing in the statute
causes a violation of a self-regulatory requirement by a member or
a listed company to be a violation of the Exchange Act or a Com-
mission rule. Neither the language of section 6(b) nor the policy
base of the Baird case justifies the finding that the implied statu-
tory duty of an exchange to use reasonable diligence in enforce-
ment carries with it another implication of a statutory duty on mem-
bers to comply. Section 6(b) governs the registration of exchanges,
not their members. It states that "no registration shall be granted
or remain in force unless the rules of the exchange include pro-
vision for the expulsion, suspension, or disciplining of a member.
... ,,.34 The section orders the Commission to revoke the exchange's
registration if the rule is formally deleted. From this, the implica-
tion found in Baird was almost compelled, even on the most literal
basis; formal deletion and deletion by negligent or willful failure
to enforce should be equated."3 5
Also, the policy pressures for the Baird holding were intense,
for if the self-regulators are under no statutory duty to enforce the
section 6(b) rule, self-regulation could easily be useless, rendering
impossible a system of regulation that is "reasonably complete and
effective." 3' A failure to find the second implication - that mem-
appropriate disciplining of members and their associated persons "for any violation of
[the association's rules]." Though the language in § 6(b) concerning retention of
registration is missing, § 15A(j) furnishes the Commission with a veto power over
proposed deletions and changes; inconsistency with § 15A(b)'s requirements for regis-
tration is a ground for veto. Nothing in § 15A appears to duplicate § 6(b)'s explicit
command that willful violation of the act or Commission rules is a violation of just and
equitable principles, but this seems inherent in the meaning of the standard and the
purpose of an association. See also note 208 supra and accompanying text. But see
the Interpretation concerning Fair Dealing With Customers, NASD MANUAL at G-7,
in which the NASD states that, usually, any breach of fair dealing as determined by the
Commission under the antifraud provisions and rules "could" be considered a breach of
the NASD's Rules of Fair Practice. NASD Rules of Fair Practice art. III § 1, NASD
MANUAL at D-5, of those rules contains the just-and-equitable-principles standard. See
also 2 Loss, op. cit. supra note 208, at 1365 n.16 (1961 and 1962 Supp.)
233See Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963); Kroese v. New
York Stock Exch., 227 F. Supp. 519 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), and text accompanying note
353 infra; notes 214, 232 supra.
234 Exchange Act 5 6(b), 48 Stat. 885 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b) (1964).
235 See note 226 supra and accompanying text
2 3 6 See note 228 supra and accompanying text.
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bers have a statutory duty to conform - is not as crucial as a fail-
ure to find the first implication. So long as the self-regulators must
use reasonable diligence to enforce, their rules and requirements
have considerable usefulness in the total regulatory framework,
even if non-compliance by members and listed companies is not a
breach of a statutory duty.
Furthermore, extension of statutory duty in the manner of the
Baird case to members or listed companies would enlarge the statute
for all purposes - implied rights, potential administrative reme-
dies, application for injunctive relief, and criminal penalties. Baird,
for example, apparently made available to the Commission, as a co-
product, the trio of potential governmental remedies when an ex-
change fails to use reasonable diligence. 7
The consequences illustrate how far removed from the con-
gressional and Commission pronouncements placing self-regulatory
requirements outside the sphere of "legal" regulation a finding of
a statutory duty would be. For example, it has been assumed that
governmental enforcement machinery is not available to move
against members violating self-regulatory requirements,... and it
would be somewhat odd for the Commission, and not the self-regu-
lators, to have governmental subpoena power to investigate the
violations of and to enforce the section 6(b) rule or any other self-
regulatory requirement.
D. Authority of the Commission To Issue Its Own Rules
The Exchange Act relies upon Commission rules as well as self-
regulatory requirements to create an effective pattern of federal
regulation. The most important rules governing investor-broker
relationships are Rule 10b-523. and the rules under sections 15 (c)
(1) and (2).240 Rule 10b-5 covers all securities transactions (over-
the-counter and exchange) of all persons, including broker-deal-
ers.24  Rule 10b-5, moreover, does not exhaust the Commission's
rule-making authority under section 10 (b).242 Under section 15 (c)
237 See 2 Loss, op. cit. supra note 208, at 1176-78.
238 See, e.g., Special Study, pt. 4, at 704.
239 17 C.F.R. 5 240.10b-5 (1964).
2 4 OExchange Act §§ 15(c) (1)-(2), 48 Star. 895 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C.
55 780(c) (1)-(2) (1964).
241 See notes 44, 52 supra and materials cited therein.
242 Exchange Act § 10(b), 48 Stat. 891 (1934), 15 U.S.C. 5 78j(b) (1964). See,
e.g., note 52 supra; Rule lOb-3 (note 97 supra), which incorporates the § 15(c) (1)
rules. Two of the latter go beyond the disclosure concept. See 3 Loss, op. cit. supra,
note 208, at 1474-81.
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(1), which today is not a deeper source of authority in any respect
than section 10(b), the Commission can, and has, adopted anti-
fraud rules applicable to over-the-counter transactions of all broker-
dealers.243 Implied rights are available for violations of Rule 10b-
5 and section 15(c)(1) rules2 4  Under section 15(c) (2), the
Commission can and has adopted rules "reasonably designed to pre-
vent" fraud in over-the-counter transactions of all broker-dealers.
2 45
Violations of section 15 (c) (2) rules are, however, excluded from
section 29(b) 4 ' and may, in addition, be excluded from the tort
doctrine. 47
In applying the antifraud sections and rules to broker-dealers
and other securities professionals, the courts have not limited them-
selves to common law fraud. A landmark case is Charles Hughes &
Co. v. SEC,248 which rejected such a limitation and held that a
broker-dealer impliedly represents that the price of securities sold
by him to customers is reasonably related to the current market.
Thus, a sale at an unreasonable relationship without disclosure of
that fact is a fraud under the statutes. 49 The implied representa-
tion theory has come to be known as the "shingle" theory; a broker-
dealer, by hanging out his shingle, makes certain implied repre-
sentations. Other examples of shingle-theory implied represen-
tations are that the broker-dealer is solvent25' and that the broker-
243 See note 242 supra and materials cited therein.
244 See, e.g., Opper v. Hancock Sec. Corp., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 5 91628
(S.D.N.Y. 1966); Newkirk v. Hayden, Stone & Co., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 5 91621
(S.D. Cal. 1965); 2 Loss, op. cit. supra note 208, at 1474-1518; notes 44, 52 and 97
supra and materials cited therein.
245 See, e.g., SEC Rule 15c2-4, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-4 (1964) (requirement of
transmission or maintenance of payments received in connection with underwritings);
SEC Rule 15c2-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-5 (1964) (requirement of favorable suitability
determination on certain transactions in which a security is sold and credit is arranged).
246 Exchange Act § 29(b), 48 Stat. 903 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(b)
(1964).
247 See note 97 supra and accompanying text. Rule 10b-5 has, of course, a signifi-
cant impact on all companies and their insiders, and the registration, reporting, proxy,
and insider trading provisions of §§ 12, 48 Stat. 892 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §
781 (1964), 13, 48 Star. 894 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78m (1964), 14, 48
Star. 895 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1964), and 16, 48 Star. 896 (1934),
as amended, 15 U.S.C. 78p (1964), apply to companies with a listed security or a se-
curity registered under section 12 (g).
248 139 F.2d 434 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 786 (1943), discussed in 3 Loss,
op. cit. supra note 208, at 1482-93.
249 Ibid.
250 3 Loss, op. cit. supra note 208, at 1482-93.
2513 Loss, op. cit. supra note 208, at 1489.
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dealer has a reasonable basis for his recommendations. 52 A broker-
dealer occupying a fiduciary status must make additional disclo-
sures.25 These overlapping doctrines - shingle and fiduciary sta-
tus - are still developing.254
In SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc.,2 55 a 1963 deci-
sion, the United States Supreme Court for the first time interpreted
the antifraud provisions of the federal securities statutes. The hold-
ing is narrow since the Commission was only requesting an in-
junction compelling a registered investment adviser to disclose, to
the subscribers to his service, his practice of purchasing shares for
his own account immediately before recommending that security for
long-term investment and selling his shares at a profit after the rise
following his recommendation. The Commission could have pro-
hibited that practice by means of a rule under a section added to the
Advisers Act in 1960.256 However, the Commission preferred to
attack the practice under the general antifraud provisions of the
Advisers Act.2" The Court, with Mr. Justice Harlan dissenting,
reversed a divided Second Circuit (whose opinion had some over-
tones of the Chenery58 controversy) 259 and ordered the granting of
the injunction. The Court followed broad holdings such as the
Hughes260 opinion and stated, in language relevant to all of the fed-
eral securities statutes, that "Congress intended the Investment Ad-
visers Act of 1940 to be construed like other securities legislation
'enacted for the purpose of avoiding frauds,' not technically and re-
strictively,' but flexibly to effectuate its remedial purposes. 261
2523 Loss, op. cit supra note 208, at 1489-90; DuKE UNIVRSrY SCHOOL OF
LAw, CONFERENCE ON SEcuRn-as REGULATION 68-93 (Mundheim ed. 1965).
253 See 3 Loss, op. cit. supra note 208, at 1500-08.
254 See, e.g., CONFERENCE, supra note 252, at 6-11, 60-106; Cohen & Rabin,
Broker-Dealer Selling Practice Standards: The Importance of Administrative Adjudica-
tion in Their Development, 29 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 691 (1964); Mundheim,
Professional Responsibilities of Broker-Dealers: The Suitability Doctrine, 1965 DtJKE
LJ. 445; Comment, Current Problems in Securities Regulation, 62 MIca. L. REV 680,
730-51 (1964).
255 SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
2 56 Advisers Act 5 206(4), 74 Stat. 887 (1960), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6(4) (1964).
2 57 Advisers Act §§ 206(1)-(3), 54 Stat. 852 (1940), 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-6 (1)-
(3) (1964).
2 58 SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947).
2 5 9 SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 306 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1962),
rev'd, 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
2 6 0 Charles Hughes & Co. v. SEC, 139 F.2d 434 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 786
(1948).
2 6 1 SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 195 (1963) (foot-
notes omitted).
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In Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp.,'62 a 1966 decision, the
Supreme Court evidenced a liberal, remedial attitude toward the
antifraud sections of the Exchange Act and the Securities Act and
their private enforcement, though the Court's words were general
and in dictum.
When purchases or sales of securities are involved, many self-
regulatory requirements could possibly be partially incorporated
into Rule lOb-5 via the implied representation route, one widely
used in federal securities regulation.263 A member firm or a listed
issuer could be held impliedly to represent that it will adhere to
the self-regulator's requirements, at least important ones, thus caus-
ing a violation of those requirements to be a violation of Rule lOb-
5, absent prior disclosure of departure. Conceptually, this would
be a "half-way house," as a violation of law could be avoided by
advance disclosure, but the approach would actually come dose to
incorporating the self-regulatory requirements into the statute. This
approach has not been adopted264 (and it seems not to have been
urged), although in an analogous area, the Commission's New
York Regional Administrator announced that Commission-regis-
tered broker-dealers doing business in New York in violation of
that state's net capital requirements would violate the Exchange
Act's antifraud proscriptions."' As a matter of policy, quasi-incor-
poration of important self-regulatory requirements into Commission
rules - simply because they are self-regulatory requirements - is
one of those truly major extensions of the Exchange Act that should
require a specific Commission rule under section 10(b)"266
262 383 U.S. 363 (1966). The pertinent dictum in the case, id. at 364-66, 373-74
assumes potential significance because of the general similarity between some of the
allegations and the allegations in O'Neill v. Maytag, 339 F.2d 764 (2d Cit. 1964), infra
note 266, in which the majority held a good claim was not alleged under Rule 10b-5.
2 63 See notes 249-54 supra and accompanying text.
2 64 But sea note 304 infra (discussion of Rule 11a-1, which appears to make devia-
tion from an exchange "plan" to regulate floor trading a direct violation of Rule 11a-
1 (a), unless one of the other exemptions is available).
265 CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 9 76927 (1963). The announcement was made at a
time when the Commission had no minimum net capital rule. Such a rule has since
been adopted. See SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7611, May 26, 1965.266 In two of the leading cases under Rule 10b-5, 17 C..R. § 240.10b-5 (1964),
the Second Circuit has refused to be expansive in interpreting Rule 10b-5, while not
casting doubt upon the Commission's authority to adopt rules producing a contrary re-
sult. See O'Neill v. Maytag, 339 F.2d 764 (2d Cit. 1964); Birnbaum v. Newport Steel
Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cit. 1952), discussed in 3 Loss, op. cit. supra note 208, at
1468-70. Some of the discussion and materials cited in note 52 supra bears upon the
Commission's authority under Exchange Act § 10(b), 48 Stat. 891 (1934), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78j(b) (1964).
Before the Supreme Court, the Commission has fared well in situations where it has
1966]
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
Sections 15(b) (8) to (10)26 round out the most important
parts of the relevant statutory patern. These sections are compromise
provisions growing out of the Commission's proposal in the legis-
lative program culminating in the 1964 amendments that all regis-
tered broker-dealers be subjected to two-layer regulation by the
Commission and the NASD.26 Congress rejected the Commis-
sion's request that NASD membership be required. Congress did,
however, (1) authorize sufficient additional Commission rule-mak-
ing powers over non-NASD members so that there would be little
difference in total regulation of members and non-members, and
(2) direct the Commission to assess fees on non-members substan-
tially equal to the fees assessed by the NASD on its members. Sec-
tion 15(b) (10) authorizes, for example, rules "designed to pro-
mote just and equitable principles of trade. .. "2 9 Under this
authority, the Commission can go beyond a requirement of full dis-
closure. Disclosure versus prohibition describes, in general, the dif-
ference between the Commission's antifraud authority and a just-
and-equitable-principles requirement. Given the remedial inter-
pretations of the antifraud sections, the Commission has considerable
flexibility in defining material facts and in determining when a
preferred to move case-by-case (either in it own administrative proceedings or in ap-
plications for court action) rather than issue rules. See SEC v. Capital Gains Research
Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 322 U.S. 194 (1947), and
text accompanying note 146 supra. For a discussion of the Commission's practice and
philosophy on rules versus case-by-case expansion, see Cohen & Rabin, supra note 254.
For a discussion of that subject covering administrative agencies in general, see Shapiro,
The Choice of Rulemaking or Adjudication in the Development of Administrative Pol-
icy, 78 HARV. L. REV. 921 (1965).
However, extension of the Act by judicial quasi-incorporation of self-regulatory re-
quirements into Rule lOb-5 would reach conduct far beyond the current general con-
templation of the reach of the Rule, and unlike the basing of an implied right directly
upon a breach of a self-regulatory requirement, such an extension would broaden the
act for all purposes. This is, of course, not to say the Commission could not adopt such
a rule or that conduct violating a self-regulatory requirement will not often indepen-
dently violate a Commission rule.
The type of quasi-incorporation outlined in the text would appear to create no sub-
stantial problem of improper delegation of powers to a private group, as it would be the
failure to disclose in advance the departure from the self-regulator's requirement, rather
than the departure, which would violate Rule 10b-5 and the act. The implied represen-
tation that certain rules of a self-regulatory organization will be followed would be con-
sidered a material fact, and material facts under the antifraud provisions of all of the
federal securities statutes are created by the actions of private parties. See also note 289
infra.
267 Exchange Act §§ 15(b) (8)-(10), 48 Stat 895 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C.
55 78o(b) (8)-(10) (1964).
268 See Phillips & Shipman, An Analysis of the Securities Acts Amendments of
1964, 1964 DuKE L.J. 706, 818-28.
269 Exchange Act § 15(b) (10), 48 Star. 895 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. 78o
(b) (10) (1964).
[Vol. 17: 925
IMPLIED PRIVATE RIGHTS
broker-dealer or company is under a fiduciary duty to disclose, but
under sections 10(b)270 and 15(c) (1), it is conceptually difficult
to prohibit fully disclosed practices, though in fact this has some-
times been done.271 Under a just-and-equitable-principles standard
or under section 15 (c) (2), which authorizes rules reasonably de-
signed to "prevent" fraud, absolute prohibitions can be imposed.27 2
This difference is, however, often a thin one, as the required dis-
closure may be so sharp that the undesirable practice to be dis-
closed will be discontinued.273
Sections 15(b) (8)-(10) contain a heavy legislative history
gloss requiring Commission regulation and fees thereunder to be
substantially comparable to NASD requirements.274
Though the legislative history is silent, the violation of sec-
tion 15 (b) (10) rules seemingly will create implied private rights of
action. Arguments to the contrary are that the rules, though legal
requirements, will embody ethical rather than antifraud concepts2 .5
and that implication would be inconsistent with the comparability
gloss, assuming there are no implied rights for violation of self-
regulatory requirements. Private rights have, however, been im-
plied under several provisions of the Exchange Act that have little
to do with fraud. Violations of the margin rules are the best
example" It furthermore seems almost impossible for the com-
parability gloss to override the clear applicability of section 29(b),
and in any event, the comparability gloss can be carried only so
far. For instance, comparability cannot take from the Commission
its traditional enforcement remedies - criminal reference, applica-
tion for injunctive relief, and administrative proceedings under sec-
tion 15(b) (5)277 against the registration - none of which is
270 Exchange Act § 10(b), 48 Star. 891 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1964).
271 See note 242 supra.
272 SEC Rule 15c2-4, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-4 (1964) (transmission or mainte-
nance of payments received in connection with underwritings); SEC Rule 15c2-5, 17
C.F.R. § 240.15c2-5 (1964) (favorable suitability determinations required on sales of
securities when arranging certain types of credit).
273 For example, the investment adviser dealing with a client as a securities dealer
must disclose capacity, cost, and best available market price (if more favorable to the
client than the proposed price). See 3 Loss, SEcuRiTIs REGULATION 1500-08 (2d
ed. 1961). These disclosures prevent unreasonable markups.274 See Phillips & Shipman, supra note 268, at 822-28.
275 See Mundheim, supra note 254, at 468-69.
276 See, e.g., Comment, Securities Exchange Act of 1934 - Civil Remedies Based
Upon Illegal Extensions of Credit in Violation of Regulation T, 61 McIc. L. REV. 940
(1963).
277 Exchange Act § 15(b) (5), 48 Stat. 895 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78o
(b)(5) (1964).
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available either to the Commission or to the NASD for violations of
NASD rules.278
If private rights are implied for violations of section 15 (b)
(10) rules (which by definition will be applicable only to non-
NASD members) and none or only a few are implied for violations
of NASD rules, the discrimination will be anomalous. Any such
anomaly can, however, be rationalized as a result almost inevitably
flowing from the compromise adopted in the 1964 amendments.
II. SOME CONSIDERATIONS OF CONSTRUCTION
AND POLICY
A. In General
Since, as has been already discussed, violations of self-regula-
tory requirements are not illegal conduct violating the Exchange
Act, one possible basis for extension of implied rights is eliminated.
Another possible basis for extension is also ruled out since quasi-in-
corporation into Rule 10b-5 of violations of important self-regu-
latory requirements, solely because of the self-regulators' commands,
seems, as a matter of policy, improper absent a specific Commission
rule.
How then can an implied right under the Exchange Act be
created? Section 29(b) voids only contracts made in violation of
the Exchange Act or agency rules. Despite the integral and crucial
role played by the self-regulators in the implementation of the Ex-
change Act, it carefully distinguishes between the rules of govern-
mental agencies and self-regulatory requirements. The act does not
make the violation of a self-regulatory requirement unlawful or a
crime; nor does it authorize the Commission to seek injunctive relief
to enforce self-regulatory requirements or to impose an administra-
tive sanction for their violation. Nor does the Exchange Act give
the self-regulators governmental subpoena power.
Section 16(b) ,9 of course, creates a civil liability based on con-
duct that requires no showing of illegality, but section 16(b) is
also a congressional enactment. Should the courts - as opposed
to Congress - press beyond section 29(b) and the tort doctrine
where there is a violation of law? In one very important sense,
federal jurisdiction has not to date been extended by the courts in
2 7 8 See Phillips & Shipman, supra note 268, at 826-27.
279 Exchange Act § 16(b), 48 Stat. 896 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)
(1964).
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the implied rights area, for the courts have acted to effectuate con-
gressional purposes only after Congress has extended the statute (or
the Commission has exercised its rulemaking power) to provide a
federal, uniform legal base of investor protection in matters such as
proxy solicitation (section 14)" 0 or in the purchase or sale of any
security by any person (section 10 (b)). The extension of the Ex-
change Act by Congress - or by the Commission, using congres-
sionally created and delegated rule-making powers - has set the
standard and made available the governmental enforcement sanc-
tions. Judicial implication of a private right of action for the un-
lawful conduct gives investors - for whose protection the Exchange
Act is primarily designed - a remedy when the extant congres-
sional directive (extension) is not honored and they are damaged
and have no administrative recourse for damages. Implication of
rights in the absence of a violation of the Exchange Act or Com-
mission rules would often effectuate congressional purposes, but by
furnishing a private remedy where the government would have no
sanction, something closer to a true judicial extension of federal
jurisdiction would be present.
But in many cases considerations of fairness and effectuation of
the purposes of the Exchange Act will strongly support creation of
an implied right. Nothing in the legislative history seems to pro-
hibit the creation of implied rights for violations of self-regulatory
requirements. 8 ' As expertly and forcefully pointed out by Mr. Lewis
D. Lowenfels of the New York Bar in a recent article,282 exten-
sion of implied rights would add to the storehouse of investor pro-
280 Exchange Act § 14, 48 Stat. 895 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1964).
281The NYSE did, in the 1934 Senate Hearings, make a proposal (not adopted)
that it be allowed to promulgate two classes of rules concerning the listing of securities
- one with, and the other without, the force of law. Those with the force of law
would have been effective upon Commission approval, and the Commission could have
directed the making of such rules. Hearings on Stock Exchange Practices Before the
Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. pt. 16, at 7522
(1934).
On the Senate floor, a provision in the bill before that body that would have re-
quired an issuer listing a security to agree, inter alia, to comply with the act and Com-
mission rules was attacked because of potential issuer liabilities under state law to
investors as third party beneficiaries. 78 CONG. REC 8584-87 (1934). The provision
was not enacted. Compare the discussion of § 6(a) (1) in Judge Clark's opinion in
Baird v. Franklin, 141 F.2d 238, 240 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 737 (1944).
In Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Interstate and For-
eign Commerce on H.J. Res. 438, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 72-73 (1961), the then Chair-
man of the Board of Governors of the NASD discussed the fact that the NASD does
not award recoveries to investors harmed by member misconduct. See also Mundheim,
supra note 254, at 467-68; note 389 infra.282 Lowenfels, Implied Liabilities Based Upon Stock Exchange Rules, 66 COLuM. L.
REv. 12 (1966).
1966]
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
tections. The Second Circuit's opinion in Colonial Realty Corp.
v. Bache & Co.,28 notes that the question of the implication of a
private right is difficult because of the unique statutory scheme of
self-regulation, and because the effect and significance of particular
rules may vary with "the manner of their adoption and their re-
lationship to provisions and purposes of the statute and SEC regu-
lations .. ."284
In addition, - and this is important - extension of federal
jurisdiction to create an implied right based on a violation of a self-
regulatory requirement might remove the need for an even greater
extension of federal jurisdiction by the Commission. If, for example,
it appears to the Commission that investors should have a private
right of action for violation of a self-regulatory requirement, the
Commission in many areas can effectively incorporate the require-
ment or a similar one into its own rules."8 5 That action, however,
extends federal jurisdiction for all purposes and downgrades the im-
portance and autonomy of the self-regulators far more than a judi-
cial extension of a liability-only duty to comply with the self-regula-
tory requirement.
J. 1. Case Co. v. Borak,2 8 of course, placed primary emphasis
upon the effectuation of congressional purposes and eschewed a
narrow, technical approach to implied rights. The congressional
purpose of investor protection flows throughout the two-tier Com-
mission and self-regulatory structure created by and operated under
the Exchange Act. The conceptual step from implication for
violations of sections such as 14(a) and 10(b) and the Commis-
sion's rules under them to implication for violations of self-regula-
tory investor-protection requirements can be taken without much
difficulty, once a policy judgment is made. In either case, intersti-
tial judicial legislation is involved - only the extent differs. Sec-
tion 27287 furnishes jurisdiction, inter alia, for suits and actions to
enforce any 'liability" or duty created by the Exchange Act. 8 The
288 Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., 358 F.2d 178 (2d Cir.), petition for cert.
filed, 34 U.S.L. WEEK 3400 (U.S. May 17, 1966).
284 Id. at 181.
2 85 See notes 241-66 supra and accompanying text.
280 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
287 Exchange Act § 27, 48 Star. 902-03 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa
(1964).
2 8 8 Lowenfels, supra note 282, points out the failure of the district court in the Co-
lonial Realty case to discuss this part of § 27, which was relied upon by the Supreme
Court in the Borak case. The Second Circuit's opinion in Colonial Realty deals with
this portion of § 27. See note 374 infra and accompanying text.
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pervasive federal control of the self-regulators and of securities
transactions and the unique reliance upon self-regulation to aid in
the protection of investors could be considered sufficient to warrant
an extension of the tort doctrine beyond Borak and Baird to conduct
not violating the law.2  The Exchange Act would have created
2 8 0 In J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964), the Court had before it alleged
violations of the proxy rules and § 14 (a), the source of the Commission's rulemaking
power. The Court felt this squarely fitted in the language in § 27 giving the district
courts jurisdiction of all suits in equity and actions at law "to enforce any liability or
duty created" under the Act. However, the liability or duty found under the Act in
any implied rights case (especially when § 29(b) is not being applied) is created in
part by the Act and in part by the courts. The desirability of judicial implication in
Borak was based upon the broad, remedial purposes of § 14(a), the fact that one of the
chief purposes of § 14(a) was the protection of investors, and the "necessary supple-
ment" to Commission action that private enforcement of the proxy rules would provide.
The Court said that under the circumstances before it, "it is the duty of the [federal]
courts to be alert to provide such remedies as are necessary to make effective the con-
gressional purpose." Id. at 433. See notes 9-17, 87-92, and 171 supra and accompany-
ing text. In many cases, all of the elements present in Borak would be present where
self-regulatory requirements are violated, except that there is no violation of the act or
Commission rules. Investor protection and the promotion of optimum reliance upon
the self-regulators - two leading congressional purposes - would often be served by
implication of private rights. The question is whether some self-regulatory require-
ments are to be equated with the act or Commission rules - which govern the opera-
tion of the self-regulators and for which their requirements are often a substitute
solely for implied rights purposes.
In Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957), cited in Borak,
the Court did not rely upon the statutory tort principle in announcing that a body of
common law would be shaped under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act,
but the majority of the Court found congressional intent that the courts create such a
body of law. In applying the tort doctrine, congressional intent on implied rights has
generally been considered immaterial, absent a strong negative intent. See notes 131-34
supra and accompanying text. The jurisdictional language in § 301 is also more explicit
than § 27, although § 27 is broad and is not limited to express private rights and once
the implied right is created, § 27 readily fits. See notes 46-47 supra and accompanying
text.
A good review of the leading cases on federal common law, including implied rights,
is contained in Friendly, In Praise of Erie - and of the New Federal Common Law, 19
REcoRD op N.Y.C.B.A. 64 (1964).
Equation of certain self-regulatory requirements with Commission rules solely for
purposes of implied rights under the act would seemingly raise no substantial question
concerning improper delegation of powers to a private group, as governmental sanctions
would not be involved. The Exchange Act would be affecting the private rights of in-
vestors and broker-dealers in a manner Congress apparently could expressly impose. Cf.
Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, supra. See also R. H. Johnson & Co. v. SEC,
198 F.2d 690 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 855 (1952).
Blaney v. Florida Nat'l Bank, 31 U.S.L. WEEK 2524 (5th Cir. March 7, 1966)
held that a complaint alleging a breach of fiduciary duty by a bank through violation
of an FRB regulation requiring conformance to sound principles in operation of trust
departments does not state a federal cause of action. The court distingaished Borak on
the grounds of the broader scope of § 27 of the Exchange Act and of the lack in the
FRB regulations of the broad remedial purposes of the Exchange Act. The court also
felt that the law of trusts and estates is primarily a matter of state concern.
There appear to be few decisions discussing the application of the tort doctrine to
standards contained in sources other than statutes or rules of administrative agencies.
The cases under state law on exchange rules are discussed in the text accompanying
notes 325-39 infra. A valid rule of a court is commonly said to have the force of law
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a liability, but the governmental enforcement machinery would not
be enlarged. This technique - finding what might be labeled a
"liability-only duty" to comply with self-regulatory requirements
- would extend Baird solely for the purposes of implied rights un-
der the act. Such a limited extension would be far preferable to
quasi-incorporation into the Commission's rules by judicial action.
Another threshold question is whether any liability-only duty
would be limited to a duty to exercise reasonable diligence to com-
ply with the self-regulator's requirements, since an exchange need
do no more than use reasonable diligence in enforcement? A limi-
tation to reasonable diligence would provide a tolerance and would
arguably be required by analogy to the Baird case. The Exchange
Act, however, in several places distinguishes between the duties of
supervisory personnel and controlling persons on the one hand and
actors on the other, and limitation of the duty to reasonable dili-
gence might not be imported from Baird. 0'
B. Special Considerations Concerning Various Categories of
Self-Regulatory Requirements
Special considerations seem to be presented by several of the
various categories of self-regulatory requirements. There are two
persuasive arguments for finding an implied right for violations of
the section 6(b) rule.29' The rule is directly required by the Ex-
change Act, and section 29(a)2" voids any "provision binding any
person to waive compliance with any provision of [the act or any
rule or regulation thereunder], or of any rule of an exchange re-
on matters such as attorney's compensation. See, e.g., Weil v. Neary, 278 U.S. 160
(1929). Cf. Archer v. Griffith, 390 S.W.2d 735 (Tex. Sup. Ct. 1964). The force of
the canons of ethics of voluntary bar associations is discussed in DRINKER, LEGAL ETH-
ICS 26-30 (1953), where the author notes that the decisions are not entirely clear. This
is partially because so much of the conduct condemned by the canons would be consid-
ered contrary to public policy in any event. In Talley v. Alton Box Bd. Co., 37 Ill.
App. 2d 137, 185 N.E.2d 349 (1962), the court seemed to depart from earlier Illinois
cases in holding that the canons can have considerable force.
In negligence cases, company rules are often admitted as an admission of perception
of risk and appropriateness and feasibility of precautions. 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS
980-81 (1956).
2 90 See, e.g., Exchange Act § 15(b) (5) (E), 48 Stat. 890 (1934), as amended, 15
U.S.C. § 78o (b) (5) (E) (1964), discussed in Phillips & Shipman, supra note 268,
at 807-08; Exchange Act § 20, 48 Stat 899 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78t
(1964), discussed in 3 Loss, op. cit. supra note 273, at 1808-11.
291 See text accompanying notes 186-87 supra.
292 Exchange Act § 29(a), 48 Star. 903 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. 5 78cc(a)
(1964).
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quired thereby.... 2." The voiding of a waiver of compliance
forcefully suggests the presence of an implied right of action for a
violation of the section 6(b) rule.294 But perhaps the intent was
to prevent the exchanges from obtaining binding waivers of liability
for losses resulting from their failure to enforce. In any event, sec-
tion 29 (a) is not applicable to any NASD rule, and the desirability
of parallel treatment of exchange and NASD members for viola-
tion of the section 6(b) rule would be a strong reason for disre-
garding section 29 (a) in determining whether there is an implied
right.
One of the most telling arguments against implication for viola-
tions of the section 6(b) rule is its breadth, depth, and generality.
Implication for violations of that rule would transform the govern-
ing standard of liability at the federal level from one of fraud to one
of ethics and of fairness. Granted that the difference between the
antifraud authority of the Commission and the just-and-equitable-
principles standard is not large at this time and that notions of
proper ethics and fiduciary duties play a large part in determining
what is fraudulent under existing Commission rules, the change
from those existing Commission rules to "just and equitable prin-
ciples" is substantial. 95  Such a change would indeed, considering
the generality of the section 6(b) rule, require the application of
a body of general federal contract and tort law to relations between
broker-dealers and their customers.
Yet, "just and equitable principles of trade" is a concept that
293 Ibid. (Emphasis added.) Section 29(a) is discussed in 3 Loss, op. cit. supra
note 273, at 1811-17.
294 C1. 3 Loss, op. cit. supra note 273, at 1836 n.502 (1961 & 1962 Supp.); Texas
& Pac. Ry v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33 (1916). In Rigsby, a Safety Appliance Act case,
the Court's creation of an implied private right of action in favor of an injured work-
man was based in large part upon the statement in the statute that an employee injured
by any car, etc., in use contrary to the statute shall not be deemed to have assumed the
risk. The Safety Appliance Act cases are analyzed in 2 Loss, op. cit. supra note 273, at
989-93.
In Brown v. Bullock, 194 F. Supp. 207, 237-38 (S.D.N.Y.), afI'd without consid-
eration of the point, 294 F.2d 415 (2d Cir. 1961), the court, in finding an alleged
implied private right of action under the Investment Company Act, relied in part upon
provisions voiding exculpatory clauses relieving officers, directors, and investment ad-
visers of liability for certain conduct. The court considered non-waiver and non-excul-
patory provisions as necessarily indicating liability for acts within a non-exculpatory
direction or for acts violating a statutory duty, the performance of which cannot be
waived.
295 See text accompanying notes 241-78 supra. It has been suggested that the term
"just and equitable principles of trade" was included in §§ 6(b) and 15A(b) because
of its stock exchange history, NatL. Assn. of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 19 S.E.C. 424, 484 (1955)
(dissenting opinion of Commissioner Healy). But see § 15A(h) (1) (notes 297-98
infra and accompanying text) and § 15(b) (10).
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the Commission and the courts have applied and will apply in a
number of contexts. In section 15(b) (10)29 6 Congress did not
view the just and equitable standard as too vague to be placed in
the statute as a basis for Commission rules. Under section 15A
(h) (1),297 the Commission must, in every review of NASD dis-
ciplinary proceedings, declare whether the conduct violates just and
equitable principles.29" Twenty-five years of experience and prece-
dent have accumulated under that section. Under sections 15A(b)
(3) and (4) ,299 certain exchange disciplinary actions involving vio-
lations of just and equitable principles and other exchange rules can
form the basis for exclusion from NASD membership."0 Moreover,
in Baird and the cases that followed it, courts necessarily have been
willing to determine whether the alleged conduct of members vio-
lated just and equitable principles."0 1
If the Commission has its own direct rule-making jurisdiction,
but has deferred to the self-regulators, should violations create im-
plied rights regardless of the conclusion in other areas? For exam-
ple, section 11302 authorizes Commission rules regulating special-
ists' activities and floor trading by members for their own account.
In both areas, the Commission has issued rules within the last two
years. 3 Though the Commission's rules create a framework of
detailed regulation, they do so indirectly, in that the Commission's
rules, for the most part, only specify what provisions the rules of
the exchange must contain.0 '
Section 14(b)," 5 which was strengthened and expanded by
2 6 Exchange Act § 15(b) (10), 78 Star. 570 (1964), 15 U.S.C. S 78o(b) (10)
(1964).
297Exchange Act § 15A(h) (1), 52 Stat. 1070 (1938), as amended, 15 U.S.C. S
78o-3(h) (1) (1964).
298 See 2 Loss, op. cit. supra note 273, at 1374-80.
299 Exchange Act §§ 15A(b)(3)-(4), 52 Star. 1070 (1938), as amended, 15
U.S.C. §§ 78o-3(b) (3)-(4) (1964).
300 See Phillips & Shipman, supra note 268, at 829-32.
301 See Judge Clark's opinion in Baird v. Franklin, 141 F.2d 238, 240 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 323 U.S. 737 (1944).
302 Exchange Act § 11, 48 Stat. 891 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78k (1964).
303 SEC Rule Ha-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.11a-1 (1964) (floor trading); SEC Rule
1lb-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.11b-1 (1964) (specialists).
304 Under Rule 11a-1, however, a floor trader violating the "plan" of the exchange
violates Rule 11a-1 (a). Rule 1 lb-1 establishes its own intricate framework for changes
in applicable exchange rules and for limited Commission disciplinary action against
specialists deviating from the exchange rules; both Commission powers go beyond its
usual statutory authority. This deep Commission involvement in administration could
cause the applicable exchange rules to be considered de facto Commission rules.
305 Exchange Act § 14(b), 48 Star. 895 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(b)
(1964).
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the 1964 amendments, authorizes Commission rules governing the
voting by broker-dealers of street name securities registered on an
exchange or under section 12(g)3 0 and the transmission of ma-
terials to the owners of such securities. °7 The Commission has not
issued rules, apparently relying -upon the comprehensive rules of
several of the exchanges. 08
The deference under section 11 is not as major as it might
seem, for the conduct of specialists and floor traders remains sub-
ject to Rule 10b-5.3 9  The deference under section 14(b) has
posed one problem; the courts have ignored, in election review pro-
ceedings, alleged violations of the NYSE rules by a member firm in
voting street-name securities. 10 If the NYSE's requirements were
incorporated into a Commission rule, Borak would apparently dic-
tate that violation would in appropriate cases require a voiding of
the broker-dealer's illegal vote and perhaps other suitable relief.
A second special category of self-regulatory rules consists of
those added by Commission alteration or supplementation 1 Such
a rule is not governmental. Under section 19 (b),312 the Commis-
sion is not authorized, for example, to promulgate its rule establish-
ing exchange commission rates. It can move only by changing the
exchange's rules in accordance with the specified standards and pro-
cedures. Such self-regulatory rules are, however, similar to the sec-
tion 6(b) rule in that both are directly required by the government
- the section 6(b) rule by the statute and the other type of rule
by the Commission under statutory discretion granted it. An ex-
change rule added by a section 19(b) proceeding (there has been
one proceeding) apparently fits within the non-waiver stipulation
of section 29 (a) as a rule of the exchange required by the Exchange
Act or Commission rules3 13 Furthermore, such an exchange rule
300 Exchange Act § 12(g), 48 Stat. 892 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 781(g)
(1964).
307 See 2 Loss, op. cit. supra note 273, at 924-30; Lowenfels, supra note 282, at
25-28; Phillips & Shipman, supra note 268, at 789-95.
308 Ibid.
309 United States v. Re, 336 F.2d 306 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 379 U.S. 904 (1964).
Cf. Pettit v. American Stock Exch., 217 F. Supp. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), discussed in text
accompanying note 229 supra.
310 See 2 Loss, op. cit. supra note 273, at 928; Lowenfels, supra note 282, at 26.
31 1 See note 208 supra and accompanying text.
312 Exchange Act § 19(b), 48 Star. 898 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)
(1964).
313 See 3 Loss, op. cit. supra note 273, at 1812; 2 Loss, op. cit. supra note 273, at
1179-83. Where the Commission alters the rule of the exchange through a Commission
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probably cannot be amended or revoked without Commission con-
sent.314
Where the Commission has deferred to the self-regulators or
has altered or supplemented exchange rules, persuasive arguments
for implied rights can be made. On the other hand, as discussed
below in the analysis of the Colonial Realty opinion, there are dif-
ficulties in attempting to attach special importance to rules in the
"deference" category. 15
Two additional categories of self-regulatory requirements re-
main. Self-regulatory "housekeeping rules," as labeled by Mr.
Lowenfels, should, as he points out, never form the basis of implied
rights. 16  These rules - easier to label as a category than to iden-
tify on a rule-by-rule examination - have insubstantial investor-
protection motivation. An example of such a rule is the NYSE
rule concerning transfer of seats."' The insubstantial investor-pro-
tection purpose should preclude implied rights, even assuming that
requisite causation from a breach could be found.31 A number of
self-regulatory rules fall into this category, although, because one
of the primary functions of the self-regulators is investor protection,
it may be difficult in examining any particular rule to find the in-
vestor-protection motivation to be insignificant.
Section 28 (b)31 seems to uphold the exchange rules governing
the settlement of disputes between members, so that implied rights
would never be available as between members in contravention of
exchange procedures to settle such disputes. 2 °
Of vital importance are the consequences of the implication of
private rights under the Exchange Act on the zeal and effectiveness
of the self-regulators. The implication of private rights would prob-
ably not cause repeal of existing rules, but would it cause a reluc-
rule (rather than a Commission order - see note 208 supra), § 29(a) squarely fits.
If the Commission proceeds by its order, the result should be the same, and the exchange
rule can easily be considered one required by the act.
314A contrary conclusion would make a mockery of § 19(b). The statute, how-
ever, is not as clear as it might be. See 2 Loss, op. cit. supra note 273, at 1179-83
and n.40. See also note 206 supra; text accompanying note 183 supra.
315 See text accompanying notes 375-82 infra.
31 6 Lowenfels, supra note 282, at 24-30.
317 N.Y. Stock Exch. Const. art. XI, CCH, N.Y. STOcK ExCH. GUIDE 9 1501-13,
mentioned in Lowenfels, Implied Liabilities Based Upon Stock Exchange Rules, 66
COLuM. L. REV. 12, 28 (1966).
318 See Lowenfels, supra note 317, at 29.
3 1 9 Exchange Act 5 28(b), 48 Star. 895 (1934), as amended 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)
(1964).
320 See 3 Loss, op. cit. supra note 273, at 1814 n.4 30.
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tance to adopt needed new rules? 2 ' Where the choice is between
the possibility of implied rights for member violations of self-regula-
tory rules or a Commission rule covering substantially the same
ground, there probably would be no substantial reluctance. And
as discussed in part I," rules can provide any tolerances that may
be necessary. 3 The implication of private rights would perhaps
make it more difficult for the self-regulators to maintain the opti-
mum autonomy of which the Special Study speaks,... but, again, it
may often be preferable for a private right to be based on violation
of a self-regulatory rule than for a Commission rule to occupy the
field.
JI. EFFECT UNDER STATE LAW OF VIOLATIONS OF
SELF-REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS
Under state law, a customer of a securities or commodities
broker-dealer is usually held subject to the established customs and
usages of the exchange or market in which the broker-dealer regu-
larly deals, whether or not the customer knows of them. 25 But
the customer is seldom given the benefit of a tort or implied con-
tract doctrine when his broker-dealer violates the rules of an ex-
change to which it belongs and damages the customer,2 although
321 Section 15A(j) prevents the NASD from, inter alia, repealing existing rules if
the Commission disapproves. No similar power is spelled out concerning exchanges.
But see notes 206-08 supra and accompanying text. Also, § 6(b) prevents changes in
the § 6(b) rule.
322 See text accompanying notes 154-55 supra.
323 See notes 151-55 supra and accompanying text.
324 Special Study, pt. 4, at 692-728.
325 See, e.g., Jackson, Stockbroker's Liability Under Customs, Usages, and Rules,
12 CLEV.-MAP. L. REV. 111 (1963); 3 Loss, op. cit. supra note 273, at 1812 n.427
(1961 & 1962 Supp.) and materials there cited. But cf. Hyman v. Sachs, 194 Misc.
69, 86 N.Y.S.2d 237 (Sup. Ct 1948), aff'd mem., 275 App. Div. 804, 89 N.Y.S.2d
608, affd, 300 N.Y. 499, 89 N.E.2d 20 (1949). A customer was found to have given no
implied consent to be governed by NASD rules, since the NASD was not as well known
as the exchanges. The statement on the confirmation that transactions in unlisted se-
curities were subject to usages and customs among dealers in unlisted securities did not,
the court said, incorporate NASD rules, because rules of the NASD are not usage or
custom. In light of the growth in importance and recognition of the NASD since 1948,
a different result might be reached today.
Margin account dauses and confirmations may expressly state or dearly imply that
transactions are "subject to" the "rules," as well as the customs and usages, of the NASD
and other self-regulators. See materials cited note 336 infra and text accompanying that
note. See also note 326 infra.
326 See, e.g., 3 Loss, op. cit. supra note 273, at 1812 n.427 (1961 & 1962 Supp.);
Jackson, supra note 325, at 115. But cf. Waddns Grain Co. v. Fraser Smith Co., 221
Iowa 1164, 267 N.W. 115 (1936) (on question of scope of authority of customer's
employee, breach of rule of commodities exchange of which broker was a member that
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nothing in the Exchange Act prevents grounding investor remedies
under state law upon violations of self-regulatory requirements.32
written authorizations be obtained from customers was given weight by court in find-
ing no actual or apparent authority).
An exchange rule may give discretion to a member in certain matters, in which event
it may be difficult to show a violation of the rule. See Jacobs v. Hyman, 286 Fed. 346
(5th Cir. 1923) (rule of a commodities exchange permitted, but did not require, the
dosing of an account when margins were exhausted; delay in dosing by the member not
a violation of the rule). To the same effect is Du Pont v. Neiman, 156 Cal. App. 2d
313, 319 P.2d 60 (1957), another commodities case. In Du Pont, the court held alter-
natively that "it is manifest that the rules of a trading exchange cannot have the effect
of a statutory enactment, and therefore cannot of their own force inject illegality into the
transaction." One of the applicable exchange rules contained a negation clause providing
that the failure of a member to close a customer's account as required shall not relieve
the customer of any liability to the member.
A leading New York case holding that a violation of the rules of a commodities ex-
change does not give the customer a cause of action is Nichols & Co. v. Columbus Credit
Corp., 204 Misc. 848, 126 N.Y.S.2d 715 (1953), aff'd per curiam, 284 App. Div. 870,
134 N.Y.S.2d 590 (1954). See also Irving Weis & Co. v. Offenberger, 31 Misc. 2d
628, 220 N.Y.S.2d 1001 (1961) (action by securities broker against customer, in which
alleged violation by former of FRB margin rules was asserted as a defense and counter-
claim; defense and counterclaim denied on several grounds, with heavy reliance in dictum
on Nichols, supra) ; Whyte v. New York Mercantile Exch., 36 Misc. 2d 745, 233 N.Y.S.
2d 37 (1962) (court cited Nichols and Weis, supra, with approval, though in dictum
as the court did not find a violation of the rules of the exchange). Klein v. D. R.
Comenzo Co., 207 N.Y.S.2d 739 (1960), gave an unusual effect to the FRB's margin
rules. In an action by a customer against his broker concerning a contract to purchase
stock, the contract was held unenforceable because it obviously contemplated extension
of credit in violation of those rules. Concerning the assertion in state courts of defenses
provided by the act, see note 340 infra.
Klein, supra, is distinguished in Myer v. Shields & Co., 267 N.Y.S.2d 872 (App.
Div. 1966), which held that a customer who has violated the FRB's margin rules, but
who has paid for his stock in full, is entitled to receive the stock from the broker despite
any unlawful credit arrangements. The court viewed the dominant purpose of the mar-
gin provisions as the protection of the small speculator, and noted that Klein, supra, did
not state the facts or attempt to deal with the remedial purposes of the margin rules.
A good review of the authorities on the effect of exchange rules on customers and
interesting dictum concerning the effect of violation by a member are contained in White
v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 218 A.2d 655 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1966).
This was a suit by an investor to recover money paid for debentures that proved to be
of questionable value. Plaintiff placed his order with the defendant on February 26,
1963, and the debentures, listed on the American Stock Exchange, were purchased the
same day. The exchange suspended trading the next day, and a few days later delivery
was made and payment received. The court held that if the practices and rules of the
exchange prevented the defendant from cancelling the order after its execution, the plain-
tiff cannot complain - "unless these practices are so repugnant to common principles
of equity and fair dealing as to compel the court to redress his grievances." But, said
the court, had there been a showing that it was incumbent upon the defendant under the
rules to cancel the transaction, "plaintiff would have a proper cause of action." The
opinion is not dear as to whether the defendant purchased the debentures on the ex-
change or in the over-the-counter market.
Rospigliosi v. Clogher, 46 So. 2d 170 (Fla.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 853 (1950)
discussed in note 340 infra and accompanying text, and Gaynor v. Buckley, 318 F.2d
432 (9th Cir. 1963), discussed in notes 342-43 infra and accompanying text, contain
implicit holdings refusing to give effect, under state law, to alleged violations of NYSE
requirements.
327 See notes 398-402 inrra and accompanying text.
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The discrimination in the one-way approach seemingly has not ap-
peared unfair to courts applying state law, even though broker-
dealers (especially NYSE members) may display and advertise their
exchange memberships.32 Alleged violations by NYSE member
firms of its rules concerning voting of street-name securities have
also been considered immaterial in review proceedings 9
In related settings, courts have sometimes given effect to self-
regulatory requirements. A New York decision denied brokerage
commissions to a NASD member on transactions executed during
his suspension from the NASD, although the Exchange Act does not
require this result.33 The court reasoned that the sanction was
needed to make the suspension effective. Another New York de-
cision33' held that a former registered representative of a NYSE
firm could compel the firm to arbitrate, rather than litigate, its
claim against him for his allegedly slanderous remarks concerning
the firm while he was in its employ 2 The court found that this
result was required by the NYSE rules which require a member to
arbitrate disputes with nonmembers arising out of its business, if
the nonmember so requests. The Maryland Court of Appeals has
indicated, in dictum, that some covenants made by a company in
an exchange listing agreement may be enforceable by a shareholder
as a third party beneficiary 83
328 As discussed in notes 248-54 and 263-66 supra and accompanying text, the im-
plied representation approach has been widely used in federal securities regulation.
From a display and advertisement of memberships in self-regulatory bodies, it would
appear fairly easy to find an implied representation of adherence to important investor-
protection rules.
829 See materials cited note 310 supra.
33 0 Boruski v. National Sec. & Research Corp., 237 N.Y.S.2d 772 (App. Div.
1962). Under the act and the NASD rules, the only effect of an NASD suspension at
that time was to trigger the NASD rules concerning member dealings with nonmem-
bers. See 2 Loss, SEcURITmS REGULATION 1369-70 (2d ed. 1961). At the present
time, suspension may in addition subject the broker-dealer to §§ 15 (b) (8) - (10), dis-
cussed in text accompanying notes 268-78 supra. The discussion in the brief opinion
does not rule out the possibility that the NASD rules concerning member dealings with
nonmembers may have been relied upon by the defendant.
3 3 1 Ghiron v. Mayr, 19 App. Div. 2d 54, 241 N.Y.S.2d 144 (1963).
382 Ibid.
3 33 Mackubin v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 190 Md. 52, 57 A.2d 318 (1948). Defen-
dent's shares were listed on the NYSE, and its listing agreement required prompt dis-
closure of dividend action. On March 6, 1946, plaintiff purchased 200 shares and
placed a limit order to purchase additional shares at $30. The Board met late in the
afternoon on March 18 and voted to omit the usual quarterly dividend. Apparently
due to inadvertence, no announcement was made until 2:30 P.M. the next day. The
price then rapidly fell from its level of 3114 before the announcement to below $30.
Plaintiff's order was executed at $30.
The court held plaintiff's claim was as a prospective shareholder, although she al-
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Furthermore, the action of the Baltimore City Circuit Court in
the United Funds, Inc. v. Carter Prods. Inc.,.34 case in finding (in
a statement in a prospectus) and enforcing an implied management
promise that it would not, absent a good business reason, take steps
causing the NYSE to delist the company's stock is a landmark in
recognition and fostering of federal investor protections under state
law.
335
Most intriguing is the possibility of a bilateral incorporation of
exchange and NASD rules in the contractual relationship of mem-
bers and their customers. Margin account agreements and the re-
verse side of confirmations often state that transactions are subject
to applicable governmental and self-regulatory requirements.
33 6
The motivation of broker-dealers is probably to protect themselves
when, for example, the Commission or the exchange suspends trad-
ing or the latter cancels stop-loss orders, and the wording of the
clauses seemingly attempts to make incorporation a one-way
street.337  However, in a recent unreported federal district court
case, the plaintiff alleged that such a clause in a margin account
agreement effected bilateral incorporation and that the defendant
firm, a NYSE member, violated NYSE rules to his detriment; the
court held this presented a cause of action. 8 Obligation through
contractual incorporation under state law is or may be different
in three respects from implying a right under the Exchange Act.
First, the scope of the Exchange Act is not enlarged in that there
is no newly found duty of compliance for any purpose. Second,
state law will govern the extent and effect of contractual incorpo-
ready owned stock, and that under New York law, accepted as governing, the listing
agreement was not intended for the benefit of prospective purchasers. The court left
open the question of third party beneficiary rights as a shareholder.
334 United Funds, Inc. v. Carter Prods., Inc. CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. (Transfer
Binder, 1961-64) 5 91288 (Baltimore, Md. City Cir. Ct. 1963).
335 Ibid.
336 See, e.g., Joint Appendix, pp. 56a-57a, Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co.,
358 F.2d 178 (2d Cir.), peition for cert. filed, 34 U.S.L. WEEK 3400 (U.S. May 17,
1966); Goldenberg v. Bache & Co., 270 F.2d 675, 677-78 (5th Cir. 1959); Special
Study, pt. 1, at 390-93, 442-45; 3 Loss, op. cit. supra note 330, at 1812 n.427.
837 Ibid.
3 38 Folsom v. Townsend, Dabney & Tyson, Civil Action No. 7-199 (D. Maine Dec.
20, 1963) (oral opinion). The allegations of violations of NYSE rules constituted the
second count, the first being an allegation of violations of the FRB's margin rules. See
also note 326 supra. On incorporation, see also Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 433 n.18
(1953), discussed in text accompanying notes 387-93, 412-14 infra. If there is two-
way incorporation as a matter of state contract law, the incorporation would seem to ex-
tend to federal and state governmental requirements, because of the sweeping language
used in the clauses. Cf. 2 Loss, op. cit. supra note 330, at 996-99; 3 id., at 2005-06;
text accompanying notes 396-402 infra.
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ration. Third, section 29(a) will not prevent the broker-dealer
from enforcing a pre-controversy agreement to arbitrate customer
claims of damage from violations of self-regulatory requirements."'
IV. PRE-COLONIAL RiEA.LTY CASES ON IMPLIED RIGHTS
UNDER THE EXCHANGE AcT
The Florida Supreme Court has considered the effect of a NYSE
rule forbidding its members or their representatives from having an
interest in customers' accounts.840 The plaintiff, a registered rep-
resentative of a NYSE firm, sued his alleged common-law wife for
his interest in an account carried in her name, maintaining that,
pursuant to an agreement between them, he had a part interest. The
defendant argued that the plaintiff's violation of the NYSE rule
prevented his action and that any agreement by her was voided by
section 29(a). The court, without mentioning Baird, held that
sections 6(b) and 29(a) were inapplicable, as the rule in question
was not one required by the Exchange Act. The court construed
the Exchange Act as requiring an exchange to have only one rule
- discipline for violation of just and equitable principles of trade
- and as allowing an exchange, within limits, to have any number
of other rules. The court seemed to believe that civil remedies un-
der the Exchange Act would flow from the violation of the one re-
quired rule, but held that none would flow from the violation of
others.
In Walsh v. Peoria & E. Ry.,84' an insurgent solicitor of proxies
alleged that NYSE member firms wrongfully failed to forward his
material to beneficial owners of street-name stock. Since the court
found an alleged violation of the Commission's proxy rules, it did
not decide whether a violation of the applicable NYSE rule would
create an implied private right of action, although it said the ques-
tion was "more doubtful."
Several recent cases have touched upon the availability of pri-
vate rights where issuers or their managements are alleged to have
839 See note 353 supra and accompanying text.
840 Rospigliosi v. Clogher, 46 So. 2d 170 (FIa.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 853 (1950),
discussed in 3 Loss, op. cit. supra note 330, at 1812.
The court did not mention the declaration in § 27 that only the federal courts have
jurisdiction of claims under the act. Where, however, the act is raised as a defense,
as it was, state court jurisdiction is proper and desirable. 'See 2 Loss, op. cit. supra note
330, at 977-86. Cf. notes 398-402 infra and accompanying text.
841222 F. Supp. 516 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). For a discussion of changes in the ap-
plicable statutory provisions made by the 1964 amendments, see Phillips & Shipman,
An Analysis of the Securities Acts Amendments of 1964, 1964 Durx LJ. 706, 789-95.
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violated NYSE requirements. In Gaynor v. Buckley,'4 where di-
versity jurisdiction was present, shareholders in a derivative action
attempting to set aside the grant of a stock option to an employee
of a listed company alleged, among other grounds, the violation of
a NYSE requirement. The Ninth Circuit dismissed the contention
with the observation that "the New York Stock Exchange does not
legislate for the state of Georgia [the state of incorporation]." ''
In Kroese v. New York Stock Exchange, 44 a holder of sub-
share certificates of proprietary interest in the Texas Pacific Land
Trust sued the Trust and the NYSE (on which trust certificates are
listed), alleging that the former was in violation of a requirement
or policy of the NYSE that listed issuers hold regular meetings of
owners, which, under a dear NYSE policy, would require solicita-
tion of proxies. Finding no NYSE rule or requirement of regular
meetings, the court dismissed the complaint. The court, however,
seemingly agreed that the Baird duty of the exchange extended to
requirements concerning issuers and seemed to have no problem
with the joinder of the issuer.
Finally, O'Neill v. Maytag,. 5 decided by the Second Circuit after
the district court's decision in Colonial Realty, was a chilly recep-
tion to implied rights under the Exchange Act against managements
for violation of NYSE requirements. The plaintiff in a share-
holders' derivative action alleged that the management of a listed
company had caused it to purchase a large block of the company's
own stock for an amount considerably in excess of its then market
value in order to protect .management's position. After holding
that the complaint stated no implied right of action under Rule
10b-5.4 or section 409(b) of the Federal Aviation Act,"' the
court dealt with the district court's refusal to allow the plaintiff to
amend his complaint to set forth a cause of action under the Ex-
342 318 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1963). It is not clear whether the alleged violation of
NYSE rules was asserted as a claim under the act or under state law.
343 Id. at 435.
344 277 F. Supp. 519 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) discussed in Lowenfels, supra note 317,
at 21. The NYSE requirements on solicitation of proxies are briefly discussed in note
202 supra and accompanying text Exchange rules also play an extremely important
role in the administration of the provisions of the act concerning delisting. See, e.g.,
Atlas Tack Corp. v. New York Stock Exch., 246 F.2d 311 (1st Cir. 1957); Exchange
Buffet Corp. v. New York Stock Exch., 244 F.2d 507 (2d Cir. 1957).
345 339 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1964), discussed in Lowenfels, supra note 317, at 23-24.
346 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
34749 U.S.C. § 1379(b).
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change Act based on an allegation that the transaction violated
NYSE rules. The court stated:
The fourth proposed allegation apparently was intended to estab-
lish an entirely new theory by claiming that the transaction vio-
lated the rules of the New York Stock Exchange. Whether or
not such a violation might give rise to a cause of action against the
defendants under state law, we do not think that it does so under
federal law. The Exchange itself is under a federal duty to en-
force its rules, . . . and this duty may be enforceable in a private
suit.... It does not follow, however, that a suit against a listed
company or its officers based on violation of an Exchange rule
arises under federal law, and we see no reason for so holding3 48
V. TIE COLONIAL REALTY OPINION
On March 10, 1966, the Second Circuit handed down its opin-
ion in Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co.14' The plaintiff's com-
plaint, in the words of the court, was as follows:
Colonial Realty Corporation, a Delaware Corporation with its
principal place of business in Pennsylvania, brought this action in
the District Court for the Southern District of New York against
Bache & Co., a limited partnership organized pursuant to the New
York Partnership Law and engaged in securities brokerage in New
York City. The controversy arises out of Bache's sales of securities
in Colonial's margin account during the stock market dip of May
and June 1962. Bache claimed it acted under authority of a clause
in its standard form of margin contract in which Colonial cove-
nanted to "maintain such margins as you may from time to time
require, upon my accounts, and promptly meet all margin calls."
Colonial relied on an alleged oral agreement that Bache would not
require a margin in excess of the minimum requirements of the
New York Stock Exchange and also claimed negligence on Bache's
part. With respect to all securities sold to meet calls exceeding
the Stock Exchange's minimum, Colonial sought to recover the
losses it had suffered, running into millions of dollars, and some
$100,000 in commissions which Bache had collected.350
This action was brought as a common law claim under state
law and as an implied right under the Exchange Act. The plain-
tiff maintained that the right of action under the act arose because
defendant's alleged conduct violated NYSE and NASD rules re-
quiring their members to adhere to just and equitable principles of
348 O'Neil v. Maytag, 339 F.2d 764, 770 (2d Cir. 1964).
349 358 F.2d 178 (2d Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 34 U.S.L WEEK 3400 (U.S.
May 17, 1966).
350 Id. at 179.
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trade. 51 No allegation of a violation of antifraud or other rules
promulgated by a governmental agency under the act was made.
The defendant moved to dismiss for failure to state a federal
claim and lack of diversity. In the alternative, it sought to compel
arbitration and stay the proceedings pursuant to a clause in the mar-
gin agreement. Such a pre-controversy clause probably is, because
of the non-waiver language in section 29(a),352 unenforceable with
respect to express and implied private rights under the Exchange
Act.
53
The district court found diversity, held that the alleged viola-
tion of the self-regulatory rules stated no federal claim on which
relief could be granted, and compelled arbitration pursuant to the
margin agreement. "4 The court found no statutory duty on mem-
bers to comply with the self-regulators' rules and that the reference
to "rules" in section 27, comprehends only agency rules.3 " ' The
35 1 The applicable NASD rule requires a member to observe "high standards of
commercial honor and just and equitable principles of trade." NASD Rules of Fair
Practice art. III, § 1, NASD MANuAL at D-5.
352 Exchange Act § 29(a), 48 Stat. 903 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(a)
(1964).
353 See 3 Loss, op. cit. supra note 330, at 1813-14; Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427
(1953) (pre-controversy agreement by customer unenforceable by broker on client's
assertion of express right of action under § 12(2) of the Securities Act); Reader v.
Hirsch & Co., 197 F. Supp. 111 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (same holding on suit alleging im-
plied right based on violation of margin rules under the act). Section 29(a) is inap-
plicable to pre-controversy arbitration clauses where the customer sues the broker-dealer
concerning commodities, not securities, transactions. Robinson v. Bache & Co., 227 F.
Supp. 456 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
354 See Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. (Transfer
Binder, 1961-64) 5 91351 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), affd 358 F.2d 178 (2d Cit.), petition
for cert. filed, 34 U.S.L. Week 3400 (U.S. May 17, 1966).
3 SSExchange Act § 27, 48 Star. 902-03 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa
(1964). Section 27 creates jurisdiction for actions based on violations of the Exchange
Act and rules thereunder and actions to enforce any duty or liability created by the act
or such rules.
356 On the statutory duty, see notes 235-38 supra and accompanying text. "Rules
of the exchange" and "rules of the association" are given specific definitions in the act.
Exchange Act § 6(a) (3), 48 Stat. 885 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(a) (3) (1964); Ex-
change Act § 15A(a) (2), 52 Stat. 1070 (1938), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3
(a) (2) (1964). Exchange Act §§ 6(b), (c), (d), 48 Stat. 885 (1934), 15 U.S.C.
§9 78f(b), (c), (d) (1964); Exchange Act § 15A(b) (3), 52 Star. 1070 (1938), as
amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b) (3) (1964); Exchange Act § 19(b), 48 Star. 898
(1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b) (1964); Exchange Act § 29(a), 48 Stat. 903
(1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(a) (1964), carefully distinguish between rules
of the exchange and governmental rules. References in sections such as Exchange Act
§ 27, 48 Star. 902-03 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. 5 78aa (1964); Exchange Act
5 29(b), 48 Star. 903 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. 5 78cc(b) (1964); Exchange
Act § 32(a), 48 Star. 904 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (1964) to rules
and regulations under the act thus seem to comprehend only governmental rules. For
a suggested possible contrary interpretation, see Lowenfels, supra note 317, at 18-19.
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court also was apprehensive that a contrary holding would, be-
cause of the breadth and reach of the standard, federalize many ac-
tions now governed by state law.357
The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's holdings and,
to a considerable extent, agreed with its reasoning. 8' The Sec-
ond Circuit also found that the alleged breach did not con-
stitute a violation of the act or agency rules 59 and construed
the reference to "rules" in section 27, which provides jurisdiction for
private suits to "enforce any liability or duty created by [the act]
or the rules ... thereunder,"36 as referring only to agency rules.361
But the Second Circuit did not consider these facts conclusive. The
opinion, written by Judge Friendly, is interesting in light of his re-
cently published views praising Erie R. R. v. Tompkins 6. while
also championing the selective growth of federal common law un-
der federal statutes and in other areas of vital or paramount federal
concern.
363
The Second Circuit opinion begins with a recognition of the
holding in Baird v. Franklin,3 on which the plaintiff primarily
relied. Even though the court agreed that in Baird, there was a
good implied right of action against the member because the mem-
ber's misconduct was a violation of the statute itself, it said that
"this does not establish that implication of a private right of action
against an exchange for culpable failure to enforce its rules neces-
sarily calls for recognizing a similar right against an individual
broker who is claimed to have violated them."36 5
The court then gave its understanding of when and why im-
plied private remedies are afforded under the Exchange Act:
We start from the proposition that the judicial recognition and
enforcement of a private remedy not expressly afforded by the
Securities Exchange Act is predicated on the duty of the courts "to
3
57 See notes 396-402 infra and accompanying text.
358 Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., 358 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1966), petition
for cert. filed, 34 U.S.L. WEEK 3400 (U.S. May 17, 1966).
359 See notes 235-38 supra and accompanying text.
360Exchange Act § 27, 48 Star. 902-03 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa
(1964).
361 See note 356 supra.
362 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
363 Friendly, In Praise of Erie - and of the New Federal Common Law, 19 REcoRD
OF THE N.Y.C.B.A. 64 (1964).
364 Baird v. Franklin, 141 F.2d 238 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 737 (1944).
365 Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., 358 F.2d 178, 181 (2d Ci.), petition for
cert. filed, 34 U.S.L. WEEK 3400 (U.S. May 17, 1966).
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make effective the congressional purpose" represented in "the stat-
ute and the federal policy which it has adopted." ... Implication of
a private right of action may be suggested by explicit statutory
condemnation of certain conduct and a general grant of jurisdiction
to enforce liabilities created by the statute, as in cases under §§ 10
and 14 of the Act, ... or from such considerations as the pro-
tection intended by the legislature and the ineffectiveness of ex-
isting remedies, administrative and judicial, fully to achieve that
end.... a6
Putting stock exchange rules into context, the court noted that
the question of a claim for violation of them is
a thorny problem because the effect and significance of particular
rules may vary with the manner of their adoption and their rela-
tionship to provisions and purposes of the statute and SEC regu-
lations thereunder; the difficulty lies in the scope of the unique
statutory scheme of "supervised self-regulation" by exchanges and
dealers' associations.3 67
After remarking that section 6(b)'s3" s mandate "could hardly
be broader," the court found something of an indication of negative
congressional intent on implied rights for violation of the section
6(b) rule in the reliance in the section on the exchanges' discipli-
nary function to protect investors. 69 This is, of course, not deci-
sive since exchanges' disciplinary duties comprehend willful vio-
lations of the Exchange Act and Commission rules, for which the
Commission can also discipline and investors can dearly assert im-
plied rights. 7
The court moved to sections 27 and 29(a), stating:
Basis for an even broader negation can arguably be found in the
absence of any reference to exchange rules in the grant of federal
jurisdiction over 'all suits in equity and actions at law brought to
enforce any liability or duty created by this chapter or the rules
and regulations thereunder,' Securities Exchange Act § 27, in con-
trast to the explicit reference to exchange rules in § 29(a) - al-
though acceptance of this argument would not foreclose a conten-
tion that there might still be a federal claim of which district
courts would have concurrent jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331
or 1337.... In O'Neill v. Maytag, 339 F.2d 764, 770 (2d Cir. 1964),
366 Ibid.
367 Ibid.
368 Exchange Act § 6(b), 47 Star. 885 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b) (1964).
369 Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., 358 F.2d 178, 181 (2d Cir.), petition for
cert. filed, 34 U.S.L. WEEK 3400 (U.S. May 17, 1966).
370 See, e.g., materials cited in note 244 supra.
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in repudiating a belated attempt to rest federal jurisdiction on a
listing agreement between a corporation and the NYSE, this court
refused to give general recognition to private rights of action for
alleged violations of stock exchange rules.
371
The use of section 29(a) - with its inclusion in the non-waiver
stipulation of exchange rules required by the Exchange Act, which
clearly includes the section 6(b) rule - to aid in a negative con-
clusion on implied rights is proper in the sense that the wording
of section 29 (a) and of other sections proves the point about the
reference to "rules" in section 27; but section 29(a) itself is, be-
cause of the non-waiver language, the best technical argument for
creation of implied rights for violations of the section 6(b) rule.372
The analysis of section 27 also fails specifically to deal with the
reference in the section to any liability or duty created by the Ex-
change Act itself, as opposed to rules of a government agency. If
the federal courts have jurisdiction -2" predicated upon a finding
of an action arising under a federal statute or a federal statute regu-
lating commerce - there would seem to be a liability created by
the Exchange Act within the meaning of section 27!" The point
is important in two respects. Aside from the liberal venue and ser-
vice-of-process provisions in section 27, if the liability is created by
the Exchange Act, federal court jurisdiction under section 27 is ex-
clusive.
The court continued: "W]e cannot ignore that the concept of
supervised self-regulation is broad enough to encompass a rule
which provides what amounts to a substitute for regulation by the
SEC itself."'375 In the largest sense, of course, most self-regulation
for the protection of investors is a substitute for government regu-
lation; section 15 (b) (10)... illustrates that the unethical can be
made illegal. The court, however, seemed to have something
more narrow in mind, as it referred to Commission powers to alter
or supplement self-regulatory rules or to issue its own superseding
371 Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., 358 F.2d 178, 182 (2d Cit.), petition for
cert. filed, 34 U.S.L. WEEK 3400 (U.S. May 17, 1966).
3 7 2 See notes 292-94 supra and accompanying text.
373 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 or 1337 (1964).
374 See 2 Loss, op. cit. supra note 330, at 995.
375 Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., 358 F.2d 178, 182 (2d Cir.), petition for
cert. filed, 34 U.S.L WEEK 3400 (U.S. May 17, 1966).
376 Exchange Act § 15(b) (10), 48 Star. 895 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. 78o
(b) (10) (1964).
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regulations. '7 7  Giving as an example the NYSE rule on voting
of street name stock, the court said:
A particular stock exchange rule could thus play an integral part in
SEC regulation notwithstanding the Commission's decision to take
a back-seat role in its promulgation and enforcement, and we
would not wish to say that such a rule could not provide the basis
for implying a private right of actionm378
The reference to an "integral part" of Commission regulation,
construed liberally, can include almost every self-regulatory rule,
as many self-regulatory rules are adopted after informal Commis-
sion urging and without a formal proceeding or request to alter or
supplement. The Commission may also, and sometimes without
much conscious consideration, not enter a field because of existing
self-regulatory requirements. Furthermore, the floor trading and
specialists rules simply require exchange rules.179  Another Com-
mission rule exempts exchange members on the basis of adequate
exchange rules."8 ' Moreover, as discussed, the Commission can,
under section 10(b),"' probably accomplish a quasi-incorporation
of many self-regulatory rules by directing prior disclosure of de-
partures from important self-regulatory rules. 82
The court then announced this test:
What emerges is that whether the courts are to imply federal
civil liability for violation of exchange or dealer association rules
by a member cannot be determined on the simplistic all-or-noth-
ing basis urged by the two parties; rather the court must look to
the nature of the particular rule and its place in the regulatory
scheme, with the party urging the implication of a federal liabil-
ity carrying a considerably heavier burden of persuasion than when
the violation is of the statute or an SEC regulation. 83
The court noted that "the case for implication would be strongest
when the rule imposes an explicit duty unknown to the common
law." The court found the section 6(b) rule "near the opposite
377 Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., 358 F.2d 178, 182 (2d Cir.), petition for
cert. filed, 34 U.S.L. WEEK 3400 (U.S. May 17, 1966). Though the court cites only
§ 19, the reference to superseding Commission rules is seemingly not limited to a
Commission rule under § 19(b) altering or supplementing the exchange's rules. See
notes 206-08 supra (discussion of § 19(b) ).
37S Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., supra note 377, at 182.
379 See notes 303-04 supra and accompanying text.
380 See SEC Rule 15c3-1(b) (2), 17 C.F.R. § 240-15c3-1(b) (2) (1964).
3 8lExchange Act § 10(b), 48 Stat. 891 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1964).
3 8 2 See notes 263-66 supra and accompanying text.
38s Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., 358 F.2d 178, 182 (2d Cir.), petition for
cert. filed, 34 U.S.L. WEEK 3400 (U.S. May 17, 1966).
384 Ibid.
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pole." ' 5  The characterization was apparently only to lack of ex-
plicitness, as the court believed that the rules, although imposing
duties on members which the exchanges can enforce,
are something of a catch-all which, in addition to satisfying the
letter of the statute, preserves power to discipline members for a
wide variety of misconduct, including merely unethical behavior
which Congress could well not have intended to give rise to a legal
claim. We find little reason to believe that by requiring exchanges
and dealers' associations to include such provisions in their rules
Congress meant to impose a new legal standard on members dif-
ferent from that long recognized by state law.8s 6
Finally, the consequences of the view urged by the plaintiff
were considered. The court found the consequences "so disruptive
as to require much more impressive evidence of congressional pur-
pose than we can discern."3 7  Considering arbitration first, the
court said:
For example, as illustrated by this very case, the widely adopted
practice of resorting to arbitration as a means of settling contro-
versies between stockbrokers and their customers would be out-
lawed whenever the customer chose to rely not on breaches of con-
tract or negligence simpliciter but on the more sophisticated theory
that the broker's acts were "inconsistent with just and equitable
principles of trade," see Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953); at
least this would be so, if the rule of Wilko, decided under the Se-
curities Act of 1933, is applicable also under the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934.88
This, of course, oversimplifies. The Special Study did compliment
the NYSE arbitration process,"' but Wilko v. Swans ° did not
"outlaw" arbitration. It held that a customer's pre-controversy
agreement, contained in that case in the fine print of a margin agree-
ment, was unenforceable by the broker against a customer who
wished to try his claim - a claim of an express right under sec-
3851 bid.
388 Ibid.
387 Ibid.
388Id. at 182-83.
389Speci4 Study, pt 4, at 559-61, 574, 577 (recommendation 5). The NASD's
charter lists as one of its purposes the investigation and adjustment of grievances be-
tween the public and members and between members. Article Third (4), NASD MAN-
UAL at C-1. Unlike the NYSE, the NASD does not have a formal arbitration procedure.
A proposed code was informally submitted to the Commission in 1944, but the Com-
mission raised several objections, and the NASD thereafter abandoned its efforts in that
direction. Specia Stady, pt. 4, at 663 and n.448.
890 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
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tion 12(2) . .. of the Securities Act - in court. The Wilko case
did not pass upon the enforceability of post-controversy agree-
ments.392 Moreover, it is not dear that the just and equitable prin-
ciples standard is to be applied in the arbitration.393
A second disruptive effect is pointed out:
Moreover, mere recitation of the statutory watchword by an ag-
grieved investor would saddle the federal courts with garden-va-
riety customer-broker suits, even though the controversy was be-
tween citizens of the same state, the sum in question did not at-
tain the jurisdictional amount required by 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and
there was no indication that the case would be decided differently
under state law - unless we were to make the large assumption
that by requiring adoption of rules embodying this phrase Con-
gress meant the federal courts to develop a new body of broker-
customer law.
Although familiar principles require federal courts to do pre-
cisely this as to those exchange rules whose violation is held to
create a federal claim, Congress scarcely contemplated judicial cre-
ation of a new body of federal broker-customer law whenever the
complaint in what would otherwise be an action under state law al-
leged conduct inconsistent with just and equitable principles of
trade.394
Here, the court does not mention that, as discussed earlier, 95 there
is something of a body of federal law on just and equitable prin-
ciples, supplied by Commission proceedings reviewing NASD disci-
plinary actions and the cases considering the Baird case duty of ex-
changes. The section 15 (b) (10) rules, when issued, may provide
another source of development.
Finally, the court said: "moreover, if... [section] 27 were read
to include exchange rules, the jurisdiction of the federal courts
would be exclusive whenever the plaintiff alleged that violation of
an exchange rule created a liability or duty created by the Security
[sic] Exchange Act and the state courts would be altogether stripped
of power to adjudicate claims so pleaded even between their own
citizens." 9 ' This recognizes that preemption is not at issue in im-
391 Securities Act § 12(2), 48 Stat. 84 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 771(2)
(1964).
392The case is discussed in 3 Loss, SEcuiTIEs REGULATION 1813-14 (2d ed.
1961).
39 See notes 412-14 infra and accompanying text.
394 Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., 358 F.2d 178, 183 (2d Cir.), petition for
cert. filed, 34 U.S.L. WEEK 3400 (U.S. May 17, 1966).
395 See text accompanying notes 296-301 supra.
396 Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., 358 F.2d 178, 183 (2d Cir.), petition for
cert. filed, 34 U.S.L. WEEK 3400 (U.S. May 17, 1966). (Emphasis added.)
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plied rights cases and that section 27 requires only that a plain-
tiff asserting a federal right based on the Exchange Act must
sue in the federal court. Section 27397 provides exclusive federal
court jurisdiction for federal claims under the Exchange Act;
it does not preempt. The Exchange Act expressly saves state
securities regulation and regulation of exchanges, insofar as they
are not inconsistent with the act and the Commission's rules 98
Also, the act explicitly saves state common law and statutory reme-
dies, although limiting total damages, whether recovered in one or
more actions, to the "actual damages on account of the act com-
plained of. ' 399  Section 27 says only that a claim arising under the
Exchange Act must be asserted in a federal court. If the facts con-
stitute a good cause of action under a state statute or common law
doctrine, that they may also constitute a good express or implied
private right under the act does not prevent the plaintiff from tak-
ing his choice; or, if he can find diversity or pendent jurisdiction for
the state law claims, all can be combined in one action.400 This
may even be the case if a state were to create a state tort based on
a violation of the Exchange Act, although a claim of a federal tort
so based or a claim under section 29(b) 40 1 can be asserted only in
the federal courts.4 2
Before offering conclusions on the most desirable handling of
implied rights under the act for violations of self-regulatory require-
ments, the effect of Commission or self-regulatory rules attempting
to negate any such rights the courts may imply will be briefly con-
sidered.
307 Exchange Act § 27, 48 Star. 902 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1964).
308 See §§ 6(c) and 28(a); 1 Loss, op. cit. supra note 392, at 155-58.
309 See § 28 (a); note 51 supra and accompanying text.
400 These problems are discussed in 2 loss, op. cit. supra note 392, at 973-1019; 3
Loss, op. cit. supra note 392, at 2005-06. In UMW v. Gibbs, 34 U.S.L. WEEK 4335
(U.S. March 28, 1966), the Court adopted a liberal test concerning the power of the
federal courts to exercise pendent jurisdiction.
4 0 1 Exchange Act § 29(b), 48 Star. 903 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. S 78cc(b)
(1964).
402 See 2 Loss, op. cit. supra note 392, at 996-99; 3 Loss, op. cit. supra note 392,
at 2005-06. If the plaintiff can persuade a state court (1) to apply a state common
law doctrine that violations of exchange rules should be treated the same as violations
of state statutes adopted for the protection of investors (compare notes 325-29 supra
and accompanying text) or (2) to find a bilateral contractual incorporation (see notes
336-39 supra and accompanying text), the state court's jurisdiction would definitely be
unaffected by § 27. The court's statement clearly recognizes that ordinary contract and
tort actions under state law are unaffected by § 27.
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V. EFFECT OF NEGATION RULES
The conclusion stated in Part 143 would seem, in general, to be
applicable here. Federal jurisdiction to grant relief under federal
law is dependent upon the finding of a liability "created by" the
Exchange Act. Thus, the self-regulators should dearly be con-
sidered without authority to promulgate binding negation rules, and
the reasons given in Part I support treatment of a Commission nega-
tion rule as automatically ultra vires.
However, judicial discretion in applying the tort doctrine has,
as the Colonial Realty opinion noted, often been affected by the
availability or non-availability of other sufficient remedies." 4
Therefore, the availability under the rules of a self-regulator of an
effective arbitration process which gives due weight to violations of
its rules could justifiably be considered sufficient in itself to pre-
dude implication of a private right under the Exchange Act against
members.0
5
In'any event, the self-regulators can provide proper tolerances
for example, that reasonable or good faith attempts to determine
suitability of securities for the needs of customers will suffice.4"8
These tolerances would probably be supplied by the courts, but
explicitness in the rules on this point would ensure that liability
4 03 See text accompanying notes 166-79 supra.
404 See text accompanying notes 366, 387-94 supra; J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S.
426, 434-35 (1964); the Safety Appliance Acts cases discussed in 2 Loss, op. cit. supra
note 392, at 989-94.
4 0 5 See notes 413-14 infra and accompanying text. The rules of the NYSE presently
require a member to arbitrate disputes arising out of its business with a nonmember, if
the latter so requests. See text accompanying note 332 supra; CCH N.Y. STOCK EXCH.
GUIDE 55 1351-57, 2481-92B. The NYSE rules do not, however, specify the weight
to be given in the arbitration to a member's violation of NYSE requirements.
An argument for refusing to create an implied right under the act for violations by
member firms of the self-regulator's requirements when the self-regulator maintains an
effective arbitration process giving appropriate weight to those violations is that the ar-
bitration panel will probably be more familiar with the governing standard of conduct
than are the courts, while the reverse is likely to be true when violations of the act or
agency rules are alleged (see materials cited notes 352-53, 389-93 supra and 412-14
infra and accompanying text).
Where prospective relief is desired - say, adherence to the street-name-stock rules
in a proxy contest - the lodging of a complaint with the self-regulator would seemingly
most often suffice to remedy any deviation that may be present.
406 This could be done, as a practical matter, only with Commission consent. See
notes 204-08 supra and accompanying text. It might be noted, however, that NASD
Rules of Fair Practice art. III § 2, NASD MANUAL at D-5 requires only "reasonable
grounds for believing" a recommendation is suitable. Section 3 (b) may furnish the
Commission with authority to define "just and equitable principles of trade," the key
term in § 6(b). See also notes 152-55 supra and accompanying text. Suitability of
securities for the needs of customers is discussed in note 419 infra and materials there
cited.
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would attach only where a proper degree of culpability is found."0 7
One effect of implication or possible implication of private rights
is that the self-regulators may become more explicit and careful in
their rules, which is both good and bad. One advantage of having
businessmen participate in their own regulation is that less legally
oriented regulaton can be more flexible and responsive. However,
optimum specificity in rules or interpretive releases is itself a de-
sirable goal for any organization, especially one exercising govern-
mental-type powers.40
VII. CONCLUSION AND A SUGGESTED TEST
Reservations on some of the statements in the Colonial Realty
opinion should not obscure three far more important points: (1)
The correct result was reached in the case before the court; (2)
The court's approach demonstrates a penetrating and sophisticated
appreciation of the complexities and subtleties of the two-tier gov-
ernmental and "non-governmental" structure of Commission regu-
lation and self-regulation; and (3) The dictum that some self-regu-
latory requirements may form the foundation for implied rights
under the Exchange Act leaves the door open for judicial statesman-
ship in effectuating the purposes of the act and in removing what
may often be a pressure for the Commission to superimpose its rules
on the self-regulators' requirements.
The conflicting pressures and fine distinctions that permeate
the question of implied rights for violations of self-regulatory re-
quirements have been mentioned. The section 6(b) rule brings
with it more, and more specific, conflicting pressures. Section 29
(a) cannot be ignored. Section 6(b) squarely requires exchanges
to have this rule. Foreclosing a statutory tort type of remedy
under the Exchange Act seems somewhat unfair in light of the fact
that customers are often bound by exchange rules under state law,
even if they do not know of them, and that incorporation clauses
(one was present in the margin agreement involved in Colonial
407 Exchange Act § 18, 48 Stat. 897-98, (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78i (1964) estab-
lishes a good faith defense applicable to actions under that section. RESTATE1MENT
(SEcoND), ToRTs § 288A (1965) notes that excuses for acts violating a statute or
administrative rule can be available when the statutory tort doctrine is applied to neg-
ligence actions, unless the statute or regulation is construed as not permitting an excuse.
408 This is not said in criticism of the manner in which any existing self-regulatory
requirements are framed. The author means only that a pressure from the possibility of
implied rights can, in general, be helpful in attaining and maintaining optimum sped-
ficity.
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Realty)4 °9 seemingly try to strengthen this state-law rule without
giving the customer benefits.
Yet, in balancing the interests of investors (protected by a body
of remedially construed Commission antifraud rules with a poten-
tial for growth) against the adverse effects of an across-the-board
leap to a new general, and potentially quite demanding, standard
of legal liability for member firms, the court's answer was the
proper one. Despite the precedent that has been accumulated con-
cerning the reach of "just and equitable principles,"41 it is an in-
explicit standard. In one of its footnotes, the court labeled the sec-
tion 6(b) rule as a commandment "vaguely adjuring [the mem-
ber] to behave himself."41' Although this overstates, a just-and-
equitable-principles standard would introduce considerable uncer-
tainty. Moreover, the contrary result would have increased the use
of litigation, rather than arbitration, to resolve disputes between in-
vestors and broker-dealers, and the increased litigation would be
directed exclusively to the federal courts by section 27.
The foregoing problems would not have been as serious if
member firms could obtain binding agreements from customers to
arbitrate implied rights for violations of the section 6(b) rule.
Broker-dealers, which naturally desire to cultivate a good reputa-
tion, prefer, in general, to avoid litigation in public proceedings.
Perhaps the court could have found an implied right and construed
Wilko v. Swan41  as inapplicable; the defendant's brief urged this
result if, contrary to its argument, an implied right were found."'
But at this time, only the Supreme Court can issue a binding
clarification of the Wilko case allowing enforceable pre-controversy
agreements authorizing members to compel arbitration of implied
rights of any type. Furthermore, the Court's opinion in Wilko
noted the difficulties, in general submissions of the type contem-
plated by margin agreement clauses, in holding arbitrators to legal
concepts formulated by the courts.414
Where a self-regulator's requirement (even if announced in a
409 Joint Appendix, pp. 56a-57a; Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., 358 F.2d
178 (2d Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 34 U.S.L. WEEK 3400 (U.S. May 17, 1966).
410 See notes 295-301 supra and accompanying text.
411 Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., 358 F.2d 178, 183 n.6 (2d Cir.), petition
for cert. filed, 34 U.S.L. WEEK 3400 (U.S. May 17, 1966).
412346 U.S. 427 (1953).
413 Brief for appellee, pp. 11-13, Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., 358 F.2d 178
(2d Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 34 U.S.L. WEEK 3400 (U.S. May 17, 1966).
41 4 Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 435-37 (1953).
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release under the section 6(b) rule) is moderately specific, the
balance can easily shift. The dangers of judicial misconstruction
of the self-regulatory requirement diminish. Also diminished is
the potential volume of new cases for the federal courts to consider.
Furthermore, the amount of new federal common law to be fash-
ioned is decreased, because the standard will have considerable con-
tent on its face.
But two additional considerations remain - comparability and
the reference in Colonial Realty to self-regulatory rules that are an
integral part of SEC regulation. Many moderately specific self-
regulatory requirements can be considered integral parts of SEC
regulation. The potential reach and lack of certainty of an "in-
tegral part" test has been mentioned. Moreover, where the SEC
has failed to exercise its authority to impose requirements on non-
member broker-dealers or unlisted companies similar to those im-
posed by the self-regulators, it may be unfair to subject members
and listed companies to implied liabilities under the Exchange Act
for violation of the self-regulators' requirements. A limitation that
the self-regulatory investor-protection requirement be a direct substi-
tute for Commission regulation would maintain comparability415
and would produce maximum predictability in applying an "in-
tegral part" test. That a self-regulatory requirement is a direct sub-
stitute would be demonstrated by: (1) a Commission rule expressly
exempting persons from its requirements on the basis of self-regula-
tory requirements found adequate by the Commission, or (2) a
Commission rule limited to nonmembers or unlisted companies and
imposing requirements similar to those imposed by the self-regula-
tors.418  This approach would have several advantages. It is easy
415 Comparability is discussed in the text accompanying notes 268-78 supra. If the
NASD's just-and-equitable-principles standard is considered so inexplicit that implied
rights are not to be created for its violation, but other more definite standards are to fur-
nish a base for implied rights, the same test might be applied to rules under § 15 (b)
(10).
416 Thus, exchange or NASD rules supplied by Commission alteration or supple-
mentation would not be equated with Commission rules for implied rights purposes
unless one of the two tests in the text were met
On the other hand, rules of the exchanges to which the Commission's, floor trading
and specialists rules refer (see notes 302-04 supra and accompanying text) would be
considered direct substitutes, for the Commission in both instances is exempting from
its own rules on the basis of exchange rules found adequate by it.
Moderately specific NASD requirements would be considered direct substitutes when-
ever there is a similar Commission rule under § 15(b) (10). Such rules would, by
definition, be inapplicable to NASD members. Even though the Commission might not
have power under other sections to impose requirements on NASD members similar to
those imposed under § 15 (b) (10) on nonmembers, the promulgation of a rule under
§ 15 (b) (10) similar to a NASD requirement places the latter squarely in the "direct
1966] 1007
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
to apply, supplies the maximum predictability, and comprehends
the fewest self-regulatory requirements. It would also preserve
parity of treatment and would restrict implied rights to violations
of ethical concepts that demontsrably could be converted into legal
requirements. This approach would focus attention on the differ-
ences between the Commission's regulation of nonmembers and un-
listed companies, and the self-regulators' treatment of their mem-
bers and listed companies. In turn, the Commission would be in-
duced to exercise its powers in adopting what can profitably be bor-
rowed from the self-regulators to apply to over-the-counter com-
panies registered under section 12(g) and to nonmember broker-
dealers.
For example, in applying this test, the street-name-stock rules
of the exchanges would not be considered direct substitutes until
the Commission issues similar section 14(b)417 rules applicable to
broker-dealers not subject to the exchange rules. The NASD's suita-
bility requirements would not be considered direct substitutes un-
til the Commission adopts similar requirements under section 15
(b) (10) ,418 which would be inapplicable to NASD members.419
substitute" category. For example, a nonmember joining the NASD would automati-
cally avoid the § 15(b) (10) rule and become subject to the NASD requirement. And
the scheme established by the 1964 amendments - with 5§ 15(b) (8)-(10) being
applicable only to nonmembers - illustrates the direct substitution which NASD re-
quirements perform. So long as there is no rule under § 15(b) (10) similar to the
NASD requirement, there will, in general, be no Commission regulation for which the
NASD requirement directly substitutes. See also note 419 infra and accompanying text.
The use of § 15(b) (10) rules to establish the direct substitute nature of certain
NASD requirements and thus to base implied rights under the act on violations of such
of the latter as are moderately specific and contain substantial investor-protection pur-
pose can be criticized by arguing that the purpose of §§ 15(b) (8)-(10) was to allow
the Commission to substitute for the NASD and not to establish that the NASD some-
times directly substitutes for the Commission. There would be some irony in using the
gap-closing sections of the 1964 amendments to effect a considerable change in the con-
sequences of violations of certain NASD rules. However, the arguments in the preced-
ceding paragraph for use of § 15 (b) (10) rules in the manner there suggested are
stronger than the counter-arguments. Concerning the possible effect of arbitration rules
and procedures on creation of implied rights for violations of NASD requirements, see
notes 389, 404-05, supra and accompanying text. The chicken-and-egg type of questions
discussed in this and the preceding paragraph are related to the comparability require-
ment underlying §5 15 (b) (8)-( 10) (see notes 268-78, 415, supra and accompanying
text).
417 See text accompanying notes 201, 305-08, 310, 329 supra.
4 1 SExchange Act 5 15(b) (10), 48 Stat. 895 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §
78o(b) (10) (1964).
419 Suitability is discussed in Mundheim, supra note 254; Loss, Book Review, 18 J.
LEGAL ED. 238 (1966). See also notes 406-07, 416 supra and accompanying text.
Article III § 2 of the NASD's Rules of Fair Practice, NASD Manual at D-5, provides
that:
In recommending to a customer the purchase, sale or exchange of any security,
a member shall have reasonable grounds for believing that the, recommenda-
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Violations of the prompt disclosure requirements of exchanges
would not create implied rights under the Act unless the Commis-
sion were to impose similar requirements on unlisted companies
subject to section 13.420
The suggested limited approach to implied rights would also
encourage the maximum feasible Commission reliance upon the
self-regulators. The self-regulators should not object, as private
rights would be implied only where a nonmember or an unlisted
company engaging in the same conduct would be subject to civil
liability because of a violation of law. This approach would also
often enable plaintiffs to frame their complaints without resorting
to fraud or other violation-of-law terminology, which carries with it
a possibility of a stigma for broker-dealers and companies and their
managements.
Judicial extension of implied rights for violation of self-regu-
latory requirements in the limited manner suggested would in-
volve a minimal extension of the principles applied in Borak. Limi-
tation to breaches of self-regulatory requirements that could be im-
posed as a matter of law and that in some cases are so imposed on
companies or broker-dealers outside the self-regulators' require-
ments would restrict federal jurisdiction to those requirements that
are demonstrably important in the federal scheme of regulation.
tion is suitable for such customer upon the basis of the facts, if any, disclosed
by such customer as to his other security holdings and as to his financial situa-
tion and needs.
A recent guideline, NASD Manual at G-7 to G-9, notes that the NASD's rules are
dearly violated when a member recommends speculative low-priced securities to cus-
tomers without knowledge of, or an attempt to obtain information concerning, the cus-
tomers' other securities holdings, their financial situation, and other necessary data.
4 2 0 Fleischer, Securities Trading and Corporate Information Practices: The Im-
plications of the Texas Gulf Sulphur Proceeding, 51 VA. L. REV. 1271, 1295-1300
(1965), discusses the problems involved and points out that good faith judgments
should be deemed compliance. See also notes 406-07 supra and accompanying text.
The listing agreement presently used by the American Stock Exchange contractually
requires prompt public disclosure. CCH AMna STocK ExcH. GUiDE 8955-59 (List-
ing Form L). On the other hand, the NYSE prompt disclosure policy is, with a few
exceptions, not incorporated in the listing agreement currently in use. N.Y. STOcK
Exci-L Co. MAI UAL A-18 to A-28. See also note 333 supra and accompanying text.
The requirements of the exchanges thus may not be "rules of the exchange," but this
distinction should make no difference for implied rights purposes. Cf. notes 233, 344
supra and accompanying text.
The requirements of the exchanges concerning prompt disclosure of material events
go well beyond those of the Commission, which are applicable to listed companies and
over-the-counter companies with a security registered under § 12 (g). The Commission
also imposes certain reporting requirements under § 15(d). For the Commission's
requirements, see Form 8-K. See also Form 10-K (item 4), 17 C.F.R. 5 249.310 (1966
Supp.); Rule 14a-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3 (1966 Supp.) Rule 10b-5 has not been
interpreted as requiring prompt disclosure of material events when neither the company
nor its insiders are trading in the company's securities.
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The limitation to moderately specific requirements would assure
that the standard of conduct to be applied would arrive with con-
siderable content. The two requirements combined would place a
salutary limit on the number of new cases the federal courts would
be asked to consider.
By this type of limited and careful extension of implied private
rights, two congressional purposes will be served. Investor protec-
tion would be strengthened, and the accomplishment of that end
through the maximum feasible reliance upon the self-regulators
would be encouraged.
